Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
Honourable members of the committee, obviously, it's a pleasure to appear before you today to contribute to your review of Canada's Lobbying Act.
As you mentioned, Mr. Chair, I am joined today by Ms. Nejla Saula, head of the OECD's anti-corruption, integrity and open government division, which is responsible for all aspects of lobbying at the OECD, and by Ms. Pauline Bertrand, from the same division, who leads our work on transparency and integrity in relation to lobbying and influence. I'll make a few remarks for context, and my colleagues will answer any of the more technical questions.
I'll start with a few words on the OECD's work in this area. Our work is based on the OECD recommendation on transparency and integrity in lobbying and influence, which was first adopted in 2010 and updated in 2024. The update was quite comprehensive.
An OECD recommendation is a legal instrument, and in this case, a non-binding one, adopted by the OECD council, and thus by the 38 OECD member countries. It sets out agreed-upon principles and standards for public policy to guide countries.
This specific recommendation is now a leading reference and helps public authorities optimize the benefits of lobbying while mitigating the risks of undue or disproportionate influence. This is the first international instrument to take a comprehensive view of the influence ecosystem. It covers all stakeholders engaged in lobbying as well as a whole range of influence tools, from direct representation of interests to communication campaigns and influence exerted on behalf of interests linked to foreign states.
The recent review of the recommendation sought to address the increasingly digital, complex and interconnected nature of influence ecosystems as well as the need to adapt regulatory frameworks accordingly. Today is therefore a particularly timely opportunity to engage in this discussion regarding potential ways to strengthen Canada's Lobbying Act.
Our data show that lobbying remains one of the least regulated areas of public integrity across the OECD. Within this broader context, Canada stands out as having one of the most robust frameworks.
According to the 2025 public integrity indicators that the OECD publishes, Canada is among the strongest performers, in both the strength of its legal framework and its implementation. According to our data, it is fulfilling 80% of the criteria for lobbying regulations and 89% for practice, which are well above the OECD averages of 43% and 38% respectively.
It's also important to note that these indicators focus on the core building blocks of the lobbying framework. As such, while Canada performs strongly on these foundational elements, there remains scope for improvement in more detailed and technical aspects of the regime. In this regard, there is a growing body of international good practices from which Canada can draw inspiration.
Our latest data show that, as of 2025, 61% of OECD countries formally define lobbying in their regulatory frameworks. This progress is particularly striking when viewed in a historical perspective, because 15 years ago, only five OECD countries, including Canada, had formal lobbying regulations in place.
To conclude, I would emphasize that the growing number of integrity rules and reporting requirements is sometimes perceived as a constraint on effective governance. Lobbying regulations may be viewed as burdensome by some who are subject to disclosure obligations. Some public officials may feel that such rules limit their ability to engage freely with stakeholders.
That being said, experience across OECD countries consistently shows that well-designed lobbying frameworks strike a balance between transparency and proportionate compliance. They provide clarity for stakeholders, strengthen accountability and ultimately support better public policy-making, leading to more effective, fair and trusted outcomes.
This is particularly relevant in the Canadian context. According to the OECD 2024 survey on the drivers of trust in public institutions, 49% of respondents in Canada still believe their government would accept corporate lobbying that favours industry interests over those of society, compared to 43% at the OECD level. These are perception data, but perception data are also facts. They are factual perception data.
When nearly half of citizens question their government's resilience to undue influence, even if it is only a perception, this is not a marginal concern. It's a clear call to action.
We are very happy to discuss this further with the committee and to provide any information or comparative insights that may support your study.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair and members of the committee. We welcome any questions you may have.