Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
I spoke on this motion last Friday. I tried to explain why I was objecting to the motion being tabled. I challenged the tabling of the motion by my fellow member Mr. Barrett.
I spoke to a few issues, and that gave me time to reflect over the weekend. I thought about what made the member table his motion, while respecting his initiative and his perspective. Based on his remarks when he presented his motion, he wanted to have transparency.
Once again, I would like to point out something that is of the utmost importance. I'm very proud and very glad to serve on the Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics. However, the number of people who have no confidence in our institutions in general at the federal, provincial and municipal level is a very important factor. That's a problem. I think the same has been said on the other side of the table.
It's up to us as a committee to see how to bring transparency and instill confidence in Canadians. However, again, there's a way to do that. We should not do it in a manner that creates more doubt by presenting Canadians with hypothetical issues. I don't think that's the right way to restore Canadians' confidence. On the contrary, I think that will erode their trust.
Today, I'd like to start by pointing out something that, in my opinion, is fundamental before I get into the heart of the matter. We were selected as members of this committee to undertake serious work. The role of a parliamentary committee is to examine and inform. It is not to pile on, drown out or grandstand. That is precisely why the motion before us today must be reviewed against that objective.
I'm saying this with all due respect for my fellow member Mr. Barrett. I'm also saying this with all due respect for the work of the opposition in general. Parliamentary oversight is a pillar of our democracy. It's a right. It's a responsibility. It's something that members of the committee on this side of the table take very seriously.
However, parliamentary oversight should not be measured by the number of documents reviewed. It doesn't require obtaining all the documents, all the discussions and all the emails pertaining to that matter. In short, parliamentary oversight should not be measured by the number of documents produced. Instead, it should be measured by the calibre of the work accomplished, the relevance of the questions being asked and by rigorous analysis. As such, it's not a matter of obtaining more documents. As we say in Quebec, “enough, already”.
That's where I have a real issue with this motion. I would like to remind the committee of what we're speaking to here, because I think it's important to do so as precisely as possible. The motion moved by the hon. Mr. Barrett has two parts. I think my colleagues mentioned them in detail. The first part requires the Privy Council Office to provide the committee, on the fifteenth day of each month, with a report detailing each time an assessment was undertaken relating to the Prime Minister's conflict of interest screen.
The motion is not just asking for a summary. Had that been the case, we might have understood, but that is not the case. It's asking for the outcome of each analysis. It's asking for records of internal conversations. It's asking for notes. It's asking for meeting minutes. It's asking for emails, text messages and instant messages. It's also asking for the first report to be provided by June 15, 2026 and that it should cover each assessment since the Prime Minister's conflict of interest screen came into effect.
The second part of the motion is asking for the production of the Prime Minister's travel itineraries for international travel since he became Prime Minister. It's asking for a list of each meeting and every attendee, all without redaction. It's asking for all of that in both official languages, which is very reasonable—I fully agree with that—within six weeks.
I want to speak to the specifics, because I completely disagree with the second part, for a number of reasons, and mainly because we have to strike a balance. I want to speak to the issue of transparency, and the issue of security, obviously. However, before I get to that, I would like to take a moment to put what conflict of interest screens are all about into context. In my opinion, it's clear that the committee would be well advised not to lose sight of the real nature of this mechanism.
All of us here had the opportunity to hear remarkable witnesses speak to this subject. We heard from Mr. Michael Sabia, the clerk of the Privy Council. We heard from Mr. Marc‑André Blanchard, the Prime Minister's chief of staff. We also had the privilege to hear testimony from Mr. Konrad von Finckenstein, whose expertise in public law is well established. We learnt a great deal from listening to him and asking him questions. Collectively, what these three individuals told us points to the same important things, and these bear repeating today.
The conflict of interest screen was not invented by this government. It's not something that's being applied for the first time and which we want to be a first. It's not a dubious, opaque mechanism. It's a compliance tool developed under the direction of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner in accordance with the requirements of the Conflict of Interest Act. The commissioner himself validated it. I want to underscore that point. I want to stress that this is a compliance tool developed under the direction of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, who is independent, pertaining to how to apply the requirements of the Conflict of Interest Act. The tool was validated by the commissioner. That is important because the commissioner is an independent entity. Furthermore, the Federal Court has confirmed that the screen is a reasonable and appropriate measure.
Mr. Konrad von Finckenstein, whose neutrality and competency cannot reasonably be put into question, also explained that the screen is a proactive preventive measure. The goal is to stop conflicts of interest before they arise. The commissioner is independent and his level of expertise commands respect. He told us that the screen is a preventive measure. That is very important. The goal is to prevent conflicts of interest before they arise. That's the primary goal. To do so, the people responsible for the documents that come before the Prime Minister review them to determine if they present any potential conflict of interest situation. If such a case arises, the document is simply not brought before the Prime Minister. It is redirected, and the Prime Minister is only made aware when decisions are finalized to ensure he does not influence decisions.
I'm reiterating this for the benefit of the people who are listening to us: These determinations and these testimonies are not coming from me. They were made here, within this committee, in response to questions from members.
I've just provided an overview of the structure of the conflict of interest screen. As such, as soon as a conflict is identified, the document is withdrawn and the Prime Minister is only made aware of it once a decision has been made. That is a well-designed, rigorous and consistent institutional structure. That's what Mr. Sabia described with remarkable clarity.
On his part, Mr. Blanchard went into great detail in his testimony and explained that in practical terms, on a day-to-day basis, the Privy Council Office and the Prime Minister's Office are in constant communication. When a department or agency prepares any document for the Prime Minister, that document is first assessed using the tool developed by the Privy Council with the assistance of the Ethics Commissioner.
If this tool determines that the screen may apply, due diligence is performed and a recommendation is submitted to the clerk of the Privy Council directly. The clerk reviews it and then sends it to the chief of staff. Then both administrators make a joint decision on the matter.
Again, this is not done on the fly. It's a proactive preventive approach. It's not something that's done in the dark. It's a structured, clear, documented and validated process that has passed muster with distinguished experts on the structure. Above all, it should be noted that this is an independent process.
I think that the opposition has not understood this independence. We must remember that here, we have a situation where the procedure is fully structured, clear, documented, explicit and above all, independent.
On his part, Mr. Sabia shared a very important aspect. Every time there is even a remote possibility that the screen may be needed—not that it has to be applied, just that there is some possibility that it might be—it is immediately put in place. The rule is to always err on the side of caution.
I think Mr. Barrett was in attendance when Mr. Sabia said that. The goal is to prevent conflict of interest and to err on the side of caution. That's not the rule for a system that wants to avoid accountability, but rather the rule of a system that takes its obligations very seriously.
Mr. Sabia provided tangible data on 13 situations where the issue of applying the conflict of interest screen came up. Every situation was validated by the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner. Based on principles underlying the assessment tool, the screen did not apply to seven of the situations. It did apply to six situations. The Prime Minister was not aware of four of the six cases. Decisions on the other two cases are now public information. Everybody knows decisions have been made, including the Prime Minister, obviously.
The motion is asking for information. That's why I'm asking questions. I'm wondering where the hon. Michael Barrett is coming from with this motion even though we have all this information and we have answered all the questions.
Despite my limited experience and considering the questions that I asked in committee, I think I can say the system is working well, and that is also what the experts have said. The system, which has been described here in committee, is transparent and it has been documented and validated independently.
Again, I have the following question: Why was this motion tabled?
Aside from the language used in the motion, we need to look at what is behind it, namely, the possible outcome of the motion. The motion seeks to have the committee provided with all kinds of internal assessment processes, discussions, notes and communications each month. It proposes that nothing will be protected, screened or subject to any operational safeguards.
Let me be clear before I go any further: To begin with, I support that all information should be made public. However, at times, some information needs to be protected, but in many cases, that need must be demonstrated. That's not the issue. That is not the same thing as holding people to account.
Holding people to account is one thing. That involves asking questions, and above all, asking specific questions on decisions that have been made. The answers help us assess compliance with the law. We have to ask questions to assess whether obligations have been fulfilled and to verify whether principles have been upheld. That's what the committee does. When we hear from witnesses, we try to see whether existing procedures have been followed, whether directives were actually aligned with the obligations and whether basic principles were actually followed. That is our job.
However, the motion is asking for something else. It has espoused logic that I would never agree with. The logic involves full exposure, without any distinction, prioritization or consideration for institutional repercussions. Speaking of institutional repercussions, we have to ask the following question: Is that really what this committee wants?
The first part of the motion seeks access to internal communications, notes, meeting minutes, emails and text messages, and this is not a trivial matter. It touches on a fundamental part of our system. We have a system of governance with restricted capacity. There is the capacity for public servants to give candid advice. That principle is in place for a good reason. If every preliminary thought, every exploratory discussion and every working note can be taken out of context and made public, this would put significant pressure on the people who are responsible for analyzing complex situations because the people making things public lack context because they were not in attendance. This would make public servants censor themselves or share advice that is less incisive. They are being asked to provide less comprehensive advice. If information is incomplete or unclear, and it is disclosed, then people may be less candid precisely because they know that the opinion may end up in a committee, and then in the media and in the middle of public debate. What will they do when that happens?
Again, we are eroding Canadians' trust. That's a real problem and it's not theoretical. I'm trying to follow the logic of what is being asked for and to set that in motion. It's not theoretical. This could be an issue that is contrary to what this committee is all about.
Now, let us turn to the public servants who work in the Privy Council Office, departments and agencies. Their mandate is to provide the highest level of analysis. Their work hinges on their ability to think and to think freely.
Their work also involves testing assumptions and re-examining preliminary conclusions. If this space for thought is constantly exposed to requests for massive disclosure—and I do mean “massive”—it will shrink. If this space shrinks, the quality of public decisions will suffer. I wasn't the one who said it.
I ask you to go back, to go back to September, since the committee has been sitting. It's very significant. Moreover, I encourage you to listen carefully to what was said by the Information Commissioner. It really pushed me to review the proposed motion. If the space for thought is exposed to requests for massive disclosure, that space shrinks, which means the quality of what's given to the public will really become less interesting.
Once again, what I'm saying here is not based only on the motion but also on the testimonies of the experts who explained these factors to us. These are not assumptions; people who have worked in serious public institutions recognize this reality instantly.
I would also like to raise another point, which is systemic consistency. I disagree with Mr. Barrett, but I respect his work and what he wants to implement. The conflict of interest screen was designed to operate in a certain way. As I said earlier, it's preventive, proactive and allows for upstream action. Its mechanisms are confidential, precisely because confidentiality is a condition of its effectiveness. If the Prime Minister knows that every internal decision on whether to apply the screen will be made public in the coming weeks, including all the discussions that led to it, this will obviously change the very nature of the mechanism, especially for decisions that will take months and months to come to fruition. This is especially the case for any options that our government might be exploring.
I'm not saying that transparency is bad—far from it. Let me repeat: I am in favour of transparency. What I'm saying is that some compliance tools work precisely because they operate within a protected space. It's true in law and it's true in ethics, especially when it comes to ethics in government affairs, and it's true in federal public institutions. Mr. Blanchard explicitly told us that the system currently in place is one of the most comprehensive and rigorous.
Mr. Blanchard has had an extensive career at both the national and international levels. What he is saying is that the current system is one of the most comprehensive and rigorous he has encountered in his career. For his part, he hasn't just had a six-month career; he's had quite a substantial career. He said that he is proactive. Mr. Blanchard adds another aspect: He said he acts preventively and is extremely rigorous due to the high level of awareness within the government. This means that everyone who is either directly or indirectly involved in the procedure I spoke about earlier, which is structured, understands the sensitivity behind the screen that has been put in place. It's very important to remember that.
When I read Mr. Barrett's motion, I wondered if he was telling us that all of this is not enough, that the Ethics Commissioner, who approved this system, also found it insufficient, and that the decision of the Federal Court of Appeal, which recognized it as reasonable, was not enough. That said, maybe I misunderstood what he said.
If that is the reason for Mr. Barrett's opposition, I need a better explanation before proceeding. All weekend, I thought about everything I said here on Friday. We need an explanation, because this requires serious justification.
This is what I'm asking of Mr. Barrett so that we can move forward and gain a better understanding of this motion.
That was the first item of the motion. I will now move on to the second item, which concerns all of the Prime Minister's travel itineraries. It should be noted that, in Mr. Barrett's request, it's even more problematic without redaction. I'll explain why. Let's start with the practical aspect. This refers to all of the Prime Minister's travel since he took office, all meetings, all participants and all related documents in the possession of the Privy Council Office, the Prime Minister's Office or any federal department, in both official languages. Once again, when I say that, I'm not disagreeing. I just want to break down this part of the motion. Particularly with respect to the issue of the two official languages, I'm adamant about it. It also states that it must be sent without redaction and within a period of six weeks. Let's take a moment to gauge what this concretely represents.
Since the Prime Minister took office, the geopolitical situation has been unlike anything we've ever seen before. I think Ms. Lapointe explained it well. We're dealing with instability and with factors, constraints and contexts that are constantly changing. The Prime Minister took office during this time of great international instability. Our country is going through a significant period of geopolitical realignment. Trade relations, security alliances, and multilateral dynamics are all in motion—constant motion, total change—and the Prime Minister has by definition participated in meetings and discussions.
It should also be noted that, when you have this kind of role, meetings can often be exploratory, and other participants in the meeting may not have consented to all the discussions in the meeting potentially becoming public. As I just said, the Prime Minister has by definition participated in discussions that have been unfolding in this context of constant geopolitical change. Some of these meetings may have a delicate diplomatic aspect, some have a national security aspect, and some involve ongoing, progressive negotiations. For this reason, I wonder if it would be a good decision to disclose this information right away, to make it public. Some of these meetings involve partners who have obviously not consented to these discussions becoming public.
Let's go back a little. When we talk about transparency, can we agree that transparency can have legitimate limits? This is not a question of taking an ideological or partisan position; it's a principle recognized in all serious democratic systems. In all self-respecting countries, there are mechanisms that allow for some information to be protected while maintaining an appropriate, respectable and democratic level of parliamentary oversight. I encourage the people on the other side of the room to keep doing it because it's their role. It's the opposition's role. This mechanism exists precisely because we recognize that there can be a tension between two legitimate values.