Thank you.
I support the income trust tax plan, with no increase in grandfathering beyond four years. I strongly urge that the income trust tax plan be enhanced by the addition of prescribed conditions to the Income Tax Act to stop income trusts from reporting deceptive, non-gap financial measures. Cash distribution must be defined as income distribution and return of capital distributions. The cash yield calculation should be restricted unless there is an equally prominent income yield calculation.
The federal government should not be giving tax incentives for an investment targeted to seniors where the product is an unsuitable investment based on the investment objective of secure retirement income and preservation of retirement capital. The high-risk design of income trusts and their deficient investor protection legal framework makes them unsuitable for seniors.
Making matters worse, the tax incentive is promoting the purchase of an investment where there is considerable malfeasance in the financial reporting and marketing material, which I'll speak about in a moment.
I have found that two out of three business income trusts pay distributions well in excess of their incomes. The average amount that the cash distributions are above income is 60%. The sources of the extra money are borrowed money, reserves from prior financing, and not retaining cash to replace plant, machinery, equipment, and software. This financial engineering, without proper transparency, is causing the return of capital to be capitalized as income. This is causing excessive pricing in the market.
In my research “Heads I Win, Tails You Lose”, I found that the business income trust market was trading at a premium of 55% relative to the TSX/S&P60, which comprises sixty of Canada's largest public corporations and a few income trusts. I also compared it to a sample of Canada's non-cyclical public corporations, which comprise the banks, the telcos, the utilities, and the power companies. On that basis, Canadian business income trusts were trading at a 55% premium. Even when I looked at the cashflow from operations, I found that income trusts were trading at a 40% premium. I believe the tax advantages in income trusts contributed 16% of the 55% premiums.
I conclude that the income trust tax plan with a four-year grandfathering period has a 10% negative impact on prices. My calculations differ from the calculations Mr. McKay asked about earlier with respect to what the investment losses have been since October 31 and the announcement of the plan. Business income trusts and energy income trusts, based on a roll-up of each of the individual trusts, are down 13%—up to about two to three days ago—for a loss of $23 billion.
On the basis of my detailed analysis of the tax advantages and the elimination of the premium associated with the tax advantages, it's my opinion that the income tax loss associated with the decision to introduce the income tax plan is $17 billion. This damage is a necessary consequence of a government closing a tax loophole that is not achieving benefits for the economy and is promoting the purchase of an investment by seniors for which this investment is unsuitable.
For a properly diversified portfolio with less than 20% invested in income trusts, the new tax damage is 2%. This is clearly capable of being absorbed by Canadians who invested in this security. Those who have higher losses than this have seen them occur as a result of improper diversification, or perhaps they have suffered the losses as a result of the malfeasance with respect to the improper marketing of income trusts to seniors.
I want to note that on May 3, 2006, the Canadian Accounting Standards Board said that the failure to distinguish clearly between returns on capital and returns of capital is inaccurate and potentially misleading, particularly when terms such as “yield” are used to describe the amount distributed.