That's an extraordinarily good question. We spend a lot of time working on this issue.
First of all, think of the world as one gigantic closed economy. We don't trade with Mars yet, but we trade a lot with each other. What we are experiencing is a rather prolonged period now in which the United States has been the principal absorber of savings. Their savings have not matched their domestic investment, so they've been sucking in imports. Asia and, with the rise in oil prices, the Middle East have been the big suppliers of savings to the world. So you need an adjustment to go on.
Part of that ought to be some appreciation of exchange rates for the Asian countries and the Middle East. Part of the adjustment ought to be that their domestic demand has to grow a bit faster. And part of it is that the U.S. domestic demand is going to have to grow a little bit more slowly over a period of time. That's the basic adjustment that we know has to go on, and it's the basic adjustment we've been pointing to in G-7 communiqués for quite a while now.
The question is, what policies will facilitate this in the smoothest manner to allow the world to continue to grow at something close to 5%? Therein is the great challenge. It's a challenge for everybody, but it's a challenge for us because of the structure of our economy.
What we've been working on is essentially a three-pronged strategy: first, to get more flexibility in exchange rates around the world so that all the burden doesn't fall on countries such as Canada, Australia, and the U.K., which have flexible exchange rates; second, to try to persuade the Asian economies to take the social measures and other measures to reduce the amount of their precautionary savings so that they increase their demand; and finally, of course—the other side of the coin—the United States has to do a little bit to rebalance the weight that goes on consumption.
This is a very tricky thing, and provided everybody is moving roughly in the right direction and roughly quickly enough, the chances of a relatively smooth adjustment to that situation are high. To the extent they're not—or even worse, Mr. Chairman, that they're perceived not to be—playing by these general rules of the game, there's a huge danger of protectionist sentiment building up. For us in Canada, that would be an absolute disaster, because we'd be caught in the tailwind of U.S. protectionism that, at least ostensibly, was aimed at Asia but sweeps us up in the process. That, then, can lead to a downward spiral in global growth.
That's what we as a country, whether in the ministry of finance or whether as ourselves at the Bank of Canada, have been working extraordinarily hard to try to promote. But it's not easy.