Good morning. My name is Steven Staples. I am president of the Rideau Institute, an independent research advocacy and consulting group with demonstrated expertise in defence policy.
I noted that other organizations have been presenting on the issue of defence spending to this topic, and I just want to make it clear that we do not receive funding from the Department of National Defence, which may differentiate us from others.
I would like to thank you for giving me the opportunity to present my recommendations on spending reform in the Department of National Defence to contribute to the goal of balancing the budget.
The first recommendation is for the Government of Canada to reduce national defence departmental spending, with the goal of returning to pre-September 2001 levels.
Second, we recommend a review of planned equipment spending to ensure that projects still meet Canada's national defence priorities.
Finally, the Department of National Defence equipment spending oversight should be increased by establishing a parliamentary committee or subcommittee to be responsible for major crown projects.
In response to the events of September 11, 2001, Canada, along with others, undertook an extensive program of defence procurement, weapons acquisition, and operational expansion. We've estimated that this, along with other public security spending increases, amounts to about $92 billion in nominal spending, as we put out in our report earlier this year, and $69 billion adjusted for inflation over the last 10 years has been added to overall national security spending since the terrorist attacks on the United States.
A decade later, the Canadian military mission in Afghanistan is winding down, the country's international obligations have shifted, and the global financial crisis has developed into the primary threat to the livelihood of Canadians. Despite these changes, however, Department of National Defence spending will reach $22.2 billion in 2010-11, a level 19% higher than it was at the end of the Cold War. In fact, we are now spending more on defence, in adjusted dollars, than at any time since the Second World War. It is 40% higher than the year before the attacks of 2001.
In other areas, the government has responded to the financial crisis by developing plans to balance the budget, reduce public sector spending, and require departments to demonstrate the need for new spending programs. In the field of defence, however, the government plans to divert an additional $1 billion to capital spending within the budget over the next two years, with particular emphasis on equipment procurement. These levels of spending are unsustainable in the future and have been set without adequate demonstration that the benefits to the security of Canadians will outstrip these significant economic costs.
That brings us to the need for a comprehensive review of planned equipment spending. The ambitious build-up of the last decade has allowed military equipment programs to proceed without always ensuring that the new material is essential to defence or that these billion-dollar procurements are acquired in an open and transparent manner. The selection of the F-35 stealth fighter for the next-generation fighter capability project provides a prime example of the drawbacks of the current spending scheme. The F-35 program, which includes no contract, contains zero offsets, so there are no guaranteed jobs from it, and includes no guaranteed cost, is the product of a non-competitive contract system that appears to be driven by private interests rather than Canadian security considerations, which should always be the main determiner of military spending.
The long-term success of improvements to the equipment procurement process and of efforts towards a return to pre-2001 spending levels in the Department of National Defence depends on increasing parliamentary oversight of these spending programs. The Parliamentary Budget Office, the Office of the Auditor General of Canada, and other fiscal monitoring agencies have repeatedly cautioned against the continued increase in defence spending programs, to little avail. A mechanism to systematically inform parliamentarians of developments in major crown projects, such as a subcommittee on major crown projects of the Standing Committee on Government Operations and Estimates, would be a useful tool to provide greater oversight and curtail overambitious capital equipment costs.
In light of the major shipbuilding announcement yesterday, this is even more critical.
Supporters of a continued defence buildup will argue that military spending cannot be considered discretionary and that a return to 2001-level defence funding will entail a reduction in the security of Canadians. This argument ignores the changing realities of the Canadian security situation a decade after 9/11, as well as the threat to economic security that unchecked defence spending poses to Canadian taxpayers. A responsible, transparent, and more democratically accountable attitude towards military spending, with the goal of returning to pre-September 11 spending levels, is the best means of ensuring long-term defence sustainability.