In terms of the financial transaction tax, I think it's always a little difficult answering that question, for two reasons. First, the prospect of a global financial transaction tax is extremely low. In fact, I would say that it's null, so we're into the realm of the hypothetical. The second reason it's difficult is that the proponents' reasons for a financial transaction tax are varied. Sometimes it's a revenue exercise for a very worthy objective, but it's a revenue exercise. Sometimes it's to stop certain types of bad behaviour or perceived bad behaviour.
Let me try to address the second one. What are some of the reasons you would have with a financial transaction tax? What are you trying to get at? The first is to raise additional revenue, obviously, from the financial sector, feeling that the financial sector as a whole doesn't pay sufficient sums. That's a political decision. Different countries will come to different views.
There are better ways to tax banks. Taxing the profits of banks is the most effective way to do it. It causes the fewest distortions. It will raise the most money.
We had a long experience in this country of taxing the capital of banks, which was a terrible idea, because it, of course, discouraged them from having adequate capital, which we've learned from the last crisis was not a good idea. That was phased out over the course of the last decade, and I commend various governments for having done that.
If it's to raise money from the sector, we would advocate taxing the profits, as is done. The banks, as Mr. Goodale and others know, are large payers into the federal fisc.
The second reason one might have a financial transaction tax is to reduce so-called wholesale funding of banks. In other words, it is not the retail deposits that everyone around this table and your constituents put into banks; it is borrowing in the markets. That type of borrowing, particularly if it's short term, is riskier than retail deposits. It can move quickly away from an institution that's perceived to be in trouble, and those perceptions can become reality. So sometimes there is a desire to use a tax to reduce that type of behaviour.
Again, there's a better way to do it, but it doesn't raise revenue. It's through various liquidity standards that actually encourage institutions to have longer-term borrowing rather than short-term borrowing, and borrowing that more closely matches their assets. It is part of the Basel reforms, the so-called Basel III reforms, that are being put in place now through to the end of this decade. They are actually being implemented. There are liquidity standards, both short- and long-term liquidity standards, and they will dramatically change the incentive of financial institutions to borrow too much in the short term.
The third reason you might have a financial transaction tax, from a policy perspective, is to reduce “speculation” and churning in the markets, or actual market behaviour. The strategy there is to adjust the capital requirement for the trading books of banks. As part, again, of the Basel III reforms, the capital requirement for the trading book of a financial institution--the capital you put against all those people who are sitting in those dealing rooms and what they are doing--has tripled. That is being put in place from the end of this year. And that will significantly increase that requirement, which is going to, on the margin, reduce this type of activity.
The last point, just to go back to where I started, is that the reason it is not going to come into place, in our view, is that there is significant opposition to it, because it is the second, third, or fourth best way of addressing various issues. Unless everybody does it, activity is going to flow to those jurisdictions where they don't do it. The experience of Sweden and others, who had variants of this tax in the eighties and nineties, has been that they lose money in net terms, because the level of activity that goes abroad is so significant that it overcomes any [Inaudible--Editor].
I missed the second bit.