Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee.
Thank you for the opportunity to contribute to the committee's review. I will be giving my presentation in English but would be happy to answer questions in English or French.
I am an Advisor on Beneficial Ownership and Anti-Money Laundering with Transparency International Canada. I'm a former Deputy Director of FINTRAC and former Director General with the CRA's criminal investigation directorate.
Transparency International Canada is a member of the world's leading non-governmental anti-corruption organization, with more than 100 chapters worldwide and an international secretariat in Berlin. TI Canada has been at the forefront of our national anti-corruption and transparency agenda.
TI Canada welcomes the review of PCMLTFA. We recognize and support the work played by all the anti-money laundering/anti-terrorism financing partners in Canada and the critical role reporting entities play as a first line of defence in this fight.
We will be providing to this committee and the Department of Finance a more comprehensive submission on our recommendations. As we don't have much time, I would like to move directly to TI Canada's five key recommendations.
First, TI Canada recommends implementation of a nationally integrated, publicly accessible beneficial ownership registry of corporations in an open data format. The registry would be a one-stop shop with registrars, or a registrar, having appropriate powers to apply proportionate and dissuasive sanctions when information is untruthful.
Also, the act should be amended to require all reporting entities, including what are called DNFBPs—basically the ones that are not financial entities or institutions, such as real estate, which is now exempt from the obligation to identify beneficial ownership—to determine and verify the identity of the beneficial owner; determine if their customers are politically exposed persons, family members, or associates; and ensure that no accounts are opened or financial transactions completed until the beneficial owner has been identified, with their identity verified by a government-approved ID. Of course, this recommendation will be facilitated by the implementation of a publicly accessible beneficial ownership registry.
Canada needs to make beneficial ownership transparent. In Canada, more rigorous identity checks are done for individuals getting library cards than for those setting up companies. We need a proactive corporate registry function harmonized and integrated across Canada with powers to audit, compel information, apply sanctions, and detect and report suspicious activities.
Pending final legislative approvals, all 28 European Union member states are expected to implement a public registry by the end of 2019. A majority of the 37 FATF members—the international standard-setting body on money laundering—are expected to implement a publicly accessible beneficial ownership registry. It's not a stretch to anticipate that such a public registry will be the new FATF standard in a few years. That's the standard Canada should meet.
We welcome the positive steps the finance ministers announced on December 11, 2017 to ensure appropriate authorities know who runs which corporations in Canada. However, we believe they must go further. They must make the registry publicly accessible and look to also create a registry of trusts.
A public registry will allow all reporting entities, the public, and the media to work together to prevent and dissuade the abuse of corporations and trusts by secretive beneficial owners. This will lighten the burden on reporting entities and anyone doing business with corporations to more accurately assess their business risks. A publicly accessible registry is an investment in prevention. It would also ensure that Canada keeps up with international best practices such as those adopted by the UK and our new EU free trade partners.
Second, Canada's 2015 risk assessment was clear: legal professionals are inherently highly vulnerable to money laundering. The FATF evaluation of Canada also highlighted the gap created by the absence of lawyers from the AML/ATF regime and the lack of scope in their own regime. Without an independent expert assessment, Canadians have little information to be assured that the legal profession's rules and practices meet the current Canadian standards set by the act or even the FATF standards in protecting against money laundering and terrorist financing.
We recommend that the government bring legal professionals into the ALM/ATF regime in a constitutionally compliant way. The Solicitors Regulation Authority that regulates solicitors in England and Wales is a model that the Federation of Law Societies of Canada and the government should seriously explore.
We also recommend that the act should designate as high risk all financial transactions by legal professionals, especially those using trust accounts, and require reporting entities to take enhanced due diligence measures on those transactions, including determining the beneficial owner and the source of funds.
Third, we recommend strengthening the regime by expanding the number of DNFBPs covered under the act, as per the Department of Finance’s recent consultation paper, especially for non federally regulated mortgage lenders because of the high vulnerability of real estate to money laundering.
We understand from law enforcement that money laundering charges by prosecutors are abandoned because of the complexity of linking money laundering to the predicate offence. The government should consider recklessness or gross negligence as a standard of proof.
This leads to our fourth recommendation, that the government bring Criminal Code amendments to make money laundering easier to investigate and prove, and that resources for police and prosecutors be re-examined to better support enforcement. Otherwise, laws without adequate enforcement are meaningless.
Concluding with our fifth recommendation, we recommend that comprehensive annual reports be published by the Government of Canada, in collaboration with all provinces and territories, on the AML/ATF regime’s results for all Canadian jurisdictions, including the number of compliance violations, penalties issued, money laundering investigations, charges laid, prosecutions, convictions, forfeitures, and seizures, as well as activities by the Canada Border Services Agency that are related to the act.
We believe that more information and transparency should be available publicly on the results of the AML/ATF regime.
Thank you for the time you have offered us to speak today. I’d be happy to answer your questions.