Thank you. I'll go quickly to my remarks.
Mr. Chair, vice-chairs and members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity to address the changes to the PBO's mandate and operations, as set out in Bill C-44.
You have in your hands a discussion paper that outlines the major implications these changes could have on the PBO's effectiveness and ability to provide services to members of the Senate and House of Commons.
There is a paradox in the drafting of this bill. In the introduction, the new mandate is well written and respects the spirit of the PBO's role, as evidenced in proposed section 79.01:
Sections 79.1 to 79.5 provide for an independent and non-partisan Parliamentary Budget Officer to support Parliament by providing analysis, including analysis of macro-economic and fiscal policy, for the purposes of raising the quality of parliamentary debate and promoting greater budget transparency and accountability.
The paradox comes later when the bill imposes restrictions on this independence, in addition to undermining the PBO’s ability to effectively and efficiently respond to Parliament's requests. The most restrictive restrictions include, first, the degree of control that the Speakers of the Senate and the House of Commons will be expected to exercise over the office of the PBO’s activities; second, the limits of the PBO’s ability to initiate reports and members’ abilities to request cost estimates of certain proposals; third, the risks flowing from the PBO’s involvement in preparing cost estimates of election proposals; and finally, the restrictions on the PBO’s access to and—this is important—disclosure of information, and the lack of an effective remedy for refusals to provide access to information.
I see no problem in submitting a work plan to the Speakers. However, the PBO would become the only officer of Parliament to require the approval of both Speakers for his or her annual work plan. It seems clear to me that this will place considerable pressure on the two Speakers in regard to their neutrality, particularly during an election year and especially in the absence of a joint committee that has yet to be created.
Furthermore, if one adds to that obligation that the direction and control of the office of the PBO and its officers is vested in the Speakers, it is easy to see how time-consuming it could become for them and their own administration. That is why I'm fairly confident that this aspect of the bill will be reviewed and revised by the government.
The current wording of paragraph 79.2(1)(f), which deals with the freedom of any member of the Senate or House of Commons to request an estimate of the financial cost of any proposal, can be interpreted in more than one way and should be clarified.
Lastly, with respect to access to information, the absence of any mention of a remedy in the event of a refusal suggests that it will be up to the two Speakers to intervene in the event that a department or agency refuses to provide information requested by the PBO, or refuses that information be released by the PBO. This too could exert additional pressure on the two Speakers, and create a challenge for their staff, which will have to manage these matters of parliamentary privilege.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.