Mr. Chairman, it was not that much of an effort. It's a privilege to be with you and your members this afternoon.
The issue of large-scale infrastructure investment, as we all know, is foremost about stewardship, but sadly, in most of the developed countries, our eyes, so to speak, have always been larger than our stomachs. We all want lots of it, but only a few governments, particularly the Government of Germany, have been sufficiently responsive in trying to pay for the trillions of dollars worth of investment that we need.
Public investments, whether in surface transportation projects, electricity transmission projects, and broadband especially, and airports, and wastewater projects, are at some of their lowest levels since records have been kept. We know these massive deficits persist despite the fact that infrastructure investment is perfectly poised to take advantage of the growth sectors in energy, driverless vehicles, and clean tech, which are now starting to wash over all of manufacturing. It's especially despite the fact that a nationwide decade-long program of infrastructure investment, with its massive multiplier effects throughout the whole of an economy, is best positioned to close persistent real unemployment gaps—which in the United States are in the order of an additional 5%, even though we have had nominal full employment as of the last month.
America's overall deficit in revenue-generating infrastructure is estimated by the American Society of Civil Engineers to be $3.3 trillion, of which a trillion and a half dollars is clearly outside the capabilities of our state and municipal budgets. This is why the infrastructure issue was one of the four main platform pillars of our November 2016 national election. President Trump, Secretary Clinton, and Senator Bernie Sanders each called for spending in excess of $1 trillion on public infrastructure, but at the time of the election, only Secretary Clinton had begun to settle on how to best pay for such massive investments, using perhaps the structure we will discuss this afternoon, which I advised her on.
To address investment shortfalls, there are usually only three meaningful infrastructure funding alternatives in the developed countries. In my opinion, two of them immediately fail, because they are each too small and too politicized. The first of the two alternatives that fail are smallish block grants, whether they're authorized by our Congress or your Parliament, of the sort we've seen for decades. The second alternative is a so-called budgetary cap, devoted exclusively to investments in infrastructure, since budgetary caps in the developed countries, whether for defence or non-defence spending, typically do not provide opportunities to allocate funds for infrastructure. In my opinion, however, it's practically impossible under appropriations bills to depoliticize, and especially to fairly prioritize, infrastructure projects spread over the myriad of states, provinces, or municipalities. Most importantly, neither alternative comes anywhere close to meeting the massive needs figures of our respective countries.
In short, we believe that only sensitively developed national infrastructure banks address the limitations and obstacles that exist. The bank we are proposing for the United States would be a wholly-owned government corporation with non-partisan directors appointed by the President and confirmed by our Senate. By law, the bank's investment decisions would be made in a transparent, non-partisan manner. In order to make the bank as responsive as possible to different infrastructure needs across our country, it would, like our Federal Reserve, be regionalized into operating districts. Notably, the bulk of the bank's capital structure—fully 90% of the total—would come from relatively low-interest rate loans to the bank by our nation's large state and municipal pension plans, and by certain sovereign wealth funds such as Norway's and Kuwait's. Only the remaining 10% would be appropriated by Congress, and that would be in the form of shared first-dollar-of-loss guarantees of the bank's loans to infrastructure projects.
In specific terms, $1.35 trillion of the bank's capitalization would come from large fiduciaries, and the first $300 billion of loss—if any—on the bank's project loans would be shared fifty-fifty between the bank and the U.S. Treasury. It is the fiduciary plans' relatively low expectations of the rates of return on their fixed income portfolios of just 2% to 3% that match up best, Mr. Chairman, with the vital objective of achieving for the bank the lowest possible cost of capital—which, unfortunately, has never been the case with so-called P3s, as we can elaborate.
Of course, the plans will be induced to invest in the bank by the support available to them from the shared federal guarantee. In considering this particular bank structure, it's especially important to note that, because the financial default rate on public infrastructure projects is consistently de minimis—in the order of just 1% or less—our particular Office of Management and Budget, what we refer to as the OMB, should be based both on precedent and on the very low risk profile of the shared federal guarantees...“score” for Congress only the cost of any actual drawn down federal guarantee payments—and then only if and when these support payments are made.
The major reason that the federal guarantee would score so little, or not at all, is that the borrowers would typically pay a very small guarantee fee that is set over time to cover anticipated costs of defaults. Since well-run credit programs usually run at "zero subsidy", this should mean in the specific case of our proposed U.S. national infrastructure bank little or zero actual cost to American taxpayers.
Almost 10 years ago this month, we started out with the non-partisan objectives of best financing the more than $1 trillion of needed infrastructure projects while minimizing the federal government's contribution, and also of fairly prioritizing projects given the broad array of projects in our very physically large country. We believe that our suggested national infrastructure bank would meet these goals.
It will be a privilege, Mr. Chairman, to hear from you and your members on some of this work in the Q and A.
Thank you very much.