Clearly we've tailored our programs to be right-sized for the problem when it's occurring and not to replace private markets when it's not, when the problem has been resolved. That's why our short-term lending programs, lending for one year or less, or buying securities for one year or less, have been rolled off. They were great to use when markets were dysfunctional, but when market functioning was restored, they became expensive. So as we intended, banks and other market participants just started to use the regular programs at the regular private markets. I think that's extremely good news.
It's trying to see how much is flowing to people and what would have happened if we hadn't done that. We need a counterfactual. In our financial system review, we did two experiments. They're going to be imperfect, but I would direct you to those. There are chart 14 and chart 15, on which we said, okay, what would arrears be in our worst-case scenario that we had in our monetary policy report in April for households if we had not helped banks do the deferrals and if the deferrals had not been put in place? You can see that the arrears would have been much higher without that.
We do a similar experiment saying, okay, what would have happened if there were no government programs to households and businesses in terms of their non-performing loans? That's not a good thing for the financial system, but it's not a good thing for businesses or people either.
That's a way to get a sense of how much we could have helped. It's always hard to give a caveat around counterfactuals, but we've tried to do that work, and it shows that the effects are quite large. The positive effects are quite large.