If I may, I will answer your question.
We raised two main problems with the external handling of complaints in the banking sector. The first problem is essentially solved by Bill C-47. It is the ability of banks to choose which external body will handle consumer complaints. Up until now, banks have had the option of choosing between two bodies to deal with complaints they received from their clients. Clearly, this is a very specific situation that, from consumers' point of view, raises a number of questions about the independence and impartiality of the body that will make decisions concerning banks. It also adds complexity to the system. Creating a system where a single body handles external complaints is a good part of this bill.
However, the problem that will remain and that will not be solved by Bill C-47 is that this body's decisions will not be binding, as you mentioned. The decisions made will only be recommendations to the banks and, theoretically, they will not be required to follow them.
So we can imagine a scenario where a consumer files a complaint against their bank, wins a case in a decision by the ultimate decision-making body, but the bank simply refuses to implement the recommendation. The consumer then ends up having to turn to the courts and fight in court, which can be quite difficult, considering the means at banks' disposal.
We see this as an unacceptable risk to consumers. If a system is created that is supposed to be impartial and fair, there is no reason for the decisions made by the external body not to be binding.