Thank you, Madam Chair and members of the committee. I am very pleased to be testifying before you today.
My name is Julien Martin and I am a professor in the economics department of the l'Université du Québec à Montréal, or UQAM.
Several years ago, I participated in a study in which it was estimated that about 7% of corporate tax revenue in Canada disappears each year into tax havens. Gabriel Zukman and his co‑authors concluded that the figure was 9%. So between 7% and 9% of Canada's revenue disappears into tax havens every year, representing a significant revenue shortfall, weakening our ability to fund public services and eroding the public trust in their institutions. This therefore directly affects Canada's interests, as it does those of many other countries.
Given these facts, I would like to stress four points that I believe to be important and that may inform this committee's deliberations. The first three are drawn directly from my research and the final one relates more to future challenges.
The first point I want to make is that tax evasion through tax havens is an extremely granular phenomenon. What do I mean by that? In a 2018 paper, Ronald Davies, Mathieu Parenti and Farid Toubal showed that French multinational firms were manipulating transfer prices to shift profits earned in France to low-tax countries. In addition to showing that there was evidence of prices being manipulated and profits shifted, that article established that most of the tax avoided through these practices was the work of only 450 corporations and concerned ten tax havens. Since that study, other more recent research using other databases has confirmed that the use of tax havens and tax evasion by multinationals involves a very small number of very large corporations operating in a limited number of tax havens. This aspect, the high granularity and extreme concentration of this conduct in the hands of a few big multinationals, needs to be taken into account when considering this issue and seeking to legislate in this regard.
My second point is that tax avoidance does not only affect government revenues, it also hurts the real economy. As we often think, tax avoidance means less revenue for the government. What a recent paper by Mathieu Parenti and Farid Toubal shows is that a firm that avoids tax procures a competitive advantage over its competitors, allowing it to sell more than the others. In the United States, it has been demonstrated that in certain sectors, more large firms than small firms avoid tax. It therefore gives these large firms a competitive advantage and strengthens their dominant position. The takeaway from this second point is therefore that tax avoidance is not just a question of public revenue; it also impacts the real economy. In particular, it tends to distort competition. When we consider tax policy, it must not be considered in isolation from competition policy; rather, it must be considered alongside it.
The third point I would like to make is that Canada is relatively poor in terms of research-accessible data on issues related to tax havens and tax avoidance. Studying tax avoidance, the use of tax havens and their implications requires very detailed data, and I have been able to do this with French or American data. In the case of Canada, however, I have not had access to this data, and very few researchers, if any, have access to it. It must be noted that under the OECD's BEPS project on tax base erosion and profit shifting, large multinationals are required to report, country by country, sales, profits, taxes paid and employment, among other things. That kind of data enables us, as researchers, to better understand what is happening, in any case as regards Canada. Several countries, including EU members and Australia, are passing legislation to make this data publicly available. Canada could potentially follow this path. This is data that is already being collected. At present, it is not made public by Canada, but that is a direction that Canada could take.
My final point, which is more prospective, relates to international co-operation in connection with tax avoidance. We must keep in mind that one of the recent major advances in international co-operation focused precisely on taxing multinationals and combatting tax havens. A few years ago, the framework developed by the OECD under the BEPS project led nearly 140 countries to agree on a two-pillar solution. One of the things established by the second pillar is a global minimum tax of 15% on multinationals. The United States appears to want to withdraw from the second pillar—
