Madam Chair and members of the committee, thank you for the invitation to testify today.
My name is Peter MacKenzie. I'm a senior policy analyst at the C.D. Howe Institute, where I lead the financial services research initiative and the financial regulatory excellence initiative.
My remarks today will draw on the institute's work on household balance sheets, financial stability and the housing market.
Canada has G7-leading household debt levels and rising consumer insolvencies. These are concerning, but they do not signal a systemic crisis. The banking system is resilient, aggregate household net worth is at a record high, and pressure on household cash flow has eased from its 2023 peak.
Severe pressure is concentrated in specific groups, including younger Canadians and highly leveraged homeowners in large cities like Toronto and Vancouver. Policy response should be calibrated to that distributional reality.
Let me start first with the aggregate picture. The measure most often cited in public debate about household debt is on household debt relative to disposable income. This ratio rose from about 114% in 2000 to a peak of 188% in 2022. It has since declined to 173%. That number alone does look alarming, and it is. Households have more debt than income.
The measure that actually tracks a household's capacity to pay is the debt service ratio, or DSR. The DSR is the share of household income going to principal and interest payments on outstanding debt. When interest rates fall or income rises, a household can carry more debt without a larger share of income going to payments. The DSR was largely flat over the same period that household debt income ratio rose dramatically. The DSR stood at 15% at the end of 2019, climbed to a record 15.2% in 2023 as the Bank of Canada hiked rates, and has since eased to 14.5% in the fourth quarter of 2025 as rates have come down.
The banking sector has absorbed the shock. In fact, the IMF's 2025 financial system stability assessment found Canadian banks and non-bank financial institutions generally resilient to severe solvency and liquidity shocks. OSFI's annual risk outlook, released earlier this month, identifies real estate-secured lending among its top risks while concluding that institutions remain well positioned to navigate the environment. Both documents point in the same direction of system-level resilience with some serious tail distributional stress.
Now, looking at that tail risk and part where there is stress or where the household distribution is hurting, we see younger Canadians. Looking at the Bank of Canada's Canadian survey of consumer expectations for the fourth quarter of 2025 shows that Canadians aged 25 to 54 reported a record 27% probability of missing a debt payment. Nearly half of those aged 18 to 24 expected to miss a payment. Canadians aged 55 and older reported just under a 1% chance of missing a payment. Household net worth reached a record $18.6 trillion at the end of 2025, but the wealthiest 20% of households hold the majority of that increase. Younger Canadians who did not yet own assets or homes have participated little in the gains.
I'll make a further point on the rise in insolvency filings. A filing can mean two very different things. A household is cash flow insolvent when it cannot meet monthly payments out of its current income, even if its assets exceed its debts. It is balance sheet insolvent when its debts exceed its assets outright.
A homeowner in Toronto, for instance, who might be facing a payment shock at renewal, is more likely to be cash flow insolvent. The equity in the home is there, but the monthly room to make the payment is not. A renter in their 20s carrying unsecured debt without assets is more likely to be balance-sheet insolvent. These two situations call for different policy responses.
Finally, this brings me to my three recommendations.
First, federal agencies should centre their public reporting on household financial health on the debt service ratio and how it varies across income, age and region, rather than other indicators such as debt-to-GDP or debt-to-income ratios. The breakdown will show that stress is concentrated in two groups, highly leveraged homeowners and younger Canadians.
Second, the Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy should publish statistics that distinguish cash flow insolvency from balance sheet insolvency.
Third, federal infrastructure, immigration settlement and transfer design should be oriented towards growing mid-sized Canadian cities into economic alternatives to larger cities like Toronto and Vancouver. Canadians who move to those cities for work are more likely to take on outsized mortgages to afford a home, and each buyer joins a highly leveraged segment. Policies often focus on demand-side measures that shift where pressure lands, but they do not reduce that pressure.
Adding supply only within larger cities does not resolve affordability on its own, because in-migration from smaller centres follows—