Thank you, Mr. Chair.
It will be nice to get back to the topic of today's study.
Mr. Laplante, I get the impression that, in Canadian history in general, the federal government has, intentionally or unintentionally, taken advantage of crises to—with the provinces' consent—centralize unemployment insurance at one point, centralize part of natural resource policy through the national energy program at another, impose more conditions in the 1990s, and impose new programs linked to the federal spending authority during the pandemic.
Currently, in the crisis stemming from tariffs, we see the federal government interfering in workforce training, albeit delicately, by taking the necessary detours, but it remains, in principle, interference.
Do you believe that, generally speaking, crises have benefited centralization? After such crises, does the federal government tend to return to its natural role or to retain the powers it assumed during the crises?