I'd like to thank you for inviting me to speak to you today.
I'm here because the Coast Guard's marine communications officers believe that the Coast Guard is acting recklessly to close traffic and communication centres, putting our coasts and the people who live, work, and play in these waterways in danger.
Before I get into more detail, I want to briefly discuss my qualifications.
I grew up in Vancouver and have lived on the west coast for over 35 years. I spent 12 years in the Canadian Armed Forces as an electronics technician, which gave me the opportunity to travel across the country. After a training accident, I was released from the armed forces in 1992 and joined the Canadian Coast Guard as a marine traffic regulator in Vancouver. I transferred to Comox in 1997. Since consolidation was announced in 2012, I have worked in the Vancouver MCTS until it closed, on assignment there, and in the Victoria MCTS as well, because of short-staffing. While working in Victoria MCTS, I requalified to work in all the vessel traffic and safety positions at that centre.
When I started working for the Coast Guard in Vancouver in 1992, vessel traffic services and Coast Guard radio were separate but complementary. VTS is much like air traffic control for ships, and the main function of Coast Guard radio is to act like a 911 radio service for mariners.
During the 1990s, something very important happened to this country's Coast Guard that I want you to reflect on. My union recognized that new technology, such as cellphones and satellite communications, would soon make some of the work they did and the offices they performed redundant. The union presented the Coast Guard with a proposal to merge Coast Guard radio and vessel traffic services. The merger of these two services would create greater efficiencies by combining operations and would allow a reduction in staffing through attrition rather than layoffs. The savings from this merger would be about $14.5 million a year.
After consultation with stakeholders and a risk assessment were completed, the Coast Guard agreed. Between 1995 and 1999, 30 Coast Guard radio stations and 14 vessel traffic services centres were closed or merged together to form 22 marine communications and traffic services across the country.
During the reorganization, the technology was available at that time to combine Vancouver traffic, Vancouver radio, and Comox radio into one centre, but this was not done for important operational reasons.
The first was emergency backup. Due to the locations of the three centres, if any one centre lost communications, the other two would be able to cover the gap, thus helping to ensure the safety of mariners travelling in this area. The workload and vessel traffic complexity that would have resulted was too great for one centre.
Next was training. It could take up to two years to train an employee to work in such a large and complex centre. It was felt that breaking the centre up would result in a higher retention rate because trainees would be given an opportunity to be more successful. Also, the fact was that the building that housed Comox Coast Guard radio had just been opened in 1993 and was designed to allow for expansion without having to do any major construction.
As a result, Vancouver traffic was split up, with one part moved to Comox in 1996. In 1998 and 1999, the remaining part was split into Vancouver and Victoria. In other words, marine communications officers have not just consented but have initiated policy discussions about consolidation of bases. What's happened over the last few years is very different, and we cannot sign off on the latest round of closures for public safety reasons.
One of these reasons is disaster management. As previously mentioned, the building housing the Comox MCTS centre was opened in 1993. Comox MCTS is the only Coast Guard communications centre in B.C. that is not located in a tsunami zone and is built to earthquake standards. The building is located approximately 100 feet above sea level on Cape Lazo, with a commanding view of the northern Strait of Georgia. All vessel traffic transiting the inside passage must pass by this point. If Comox is allowed to close, our west coast communications network could be paralyzed in the event of a tsunami event.
Beyond natural disaster, the closure of Coast Guard centres has not adequately considered officer workload and expertise. The Coast Guard has closed nine of the 22 centres in Canada. The decision was made without consulting industry, mariners, the public, or the union.
In B.C., three of the five centres were scheduled to close. The Tofino MCTS centre was closed and the work moved to Prince Rupert in April of 2015, without any of the previously qualified and trained officers moving. Vancouver MCTS was closed in May of 2015 and the work was moved to Victoria. Only five of the 11 officers actually moved.
The Comox MCTS centre is scheduled to close in May, and the work will also be moved to Victoria. Eleven officers are required to move with the work; six to eight officers may actually move. This will increase the staffing shortage already felt in Victoria even further and result in overtime costs that could reach $2.2 million per year. These shortages have resulted in occasions where members have worked for 30 days in a row or more.
As a result, the first, second, and fourth-busiest MCTS centres in the country are to be combined into one centre in Victoria that will be carrying over 40% of the MCTS workload of the entire country.
I'd like to conclude by summarizing my members' concerns and policy recommendations.
On tsunami alerting, Comox MCTS is the Coast Guard's tsunami alerting centre and is the only Coast Guard communication centre on the west coast that is not in a tsunami zone. With regard to emergency backup, keeping Comox MCTS open helps to ensure that radio coverage of the busy lower Strait of Georgia and the approaches to Vancouver harbour are maintained in case of a central outage.
On costs, the costs associated with moving Comox MCTS to Victoria—up to $1 million for relocation, $2.2 million a year for overtime due to short-staffing, and the cost to train new staff—far outweigh the cost of keeping it open, which would be between $400,000 and $500,000 a year.
As for staffing, keeping Comox MCTS open helps to ensure that the shortage of staff at Victoria MCTS is not made worse by the departure of experienced staff when Comox closes. The Coast Guard regional management in B.C. was so concerned about this that they asked Coast Guard management in Ottawa to delay the closure until at least October of this year, and to possibly keep the centre open.
With regard to workload, relocating Comox MCTS to Victoria would set up a scenario in which over 40% of the MCTS workload in Canada would be handled from one location.
With regard to local knowledge, local knowledge is very important because local people often use local names for places. For instance, in the Comox vessel traffic zone, there are two places called Twin Islands, two places called God's Pocket, and two places called Hole-in-the-Wall. Over half of the staff will not be relocating if Comox MCTS closes, and this will result in the loss of knowledge that cannot be easily replaced.
On technical problems, there are concerns that relocating Comox MCTS could result in the same echo problems that have plagued other MCTS centres since they were modernized.
As for marine safety, in his mandate letter the minister was asked to improve marine safety. How does closing the only MCTS centre in B.C. that is not in a tsunami zone improve marine safety?
The government's decision to reopen the Kitsilano Coast Guard base has sent a strong signal to British Columbians that public safety, the protection of property, and the integrity of the environment are worth protecting. The federal government should apply these principles to the important work of the Coast Guard's west coast marine traffic safety monitoring and cancel the closure of the Comox MCTS centre.
A moment ago I briefly referred to technical problems, specifically the problems with the communications control system, or CCS, that is currently being used in many of the communications centres. It's the new technology. This technology has been plagued with issues since its implementation, which started in 2012. The problems with CCS are systemic.
To give you a better understanding, I brought along a recording of a Coast Guard transmission, which was obtained through freedom of information. The audio exchange originates from a marine traffic and communications service centre in Iqaluit, which was the first centre to be modernized. It clearly demonstrates that at times Coast Guard transmissions are unintelligible.
[Audio presentation]