Fisheries Committee on March 31st, 2022

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken McDonald]

I'll call this meeting to order.

Welcome to meeting number 14 of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Fisheries and Oceans. Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2) and the motion adopted on January 20, 2022, the committee is resuming its study of marine cargo container spills.

I'm not going to go through everything about the hybrid format, everything going through the chair, and social distancing. We've heard that often enough. I'd also like to remind all participants that taking screenshots or photos of your screen is not permitted.

I would now like to welcome witnesses.

For the first panel today, we have, from the Nanaimo Port Authority, Captain Singh, vice-president, marine operations and harbour master. From the Vancouver Fraser Port Authority, we have Captain Madiwal, director, marine operations and harbour master.

I'd like to welcome back Madam Gaudreau to committee today, and also Mr. Paul-Hus. I pronounced that right, I hope. Welcome back, sir. It's good to have you here.

We'll now begin with opening remarks from Captain Singh for five minutes or less.

Go ahead, please.

[Satinder Singh, Vice-President, Marine Operations and Harbour Master, Nanaimo Port Authority]

Thank you, Chair, for the opportunity to speak about MV Zim Kingston.

I would like to start by saying that safety, security and sustainability were the pillars upon which Nanaimo Port Authority undertook the salvage operation of Zim Kingston. I had the privilege of representing the port in the initial unified command discussions pertaining to safety, security and environmental protection. The ship was held to a very high level of scrutiny and safety protocols, which included regulatory requirements. Once NPA was satisfied with the protocols that would be in place, the vessel was permitted to conduct salvage operations at DP World Duke Point terminal.

During the salvage operation, the port played an integral role in terms of ongoing safety, security, and environmental protection protocols that were adhered to at Nanaimo Port Authority. One example of this was when the ship sustained a fire on board during the salvage operation. On behalf of Nanaimo Port Authority, I had rescinded all hot work permits on the ship until my investigation was complete and I was satisfied that the proper safety protocols would be adhered to.

I also attended the vessel at different instances to make sure that the processes were adhered to. I investigated the fire incident in particular through interviews on board the Zim Kingston of the salvage team and the ship's crew. The practical assessment of the hot work process was also observed physically, and the hot work permit was reinstated for the vessel to carry on with its operations.

It is noteworthy that Zim Kingston was successful in terms of completing the operation. The disposal process was administered with a very high level of diligence in terms of safety protocols, including regulatory requirements, in co-operation with the terminal operator, which was DP World in our case.

Case in point: Zim Kingston owners commented on their reception by the port of Nanaimo. This is one comment that I received: “From our experience during the vessel's stay at the Port of Nanaimo, we would like to point out your prompt response to our inquiries and the availability of anchorage when [it] was needed for our vessel.” The second comment was as follows: “Environmental protection protocols were followed to the utmost detail in accordance with the submitted cargo discharge plan: Your quick response to safety issues that were raised during our operations [and] towards risk assessment and implementation of mitigating actions was remarkable.”

Some other salient points worth noting here are as follows: No other facility was able to accommodate Zim Kingston's salvage operation in the western region due to variables such as congestion and the time it would take to unload the damaged containers. We didn't allow the ship to offload at anchor, which was a ship barge operation, because doing so was considered unsafe and dangerous according to the input of the Snuneymuxw First Nation, who are partners and who have a relationship agreement with Nanaimo Port Authority. We respected the first nation response and looked for other options to complete the operation, which led to the DP World solution.

NPA notes that had DP World been an active container facility, lost revenue would have been a decision-making consideration. Variables could render the terminal less flexible in administering this operation. All the same, NPA would have explored active vessel management options in collaboration with the terminal to facilitate the operation.

I have a process timeline that starts on October 24, 2021, and ends on February 2, 2022, when Zim Kingston left Nanaimo Port Authority for its next port of call.

The process started with Nanaimo Port Authority being abreast of the situation through CCG Western Region-Victoria MCTS information bulletins and news outlets. On the 29th, Transport Canada's Canadian Marine Advisory Council reached out to various stakeholders. On November 4, the agent initiated conversation with Nanaimo Port Authority.

My time is up, Chair.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken McDonald]

Thank you for that.

We'll now go to Captain Madiwal for his five minutes or less.

Go ahead, please.

[Shri Madiwal, Director, Marine Operations and Harbour Master, Vancouver Fraser Port Authority]

Thank you, Chair.

Good morning, everyone. Thanks for the opportunity to speak with you today.

My name is Shri Madiwal. I'm the director of marine operations and harbour master at the Vancouver Fraser Port Authority.

Let me start by acknowledging that the port authority's Canada Place office is on the ancestral land of the Musqueam, Squamish and Tsleil-Waututh peoples, and I extend thanks to them.

The Vancouver Fraser Port Authority is a federal agency responsible for the stewardship of the lands and waters that make the port of Vancouver Canada's largest port. As a Canadian port authority, our mandate is to enable Canada's trade through the port of Vancouver by protecting the environment and considering local communities.

Our role as a port authority is to ensure goods are moved safely, efficiently and sustainably. We do this by providing the marine infrastructure and services that provide for a high level of safety and environmental protection.

Vessel safety is a shared responsibility, and the port authority works closely with other federal agencies—Transport Canada, the Canadian Coast Guard and the Pacific Pilotage Authority—to ensure the vessels calling at the port of Vancouver navigate and operate safely.

The port of Vancouver has an industry-leading safety record on vessel navigation. In 2020, the Pacific Pilotage Authority reported 99.90% incident-free assignments. This has been consistent in the last few years.

In case of an incident and/or an emergency within our jurisdiction, the port authority is not the first responder. We rely on other federal and local emergency services.

We collaborate with other organizations, such as the Canadian Coast Guard, the Canada Border Services Agency, the RCMP and the local police and municipalities to oversee safety and security and to respond to any incident within the port. We work with them on emergency response planning to promote safety and emergency preparedness. Usually this takes the form of working with the first responders and other agencies and providing information on the situation through our 24-7 operations centre, our security cameras, our patrol boats and our drone.

I would like to take this opportunity to express my deep appreciation to the Canadian Coast Guard team. Their services such as oil spill response, search and rescue and marine traffic control keep Canadian waters and our coast safe.

I would be remiss if I did not mention the Government of Canada's investment in the two emergency towing vessels on the south coast of British Columbia. The two leased vessels have proved useful since their deployment in 2018. These vessels are critical emergency response assets on the coast and play an important role during incident response.

In closing, I want to reiterate that although we have an excellent safety record in the port and on the south coast of B.C., marine accidents can occur at any time. We need to be prepared to respond and protect the mariners and the marine environment, including indigenous local communities and the surrounding waters.

Thank you, Chair. I look forward to answering your questions.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken McDonald]

Thank you. Both of you were a little bit under the time, and that is really appreciated.

Before I go to rounds of questioning, I will let members know that I'm going to get a little stricter on the time. I have little warning cards to let you all know where you are with your time, because it seems that we're losing time as we go through each list of questions. Then in the end somebody suffers for it, so I'll try to be a little stricter.

We'll now go to questions.

We'll go to Mr. Perkins for six minutes or less, please.

[Rick Perkins, Conservative, South Shore—St. Margarets, NS]

Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you for trying to keep us on time. You've been very kind in letting everybody play a little and we don't want to have our other members fall short and not be able to get answers.

I want to thank both witnesses very much for appearing on this important study.

In particular, Mr. Singh, thank you for your kindness and willingness to be here while you're still recovering from COVID, which, luckily—knock on wood—I've yet to have. I'm glad to see that you're on the road to recovery.

I'm going to refrain from my desire to ask both witnesses about the new labour regulations that came into force on February 1 and are hurting our ports in Atlantic Canada and to get your opinions. I'll stay away from that for now.

Mr. Singh, I think you ran out of time on your presentation. I wonder if you could start from the beginning and go through a chronology of how and when you found out about the incident with the Zim Kingston. Then when Mr. Singh is done, Mr. Madiwal, perhaps you could do the same. What were the various stages of your response to that, and your involvement, please?

[Satinder Singh]

Thank you for the question.

I did actually send the chronological order of how the Nanaimo Port Authority got involved.

I'll start by saying that initially my office was abreast of the updates related to Zim Kingston as they were being disseminated through the Canadian Coast Guard western region, Victoria MCTS and other news outlets. The last update I could find in my email was from October 24.

On October 29, Transport Canada, through the Canadian maritime advisory committee, reached out to my office and advised that assessments were being done on the vessel's seaworthiness. Transport Canada representatives were actively working with incident command to review plans related to the eventual movement of Zim Kingston from its current location to an appropriate yet to be determined berth or anchorage.

On November 4, Navitrans Shipping Agency reached out to Nanaimo Port Authority with an introduction, and advised that they had already received guidance as to the requirement from Vancouver Fraser Port Authority to proceed to the Vancouver anchorage. However, it appeared that the English Bay weather might be too rough to discharge safely, and they felt the better option was looking at a Nanaimo anchorage.

Navitrans Shipping Agency requested my thoughts as harbour master and requirements to explore the option to proceed to a Nanaimo anchorage to discharge damaged containers that had been secured on board. The discharge at that point was planned through a float crane and barge, with a full comprehensive plan that would be provided to the Nanaimo Port Authority.

On November 6, I requested further information, in terms of CBSA, TC and CCG contacts for this initiative, and the ship's charter representative, legal counsel and owner representative. On November 7, a unified command was convened by Canadian Coast Guard, which included the following incident commanders: myself, Nanaimo first nation representative, owner of Zim Kingston, provincial representative, and owners, contractors, and environmental leads from Environment and Climate Change Canada.

Between November 7 and December 2, the Nanaimo Port Authority worked with agents as primary contact and unified commands as a secondary to facilitate the salvage operation feasibility at NPA.

Some of the things we dealt with were that CBSA initially couldn't discharge in Nanaimo because there is no approved facility in Nanaimo for a container discharge. Therefore, based on customs rules and regulations, technically they couldn't allow the ship to discharge at Nanaimo.

The first nation engagement and response was encouraged through Nanaimo Port Authority and the unified command. We worked together collaboratively to collectively come up with a solution in terms of their first option, which was to discharge at anchor.

The transit plan was reviewed and confirmation sought that TC was on board. TC had no concerns, which was later conveyed to Nanaimo Port Authority. The container discharge plan was reviewed and confirmation sought that TC, Environment Canada and Canadian Coast Guard were on board. The Canadian Coast Guard and TC had no concerns with the discharge plan. The fire and salvage plan was reviewed. Transit environmental risk review was reviewed and confirmation sought that TC, EC and CCG were on board. TC and Canadian Coast Guard had no concerns.

Safe working procedures were reviewed, with focus on the Nanaimo Port Authority operations, and confirmation sought that TC was on board with the operational visibility. It was conveyed that TC did not have a role in approving the safe work procedures for this operation. The Nanaimo Port Authority was dependent on the ship's operator to provide all of that information. We reviewed that information and approved it.

The concept of operation and air quality monitoring was reviewed and confirmation sought that Environment Canada and CBSA were on board with that initiative. The concept of operation baseline water monitoring plan was reviewed and approvals were confirmed. CCG had no further concern with this concept. The overview of the waste management plan was reviewed and confirmation was requested from TC that it was appropriate. TC did not have a role in approving this as it was conveyed to the Nanaimo Port Authority.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken McDonald]

Thank you, Mr. Singh. The six minutes allotted to Mr. Perkins have gone a little bit over.

We'll now go to Mr. Hardie for six minutes or less, please.

[Ken Hardie, Liberal, Fleetwood—Port Kells, BC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you to our witnesses.

Captain Singh, I'm sorry that we're going to ask you a lot of questions and you're struggling to get over the bug. I hope it hasn't been too serious for you.

The fire on the Zim Kingston started in a reefer unit, I understand.

[Satinder Singh]

That is correct. The fire actually resulted from an adjacent container being worked on and a spark meeting the reefer container insulation.

[Ken Hardie, Liberal, Fleetwood—Port Kells, BC]

For people listening in, a reefer unit is a refrigerated unit for goods that need to be kept cold, obviously.

What do they use to power the refrigeration units on these containers?

[Satinder Singh]

I cannot answer that question because I don't have factual information on what they use to power the reefer unit.

[Ken Hardie, Liberal, Fleetwood—Port Kells, BC]

That's something that would be interesting to know, because it would be necessary to know if there's fuel involved, etc.

On the location of the reefer unit, was it above deck? I guess it was above deck, right?

[Satinder Singh]

It was adjacent to the hot work being performed and—

[Ken Hardie, Liberal, Fleetwood—Port Kells, BC]

It wasn't below deck. It was up in the open air.

[Satinder Singh]

That's correct. It was exposed to the open air.

The reason the spark got away and got into the reefer container was that the fire blanket did not cover the reefer unit fully.

[Ken Hardie, Liberal, Fleetwood—Port Kells, BC]

Okay.

Now, securing containers is obviously something that's really important, because they stack them very high. Was there any sense that the systems used to secure the containers failed, or was it simply that the weather was too rough for any kind of system to work properly?

[Satinder Singh]

My understanding, and because I visited the ship as well.... I did not feel that the containers were stacked too high or over the limit of stacking. I felt that inclement weather resulted in the unfortunate incident that the vessel met.

[Ken Hardie, Liberal, Fleetwood—Port Kells, BC]

Captain Madiwal, we obviously are concerned when containers fall overboard, but do you notice close calls? Do you notice ships coming into port that may not have lost anything but where things have moved around fairly substantially, especially above deck?

[Shri Madiwal]

Yes, Ken, that's a great question. Thanks for the opportunity to answer that.

In the case of the container strength securing arrangements and the locations, the International Maritime Organization has very strict guidelines around what needs to be done, and in all the class surveys that are being done for the vessels, the construction, they ensure those things are followed.

On the question specifically to the port of Vancouver, I would not be able to comment on that, because we have not received any information on whether the containers have shifted or have been lost during the transit.

In the case of any incident that occurs, the report definitely goes through the marine occurrence system to Transport Canada and the Transportation Safety Board, and those are the things we would track, but unfortunately we have not had any incident that would be considered in the same scenario.

[Ken Hardie, Liberal, Fleetwood—Port Kells, BC]

Would you not hear from the dockworkers, though, if a ship came into port with shifted cargo that made off-loading those containers more dangerous to the workers?

[Shri Madiwal]

I think this question would be better answered by the ILWU or BCMEA. I wouldn't have that information to comment on.

[Ken Hardie, Liberal, Fleetwood—Port Kells, BC]

Okay.

This is for Captain Singh, or for you, Captain Madiwal.

MCTS operations were under the microscope of this committee six years ago with the closure of the Comox base and the shifting of everything down to Victoria—to Sidney, I guess it was.

Do you have any reflections, any reports or any monitoring of those systems and their reliability? I'm particularly concerned with outages where communication with vessels breaks down simply because a system goes offline at the MCTS location.

[Shri Madiwal]

I would like to start first with the MCTS and the Canadian Coast Guard service. It's a world-class service that we have in Canada. I think we need to be really proud of the service that is provided by the Canadian Coast Guard.

In terms of the redundancy in the systems and backup, I think we have one in Victoria station and we also have one in Prince Rupert. They always back up each other as well. All the coverage that is available through the south coast of B.C., and even to the north, is captured under the MCTS. I believe that even within the area control centre they have equipment redundancy as well, so even if there's—

[Ken Hardie, Liberal, Fleetwood—Port Kells, BC]

Can I get a quick answer from Captain Singh on that?

Do you share Captain Madiwal's sentiments with regard to MCTS, sir?