Fisheries Committee on April 28th, 2022

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken McDonald]

I call this meeting to order.

I'm going to try to cut some of the preliminary information and go straight to the fact that, for those participating by video conference, when you are ready to speak, click on the icon to activate your mike, and please speak slowly and clearly. When you are not speaking, your mike should be on mute. For interpretation, you have the choice at the bottom of your screen of floor, English or French. I’ll remind everyone that all comments should be addressed through the chair.

I’d now like to welcome our witnesses for today. We have, from the B.C. Wildlife Federation, Jesse Zeman, executive director. From the Central Coast Indigenous Resource Alliance, we have Charlotte Whitney, program director, fisheries management and science, and we also have Alejandro Frid, science coordinator. From the Fraser Salmon Management Council, we have Michael Staley, biologist. From the Pacific Salmon Foundation, we have Andrew Bateman, manager, salmon health; and Brian Riddell, science adviser. From the Watershed Watch Salmon Society, we have Greg Taylor, consultant and fisheries adviser.

Mr. Zeman, we will go to you first for opening statements for five minutes or less, please.

[Jesse Zeman, Executive Director, B.C. Wildlife Federation]

Thank you, Mr. Chair. I will get right into it.

Thanks for the opportunity to be a witness today.

My name is Jesse Zeman. I'm the executive director of the B.C. Wildlife Federation. With over 43,000 members, the B.C. Wildlife Federation is the largest and oldest conservation organization in British Columbia.

In the past, I've spoken to you regarding the peer-reviewed process through the Canadian science advisory secretariat, which is supposed to be a formal, transparent process for providing peer-reviewed science advice to DFO and the public. This process is integral to Canada's Species at Risk Act. As it relates to endangered interior Fraser steelhead, this process was completely undermined by DFO.

An ATIP of the process related to endangered interior Fraser steelhead, for which there were thousands of pages of documents, revealed the assistant deputy minister's office gave a directive to modify some key points related to allowable harm for interior Fraser steelhead. Additionally, the chair of the process indicated they were cut out of the process and expressed serious concerns about the scientific integrity of the process. Furthermore, in these documents the chair states that there were things that happened to the SAR, science advisory report, after they signed it off.

During that process it was also revealed that DFO management, not DFO science, had created its own run timing model, which is the period where interior Fraser steelhead move through the Fraser River. This model was rejected through the peer review process. I believe that DFO management is still using this rejected model to brief the minister.

Years later, the peer-reviewed document called the “Recovery Potential Assessment” has still not been released to the public. I'm not aware of this happening for any other species that has gone through this process associated with the Species at Risk Act.

This summarizes what we found in 2021. Today I'm here to tell you about the next chapter of this saga within the context of science.

On April 8, 2021, the B.C. Wildlife Federation, through ATIP [Technical difficulty—Editor] related to interior Fraser steelhead dating back to 2019 on a month-by-month basis. DFO's response was that it would take until at least February 17, 2022, to retrieve these records. Please keep in mind this is a species of fish that DFO does not even manage, so one should expect there are very few records.

A complaint was filed with the Office of the Information Commissioner of Canada on May 18, 2021. On March 16, 2022, nearly a year later, I received notification that the investigator with the OIC determined that the exclusion claimed by DFO was not reasonable given the circumstances. Furthermore, the investigator found that DFO has deemed refusal of access to the requested records. To be clear, the records are not redacted or edited. DFO is simply refusing to provide them. Furthermore, the Office of the Information Commissioner of Canada advised the BCWF that if it wanted to pursue this issue, it would have to apply to the Federal Court for a review.

Now let me make this clear, the information that the B.C. Wildlife Federation is seeking is not a matter of national security. It is about an endangered fish that DFO has hidden science and edited science on in the past. DFO is refusing to disclose records paid for by Canadians. To suggest the BCWF would spend tens of thousands of dollars to take DFO to Federal Court to disclose these records means that transparency within this institution is non-existent. Within the context of science, it means that DFO is willing and happy to not only hide and edit science. It is now happy to refuse to disclose records.

When the media and elected officials wonder why trust in our public institutions is in decline, why people do not participate in public policy debate or why young people do not show up and vote, this is a prime example. This is why the BCWF is losing trust entirely in DFO. The BCWF is not concerned with DFO scientists' ability to conduct science. It is concerned with decision-makers and senior managers' willingness to edit, suppress and hide that science.

Within the broader context of science around interior Fraser steelhead, the BCWF will be funding research through post-secondary institutions with our partners and collaborators. This is not because we expect DFO to listen to independent science. We know it won't. It is because our members and the public need to see the science, and that is something that will not happen with DFO at the helm.

As elected representatives of Canadians, who value science, transparency, accountability and democracy, DFO's consistent undermining of science should be of great concern. DFO is structurally broken. Given the severity of this issue, we have one recommendation: We have to tear down DFO with a full restart and separate DFO management from DFO science, or we will lose what remains of our Pacific salmon and steelhead.

Thank you for your time.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken McDonald]

Thank you for that. That was right on the five-minute mark. I appreciate that.

I want to say thank you to the witnesses for standing by as we were late starting because of a vote in the House of Commons. We do appreciate that, and we will be adding some time onto the end to make up for most of the time that we lost.

We'll now go to Charlotte Whitney for five minutes or less, please.

[Charlotte K. Whitney, Program Director, Fisheries Management and Science, Central Coast Indigenous Resource Alliance]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

My name is Dr. Charlotte Whitney, and as you said, I'm here as the fisheries management and science program director for the Central Coast Indigenous Resource Alliance, or CCIRA. Previous to this role, I did work with the Pacific Salmon Foundation.

I am calling in today from the unceded and traditional territory of the Nuxalk Nation in Bella Coola, British Columbia. I am joined today by Dr. Alejandro Frid, CCIRA's science coordinator.

Our testimony today pertains to some of our experiences with DFO, an organization that uses and develops science to inform decision-making for managing fisheries and aquatic ecosystems.

DFO can do excellent science. Further, the Canadian science advisory secretariat, or CSAS, process can allow DFO to inform management with the best available science and to be precautionary to future uncertainties related to climate change.

However, there are often disconnects between science advice and management decisions, and between stated policies and what occurs in practice. Where these disconnects occur, they have led to management decisions that maintain a status quo rather than applying the best available science. We've seen these disconnects manifest in several cases, including the northern shelf bioregion MPA network and fisheries for salmon, herring, rockfish and Dungeness crab, undermining precautionary fisheries management.

In the interest of time, I will give just one recent example focusing on assessment and allowable catch for Bocaccio, a Pacific rockfish, and we will conclude with our observations of DFO's consideration of indigenous knowledge.

The Bocaccio case study speaks directly to two themes that we understand this committee is interested in. One is inclusiveness in the CSAS process, and two is the handling of uncertainties and the precautionary principle in management decisions.

Bocaccio was recommended for endangered listing in 2013 by COSEWIC, an independent advisory panel specific to the federal government. As of 2019, Bocaccio had declined by 97% relative to their historical abundance, well into DFO's critical zone. Accordingly, the total allowable catch for this bycatch species was set fairly low at 75 tonnes. However, an unusually large single recruitment event occurred in 2016, 44 times greater than the long-term average.

Given this and the fact that Bocaccio is a choke species, i.e., not targeted but limiting to fisheries with bycatch restrictions, further surveys were prioritized and an updated assessment was produced in 2022, this year. Largely reflecting that large recruitment event, the abundance of Bocaccio was projected to increase well into the healthy zone for the start of this fishing season. In response, DFO managers increased the total allowable catch 24 times over just two years from that 75 tonnes to over 1,800 tonnes.

For a species estimated to have dropped to 3% of its original abundance only two years prior, this is analogous to shifting an entire investment portfolio based on a few good days of the stock market when there are clear signs of a broader economic depression. This increase of the total allowable catch is inconsistent with the precautionary principle. We do not know whether large recruitment events can lead to long-term stock productivity, particularly under rapidly changing ocean conditions due to climate change, which is the biological equivalent of that broader economic depression.

This 24-fold increase in catch was based on a CSAS document categorized as a “science response”, which allows for a non-inclusive group of participants and peer reviewers, in this case just DFO staff and two commercial fishing representatives. The science response process exempts the requirement for participation from independent scientists and first nations, including those working on a species at risk.

Given Bocaccio's recent history of collapse and the implication for target fisheries, this was not illegal but certainly not in line with the principles of transparency or openness.

Finally, given that many targeted and bycatch stocks have outdated assessments or no assessment at all, this case study also raises questions as to how DFO prioritizes stock assessment.

Next I will comment on our experience of how DFO treats indigenous knowledge. Despite numerous DFO policies claiming to consider and incorporate indigenous knowledge and decision-making, for Pacific Canada we are unaware of cases in which DFO deemed indigenous knowledge worthy of triggering an early issue identification to be addressed by CSAS. This is despite first nations and specifically the central coast nations we work for having reported numerous declines in species that are critical to culture, food security and health.

For example, central coast first nations first expressed concerns to DFO about declining Dungeness crab catch rates in 2007, with great impact on food security and cultural practice. It took 10 years of engagement and nation-led western science before DFO managers showed an appropriate response to that concern.

Currently, central coast first nations have been experiencing a similar lack of response to their concerns about the precipitous decline in Pacific salmon, despite investing in nation-led western science. DFO has still failed to consider their consistent direction to limit commercial and recreational fisheries in the face of that decline.

To conclude, I offer the following recommendations for DFO to improve its application of science advice and to consistently apply its own policies and principles.

One, do not compromise inclusiveness in the CSAS process in order to rush either stock assessments or management decisions.

Two, thoroughly engage DFO’s excellent scientists in addressing climate uncertainties in stock assessments, as well as broader questions about ecosystem-based management, in order to advance beyond the current institutional inertia.

Three, abandon tokenisms about the application of indigenous knowledge. Indigenous knowledge often has longer baselines and superior understanding of local ecosystems than western science does and, therefore, should be treated as the valid knowledge system that it is. To do so, DFO should work with first nations to develop a culturally appropriate way to use indigenous knowledge in management, such as to trigger early warning signs about the health of marine species and ecosystems.

Finally, honour and respect existing fisheries and oceans management co-governance agreements and implement those processes wholeheartedly that are inclusive of indigenous knowledge, ecosystem needs and precautionary thresholds.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken McDonald]

Thank you, Dr. Whitney.

Before I go to Mr. Staley from the Fraser Salmon Management Council, I want to remind witnesses and participants to speak slowly and clearly, because if you speak fast, it makes it very difficult for the translation team who are trying to do it in both official languages. I think that would be very much appreciated by all members of the committee.

Mr. Staley, you have five minutes or less, please.

[Michael Staley, Biologist, Fraser Salmon Management Council]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

My name is Michael Staley. I am coming to you from the traditional territory of the Tla-o-qui-aht First Nation on the west coast of Vancouver Island.

I'm a fisheries biologist, trained in population dynamics, and have worked in the field, mainly on Pacific salmon, since the 1970s. In the late 1980s, I started to work in various technical capacities with first nation organizations, mainly on the Fraser River.

I currently work mainly for the Fraser Salmon Management Council and serve as the co-chair of the joint technical committee that reports to the Fraser Salmon Management Board. The Fraser Salmon Management Board was established in 2019 with the signing of the Fraser Salmon Collaborative Management Agreement between the FSMC member nations and the Minister of Fisheries. It's to deal with challenges in the management of Fraser salmon on a migratory route scale.

The Fraser Salmon Management Board has been challenged to fully implement the processes envisioned in the agreement, due in part to a lack of an implementation plan. To date, after our third year, there have been no collaborative decisions made as a result of this collaborative management agreement.

The joint technical committee also tries to meet regularly, although we are challenged with the lack of resources, to prepare briefs and to provide advice to the board in a collaborative way. To date, we've been focused on Chinook salmon fisheries management related to the Fraser stocks that are of conservation concern.

When I started to work with the Fraser first nations about four decades ago, I was one of a handful—I believe there were about three—of western-trained scientists working with B.C. first nations in the field of fisheries. Since then, with the support of federal funding and programs such as the AFS and AAROM, there have been many more well-trained and competent biologists working directly for first nation communities and their aggregate bodies. It is also heartening and appropriate that there are now many and a growing number of the first nations technical staff who are members of first nation communities.

Having lived through the restrained support for science in general and fisheries science in particular that was present in, I guess, the first decade of this century, I'm heartened that there has been increased support for fisheries science in the latter part of the second decade and in this decade. It seems to be returning. Recent federal programs such as the Pacific salmon strategy initiative appear to be used by DFO to help replenish its science capacity.

In recognition of the shared title to lands and resources in B.C. by the Crown and first nations, it is imperative that the science and technical capacity of first nations and their organizations continue to be built. It is only with commensurate support for first nation organizations that first nations can take their rightful role in co-managing the fish and fisheries resource in a collaborative way with DFO.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken McDonald]

Thank you for that.

We'll now go to Mr. Bateman for five minutes or less, please.

[Dr. Andrew Bateman, Manager, Salmon Health, Pacific Salmon Foundation]

On behalf of Dr. Brian Riddell and myself, thank you, Mr. Chair and committee members, for inviting the Pacific Salmon Foundation to speak.

For 35 years, PSF has worked to sustain and rebuild Pacific salmon. Dr. Riddell and I combined have studied salmon for over 60 years. The importance of accurate and comprehensive science advice to decision-makers and the consequences of failure to provide such advice are not new topics.

In 1997, the late Dr. Jeffrey Hutchings and others detailed DFO’s related failings in the collapse of Canada’s Atlantic cod fishery. Thereafter, in 1999, the federal government developed the SAGE principles to support sound science and technology advice, and for years DFO has used science review processes—CSAS and its predecessor PSARC—to advise decision-makers. DFO’s current science advice aims are laudable on paper, but principles and guidelines are only as good as their implementation.

Dr. Riddell’s and my recent involvement concerns open-net salmon farming in B.C. In 2018, an expert panel convened by Canada’s chief science adviser delivered recommendations to DFO for improving the use, generation and communication of science in aquaculture decision-making. Recommendations included the establishment of an external advisory committee. Based on our experience, we would suggest taking this a step further. Science advice itself should be collated, assessed and delivered by an independent body of experts.

To illustrate pitfalls of the current approach, I’ll discuss the CSAS risk assessments that stem from the Cohen commission, gauging risk to Fraser River sockeye salmon due to pathogens from Discovery Islands salmon farms. We submit that these assessments revealed DFO's overreliance on the CSAS process, failing to uphold the principles of comprehensive, open, peer-reviewed and independent science advice and conflating good on paper with good in practice.

As participants in four of the nine Discovery Islands risk assessments, we can testify. The findings of minimal risk reflect neither the current state of knowledge nor true scientific consensus. Key risks were omitted. Sea lice, cumulative effects and the conservation status of the sockeye stocks were ignored.

The processes were neither unbiased nor independent. The risk assessments were implemented, closely managed and influenced by senior officials from DFO aquaculture, and employees, contractors and others linked to the salmon farming industry served on the steering committee and as senior reviewers, so that conflict of interest threatened the integrity of the process.

More generally, consensus is held up as a strength of CSAS, but meetings apply strong social pressure on dissenting voices, creating the perfect conditions for groupthink. There is no mechanism for errors to be addressed once the consensus box has been ticked. Further, some international participants abstain from consensus votes, reducing the influence of international perspectives.

In any case, consensus is not a requirement of the scientific process, and the practice of minimizing real disagreement does a disservice to decision-makers and flies in the face of the SAGE guidelines that state that decision-makers should consider the multiple viewpoints received, not just the distilled version of uncertainty used in practice.

Even ignoring problems with the CSAS process itself, we’ve seen CSAS findings misrepresented by some within DFO. In the case of the sockeye risk assessments, findings have been used to argue that B.C. salmon farming poses no more than a minimal risk to wild salmon. This is absolutely not what the CSAS studies found, being highly specific to the risks from Discovery Islands farms to Fraser River sockeye salmon alone.

Perhaps even worse is that CSAS advice, while supposedly subject to revision as new and relevant information becomes available, is commonly used as a rationale to ignore new findings.

While CSAS review works well at the best of times, it is not in the best of times that decision-makers need the best advice. A good system can be undermined by human foibles. Although CSAS addresses some of the issues raised by Dr. Hutchings and others 25 years ago, Canada can do better. Science evolves, issues evolve and science advice needs to evolve.

In conclusion, we need to fix the current CSAS process, which is run by DFO and entwined with the management preferences, influences and aspirations of the department. Based on our considerable professional experience, Dr. Riddell and I reiterate that Canada should implement a truly independent science advice body to directly advise decision-makers and recommend further research without being subject to vested interests inside or outside DFO.

In addition to many international examples, COSEWIC provides a useful, trusted example in the modern Canadian context. A similar body for fisheries advice could adopt the best features of CSAS while avoiding many of its failings. On the aquaculture front, such a body could go a long way towards restoring the trust that many Canadians have lost in the department.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken McDonald]

Thank you for that.

We will now go to Mr. Taylor for five minutes or less, please.

[Greg Taylor, Consultant and Fisheries Advisor, Watershed Watch Salmon Society]

The fisheries management and the minister's office often fail to incorporate science or national policies informed by science in their decisions. This is nothing new. I spent much of my working life providing advice to Fisheries and Oceans Canada, first on behalf of industry, and subsequently, in the last dozen years, on behalf of first nations and ENGOs.

Decisions now, as in the past, are most often shaped by informal and formal DFO-harvester relations and external politics. Canada has never had—as Alaska has in its state constitution, or the U.S. with the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act—an obligation to ensure decisions are consistent with a science-based management framework.

What has changed over the course of my 40-year career is that the risks to our fisheries from decisions inconsistent with good science are immeasurably greater. This increased risk is driven by the climate crisis, cumulative land and water use impacts and a decision-making process that continues to put fisheries before fish.

In the absence of legal and regulatory frameworks similar to what is in place in Alaska and the U.S., forward-thinking people within DFO, including Dr. Riddell here, who foresaw the coming environmental challenges, began introducing a suite of world-leading science-based fisheries policies, beginning in the 1990s. They are captured under Canada’s sustainable fisheries framework.

Unlike many government policies, the SSF is not aspirational. They are the bits and bites of science programmed into policy, and they often provide specific direction to managers. Unfortunately, these powerful science-based policies and the management guidance laid out within them are ignored in management decisions.

It might be argued that I am too strident in stating that they are “ignored”, but you'll find the scorecard I supplied separately showing that none of the seven key policies within the sustainable fisheries framework has been implemented when it comes to west coast salmon fisheries—none. DFO officials will argue with my interpretation, saying that managers acknowledge the policies in making management decisions, but acknowledging them is a far cry from either implementing them or being bound by them as managers are in other jurisdictions such Alaska or the U.S.

Recent examples of this failure are not hard to find. In 2019, the Canadian fishing industry, after a decade of DFO's promising to implement its national policies, was forced to drop out of its hard-earned certification of sustainability from the Marine Stewardship Council, losing important and key access to world markets. This year, the minister made an arbitrary decision to cut in half the harvest of herring on the west coast, even though the fishery was consistent with both science advice and policy.

Last year, the minister announced the closure of 60% of commercial fisheries. The decision was not founded on a scientific analysis of what fisheries should be closed. In fact, development of a methodology to decide which fisheries should be closed is only happening now, without direct input from science. It all appears to be much ado about nothing, as managers are not following through on the closures the minister committed to in any event.

Currently, I am working with a B.C. first nation organization that is concerned about the introduction of a new recreational fishery in its territories. None of the sustainable fisheries framework policies has been incorporated in the development of the fishery. The involved first nations are, unsurprisingly, frustrated and angry.

Looking back through the examples I just gave, I'm sure members might agree with some of the decisions made, based on the needs of their constituents or political viewpoints. Many of my colleagues agree with some of the decisions, and herein lies the problem. If science and science-based policy are not front and centre in the decision-making, decisions become about what’s best for the fishery in the short term or about dissatisfied pressures from one group or another, not about the long-term benefit for either the fish or the fishers.

There are likely many potential solutions, but I would suggest two practical ones.

The first is a requirement that DFO implement national policies. An independent body should report on the department’s progress and provide recommendations where progress is lacking.

The second is that an independent science body should develop science-based performance measures founded in science and policy for every fishery. Each fishery’s performance would then be reviewed, say, every four years. The independent body would evaluate whether the performance measures are being achieved and where they are not, and it would recommend guidance, along with a timeline for achieving them. It could also, if necessary, amend the performance measures.

Not only would the above recommendations encourage science to take a leading role in fisheries decisions, it would go a long way towards rebuilding trust in Canada's fisheries managers and management system.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ken McDonald]

We'll now go to our rounds of questioning by members. I will remind members there are about seven witnesses here today, so if you identify who you're addressing your question to, it might make better use of your time. I think there are five organizations and a total of seven witnesses.

We'll go to questioning. We'll start off with Mr. Arnold for six minutes or less, please.

[Mel Arnold, Conservative, North Okanagan—Shuswap, BC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you to all of the witnesses. As the chair mentioned, time is short, so if you have a very long answer, please provide a brief statement and follow up with a written response. It would be appreciated.

I'll start off with Dr. Bateman, if I could. Dr. Bateman, how many CSAS processes have you participated in?

[Dr. Andrew Bateman]

Personally, I've participated in two.

[Mel Arnold, Conservative, North Okanagan—Shuswap, BC]

Could you tell us briefly what your experience was in the Tenacibaculum CSAS process?

[Dr. Andrew Bateman]

I would say that my opening statement really summarizes my experience. There was a great deal of both DFO and industry influence over that process, and dissenting voices were all but bulldozed, such that the resulting advice document doesn't reflect the true reality of opinion.

In addition, there's a critical flaw in that assessment, which I won't get into here for technical details, but I can provide a summary in my written materials.

[Mel Arnold, Conservative, North Okanagan—Shuswap, BC]

That would be great. Thank you.

If new information, such as scientific data, emerges after a CSAS process is completed, does DFO have a protocol for reconsidering the previously determined risk level and taking into consideration the new information?

[Dr. Andrew Bateman]

The CSAS advice document itself states that they will take new evidence into account. However, in my experience as a publishing scientist working on Tenacibaculum and the risk specifically to Fraser River sockeye at the moment, I can say that my work has been effectively brushed off by the department.

[Mel Arnold, Conservative, North Okanagan—Shuswap, BC]

In your opinion, is the CSAS process as robust and credible as peer-review processes of the scientific community outside of DFO?

[Dr. Andrew Bateman]

In my opinion, absolutely not. I think it's subject to the abuses I detailed in my opening statement, and it needs to be fixed or completely replaced.

[Mel Arnold, Conservative, North Okanagan—Shuswap, BC]

Thank you.

I'm going to move on now to Dr. Riddell. Dr. Riddell, you've headed the strategic salmon health initiative, which was established in 2013, after the release of the Cohen commission report. The SSHI was established as a partnership of DFO, Genome BC and the Pacific Salmon Foundation, with an eight-year mandate to complete four phases of scientific investigation that the Cohen commission prescribed.

Is that correct?

[Dr. Brian E. Riddell, Science Advisor, Pacific Salmon Foundation]

Yes, it is.

[Mel Arnold, Conservative, North Okanagan—Shuswap, BC]

Testimony provided to this committee suggested that SSHI is lapsing prior to the completion of the essential fourth phase of its mandate. I believe this occurred because of an absence of funding from DFO.

Can you tell us what the current status of the SSHI is and what resources, if any, DFO provides to SSHI?

[Dr. Brian E. Riddell]

SSHI as a program has terminated in terms of the joint funding, but the Pacific Salmon Foundation is continuing work in that field. That's being led by Dr. Bateman. The problem that you're referring to is not quite correctly expressed.

There were four phases. The first two phases were completed. The third phase, which we've received criticism on, was to do controlled experimentation that requires a facility with an extensive laboratory. We knew that this was a limitation at the very beginning, and we strove through two or three opportunities to try to build such a facility. In the end, we never reached an agreement with the local universities to construct that in order to conduct the controlled challenges.

The fourth phase that you were referring to was a workshop and final reporting, and that was conducted. The controlled experimentation was not, and it could still be undertaken, but it would require funding to ensure the establishment of an appropriate experimental centre. It would not be cheap. We had completed a full design of a centre working with Vancouver Island University.

At that time, it would have cost us approximately $350,000, but that assumes that they had the space, the water and the filtration, etc. The actual cost would have to be developed depending on where we built such a facility.

[Mel Arnold, Conservative, North Okanagan—Shuswap, BC]

Thank you.

Was part of the funding required, perhaps in the planning process, to come from DFO for that project?

[Dr. Brian E. Riddell]

There was no commitment from DFO in the beginning. If there was a commitment, it was Genome BC, which has largely provincial funding in that. They were committed to providing funds to build the centre, but as I said, we went through several tries and never succeeded in accomplishing that.