Subcommittee on Food Safety Committee on May 27th, 2009

[Carolyn Bennett, Liberal, St. Paul's, ON]

Dr. Williams, if I may, it sounded like you felt that there were people who were involved who didn't seem to even know the protocol existed.

[Dr. David Williams]

I think Dr. McKeown said that. They weren't tuned into what the protocol was, how it was effective, and how it was used at different levels.

I think the point of the reasonable and probable grounds in our legislation in Ontario is that it says that where a health hazard exists, or may exist, on reasonable and probable grounds, the medical officer of health can act.

[Carolyn Bennett, Liberal, St. Paul's, ON]

In your report, I was surprised because you say that the chief public health officer “did not appear to have a clear mandate for leadership in a cross-jurisdictional foodborne outbreak”, when indeed that is actually in his job description. I was also surprised that “Canada has not yet implemented a national outbreak management strategy that incorporates all federal agencies and ensures coordination with provincial ministries.” That's in your report.

At the time of the outbreak, it seemed to you that the chief public health officer of Canada didn't seem to have the authority or mandate to be the chief spokesperson. Is that why that's in your report?

[Dr. David Williams]

That's in my report because it wasn't clear when it went into a national-level outbreak that it was the chief public health officer of Canada leading and coordinating the response of CFIA, Health Canada, and the Public Health Agency of Canada. Is it clear that it was the leadership that was ascribed to him in that response?

The FIORP document, when it was originally drafted, antedated the Public Health Agency, so how that's incorporated in is a good question. I think we'd like to have that clarified to say that the chief public health officer, in the case of an outbreak, has a leadership role and seeks to coordinate the levels at the federal level and to work with the chief public health officers in Canada to deliver a consistent, timely, and effective response, and to be the spokesperson throughout that process. We didn't see that occurring.

[The Chair, Conservative, Larry Miller]

Okay, your time has expired.

Mr. Lemieux.

[Pierre Lemieux, Conservative, Glengarry—Prescott—Russell, ON]

Thank you very much, Chair.

Thank you for being here today.

I just want to make a few introductory remarks. I think what we've heard and what we've seen, just from your testimony today and from the other witnesses we've had here, is that food safety is indeed a shared responsibility. There are many players involved, and everyone has their own responsibility to fulfill. There are the provincial health agencies, the federal health agencies, and of course there's industry. So everyone has a key and fundamental role to play in food safety.

The other thing is that I'd like to correct the record a little bit. There were some comments that it seemed there was no cooperation at all. I would like to correct that. I think there was cooperation. In fact, in one of your letters, you mentioned there was very good interdepartmental or interprovincial or intergovernmental cooperation. It's not to say it can't be improved; it does need to be improved, but I was just looking at your September 24 letter where you say, “This serves to indicate and document our sincere appreciation for the cooperation between the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) and Toronto Public Health (TPH) during the investigation of the Maple Leaf Toronto Plant...”.

There was definitely a level of cooperation that went on, but there does need to be work done in terms of making things better and improving the communication that goes on. I don't think it was quite as Mr. Allen put it, which was two ships passing in the night with their lights out. I wanted to correct that.

I wanted to also ask a few questions about the precautionary protocols that were being discussed. I think one of the key factors in food safety issues, in recalls and health alerts, is probably the public's confidence in the system. I think this is one of the things we're investigating here.

One of the questions I have, for example, is this. There was earlier talk about—

[Carolyn Bennett, Liberal, St. Paul's, ON]

Is his time up yet?

[Pierre Lemieux, Conservative, Glengarry—Prescott—Russell, ON]

No, not yet.

There was certain talk about health alerts and recalls and the fact that they have to be confirmed in science. There was talk, for example, in the U.S. They gave warnings about eating tomatoes, but it actually turned out to be jalapeño peppers that were the problem.

My concern is that if recalls and health alerts are not founded in science and rather conclusive, it would be possible to have many recalls, many alerts. The public could actually become somewhat insensitive to them in terms of saying it's just another alert and it might be wrong, and this sort of thing has been wrong in the past. It's good for the governments, perhaps, in being able to say that they did advise the public, but if the public has less confidence in the alerts being issued, it might not be a move forward.

I wanted to ask your opinion on that. Do you see that actually as a risk, that if things are not conclusive enough and health alerts are issued much more frequently, in fact, the public could become less responsive and in fact that would increase the risk?

[Dr. David Williams]

That's a good point. I think the issue, as I have always said, is that when we engage in our risk assessment, risk management, and risk communication, the key is that when we have reasonable and probable grounds and we go forward, we want to communicate. When we communicate with the public, we do so not just because we want to talk about it; we have to engage the public in a trust, in a confidence, in a working relationship, because if we ask them to avoid something and they have no concern, there's not much of a response. We engage their trust and their confidence.

Therefore it means it behooves us, when we explain to them, to say on what grounds we did that—and we often do that in our messaging: because of this and this and this, we are concerned. If the evidence is weighted enough in their minds, even if it is precautionary, they will take the appropriate steps. Sometimes, in cases of other health hazards, when we've told them, the public decided on their own to ignore those warnings. But they have been duly informed on that. We've asked for their participation in there.

You're correct, you don't have to have everything correct in line, because the public knows that, but they do have to have enough information—transparency, as Dr. McKeown talked about—that they can engage and understand. The public is very well informed. They have lots of sources, but they want to make sure it has come from a credible source and it is in context, so they can say this informs them enough that they can make a decision and participate. If they don't, they know where they'll go for more answers.

[Pierre Lemieux, Conservative, Glengarry—Prescott—Russell, ON]

Thank you.

One of the key problematic areas is the transitioning of trying to identify a problem and how widespread it is. You've mentioned there are listeria cases that appear on a monthly basis. When does that transition into a larger problem and then eventually into a crisis? At what point does the messaging indicate that? I just wanted to know your comments on that, because I think that's where we need better communication amongst the different levels of government, better cooperation amongst the levels of government. It's right when things are transitioning, because I would imagine there are a lot of factors—I think you discussed this earlier in the meeting—that have to be assessed, and different people will have different opinions as to when and where that transition is actually taking place, where this is now moving from a community to a province-wide problem, from a province-wide problem to a Canada-wide problem.

I'm wondering if you have comments on how those transition areas can be better improved to serve the public.

[Dr. David Williams]

The key to that is the quality of your surveillance. That means you have to have surveillance, surveillance, and more surveillance. Moreover, it has to get better and better. Part of this is the data that comes in. When things go awry, it is often because people are working with limited or poor data. That means you have to have a system that gathers the information quickly. Our IFA system, which we invested in after SARS, has done that. We can get the information and material. We have a live-time hypothesis generating system that allows us to change the questions and ask them in live time.

You have to make that evidence solid as quick as you can. You also need a sophisticated laboratory surveillance system that does the modern molecular typing. You need those two combined. Your strength in going to the public depends on the evidence, not just on an opinion or feeling. You have to have the epidemiological evidence. We have clusters of cases that did not happen by happenstance. You do the targeting of your investigation accordingly and back it up with data that you can support. All the samples may not prove positive, but you have scientific, statistical, and surveillance data to map together to come up with a conclusion. You want to make sure you do that well.

So it's those systems of surveillance that have to be ramped up and ready to respond. To nail down a cause or refute one, you need background passive going quickly up to active and very enhanced and aggressive surveillance. You need to do this as quickly as you can before you go to the public with the messaging, because they have to understand the assessment and what you did to come up with the communication you're giving them.

[The Chair, Conservative, Larry Miller]

Mr. Easter.

[Wayne Easter, Liberal, Malpeque, PE]

CFIA states that their first notification was August 6. Your agency states that it was July 29. In correspondence, your office said that CFIA, by your authority, was advised of the increase in listeriosis cases in Ontario on July 29—first by telephone and e-mail, then by a posting on the Canadian Integrated Outbreak Surveillance Centre notification system. Is that is the case?

[Dr. David Williams]

Yes, that is the record we have.

[Wayne Easter, Liberal, Malpeque, PE]

Is it possible for you to table those e-mails or send them to the clerk of the committee?

[Dr. David Williams]

We have the examples of the CIOSC postings, which are public and out in the community, including at the federal level. We can look at the other ones.

[Wayne Easter, Liberal, Malpeque, PE]

I don't know whether we are going to call CFIA back, but this is a critical point in finding out about the delay and where CFIA is on this issue. The big question for us is this: why the delay on their part?

Dr. McKeown, in the Toronto Public Health report of April, you mentioned that you had concerns about the compliance verification system and the shift away from direct government oversight. I think you mean more sharing with industry self-regulations. In section 3.10 of your report, you say that “these concerns suggest that there is too much reliance on information supplied by plant operators or, in the case of imports, a source located in a foreign country”. Could you expand on that? We have gotten a lot of calls in that area since this committee started its work.

[Dr. David McKeown]

Let me start by saying that it's a good thing for food service operators to take responsibility for food safety. That underlies many local food safety initiatives: mandatory food handler training, ways in which we support food service operators to do the best job they can, and others. Even the transparency, the disclosure system, provides an incentive for food service operators to do the right thing in ensuring food safety. However, there also has to be oversight. At the local level, we have quite a strong system of oversight, and the inspections are made public on a regular basis. So I think the two can go hand-in-hand. All levels of government and the food industry have an important role to play. In my view, creating a stronger role for the food industry does not remove the responsibility of government to act as an overseer.

[Wayne Easter, Liberal, Malpeque, PE]

I guess it was Monday night that the agriculture union was here, and they raised a lot of concerns. But I think there have been improvements made since this outbreak, certainly. They raised concerns that one inspector was managing, basically, seven operations—I think he's now back to one—and that more than 50% of their time is spent on paperwork rather than on the floor.

To put it to you directly, do you believe inspectors should be on the floor, under the authority of an independent agency, doing the inspections, rather than a reporting system through industry?

[Dr. David McKeown]

Again, I'm speaking from my experience at the local level, where we're regulating and inspecting food services in the city of Toronto. It certainly is a critical part of our role to have inspectors on-site for routine inspections, and in fact, from time to time, to do a more intensive inspection in which the food preparation process is followed step by step. I think the presence of independent inspectors is an important component of food safety.

[Wayne Easter, Liberal, Malpeque, PE]

I want to come back, just one—

[The Chair, Conservative, Larry Miller]

You're actually out of time, Mr. Easter, but if you want, just finish your comment off.

[Wayne Easter, Liberal, Malpeque, PE]

I may get a chance later. Go ahead.

[The Chair, Conservative, Larry Miller]

Thank you.

Mr. Bellavance, for five minutes.

[André Bellavance, Bloc, Richmond—Arthabaska, QC]

We heard from the Minister of Agriculture and Agri-Food, people from the Canadian Food Inspection Agency and also people from Health Canada. Frankly, from hearing them, the crisis was relatively well managed. I get the impression they didn't necessarily read your report. After doing so, however, they quickly responded to you and even attacked you. I'm thinking in particular of Ms. Swan, Mr. Butler-Jones and Mr. Rosenberg, who signed the letter I referred to earlier, the letter of April 20 last. First I would like to know whether you think the federal Minister of Health had a role to play in the crisis, or whether he should have played a role, since we didn't see much of him during that period. We asked him to come here as a witness, but it ultimately took a motion from me this week, on Monday, to finally get someone to think that would be a good thing to do.

Did you see him? Did you hear him? Did Mr. Clement or his department contact you during the crisis?