Subcommittee on Food Safety Committee on May 27th, 2009

[Merv Tweed, Conservative, Brandon—Souris, MB]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thanks for being here.

I have a couple of questions. We've heard from witnesses, particularly on the listeriosis situation, and perhaps Ms. Murray.... We had the president of Maple Leaf present to the committee. He was as forthright and straight up as probably anybody I've ever heard on a committee, where it was impacting himself personally and the people he employs. If Canadians have a fear that enough hasn't been done, I think rereading that testimony and the testimony that followed would suggest that it's been done. And more has been done.

So I'll ask the safety association, do you think the handling recently of the H1N1 virus in Canada...? Do you have a position on that? Does your association...not necessarily pass a judgment, but obviously you followed it very closely. Were things done in a timely fashion, according to your group?

[Dean Anderson]

I spoke on pandemic preparation about two weeks ago at a convention in London and I said there are two things you can do wrong in a situation like that. The first one is to over-react, and the second one is to under-react.

I think the reaction from government officials in Canada, in the U.S., and a lot of other places was probably appropriate. We had a potential that was brought under control relatively quickly. The media maybe went a little too far with H1N1.

I am part of the group in Ontario that strongly has to do with awareness and notification, those kinds of things. I think an awful lot was done. In hindsight, after any event like that, you have to go back, debrief yourself, and figure out if more could have been done.

From our own standpoint, I didn't have something on my shelf for worker awareness on swine flu. I had a pile of stuff on avian influenza, personal protective equipment and proper procedures. I had to do some pretty quick 24-hour type stuff to make sure my website and my staff were brought up to speed.

But from everything I saw, we did a pretty good job across the country on something that wasn't necessarily a food safety issue but, rather, an exposure situation. I think we did a pretty good job of controlling, once we were aware of what we had. And that was the problem with that specific bug, being aware of what we had.

[Merv Tweed, Conservative, Brandon—Souris, MB]

Thank you.

Mr. Hodges, does your association, the American Meat Institute, have a position on COOL, which is currently impacting producers, particularly in Canada? Do you have a stated position?

[James Hodges]

Yes, we do. We have vigorously opposed the country-of-origin labelling provisions, as enacted by Congress. We have been at the forefront in leading that effort, and unfortunately we've put in a rule that, at least in my opinion, acts as more of a trade barrier than anything else.

[Merv Tweed, Conservative, Brandon—Souris, MB]

I'm pleased to hear you say that. As someone who lives on the American border, and our neighbours are within a stone's throw, it's really tough when we can't do commerce with them.

This may sound like more of an attack, but it's not meant that way. A lot of people say to me in my communities, “Why did Canada have more BSE discoveries than the United States?” There's been a lot of talk in other jurisdictions in Canada, suggestions as to what the producer should have done. We believe we've done the right thing by identifying the issues and dealing with them, but there seems to be such a.... Is your system that much better? Is the reporting system different? If you can enlighten us, I would appreciate it.

[James Hodges]

There's a lot of history written on BSE and its possible introduction into North America. The most likely way it was introduced is through importation of British cattle before we knew the implications of the disease. They were imported into both the United States and Canada, but one of the animals early on, before we even knew there were any human health implications in the late nineties.... There was one BSE case in Canada, and it is highly likely that the initial infection was spread through the rendering system. It was a localized pocket that I think, unfortunately, was introduced from the U.K.

I think you've done an excellent job of controlling that. It is not a public health issue. You removed the specified risk materials. So I commend the Canadian government for the way it handled the issue. You're a controlled risk country, just like us. So in our opinion, we ought to have free and open trade. BSE should not be an issue related to trade between Canada and the United States.

[The Vice-Chair, Liberal, Wayne Easter]

Thank you, Mr. Hodges.

Ms. Bennett, then Mr. Bellavance.

[Carolyn Bennett, Liberal, St. Paul's, ON]

Mr. Hodges, you stated that 10 years ago you had an investigation into your listeriosis outbreak. I wonder if you would describe the process your country went through at that time. We have had some concerns in terms of the arm's-length nature, as my colleague said, and we would like to know how you actually are able to look into something where sometimes it could be embarrassing.

[James Hodges]

Let me set the record straight. I don't know whether you'd classify what we did as an investigation. Our food safety inspection service investigated the cause, and it was not only one instance. We've had numerous instances where illnesses have been associated with ready-to-eat processed meats. In most of those cases, it has been traced back to some kind of harbourage of the bacteria in the facility that goes undetected, not because of negligence, not because of a lack of inspection scrutiny, not because of a lack of everybody wanting to do the right thing. It is a very difficult organism to control, and you have to have a very, very diligent program that you constantly revise in order to control it.

What I was referring to is that with each incident we understand a little bit more about how to control the organism and what's needed to do that. As for characterizing that as an investigation, it was not a public investigation per se. But we've learned a lot and we've reduced the incidence rates of listeria in our products dramatically.

[Carolyn Bennett, Liberal, St. Paul's, ON]

As you know, the outbreak in the situation last summer seems to have begun in a slicing machine. Maple Leaf used the cleaning instructions as per the manufacturer, and that ended up not being sufficient. Are there different protocols for slicing machines in the United States? Have you always been taking them apart and swabbing inside the machine? Can you understand why a cleaning protocol wouldn't have the machine taken apart?

[James Hodges]

I can very well understand how those situations occur, because they've occurred in our facilities. As I said, it's a continual learning process, a continual improvement process.

One of the things the American Meat Institute has done in the last decade or so is to have equipment design principles put in place. There are 10 principles and they talk about cleanability, the types of places where you could find listeria harbourages and all that. Our supplier groups, the slicer manufacturers, equipment suppliers, the people who supply sanitizing supplies--all have worked to try to improve their systems.

So we've worked collectively to “eliminate” sites for harbourage, but we still have those in some cases. Do we have different standards? No. We have the same suppliers in Canada as we have in the United States.

I think the best that you can make out of your situation and our situation is that they've been learning experiences, and the data clearly show that we're doing better every year. We have a graph of this.

[Carolyn Bennett, Liberal, St. Paul's, ON]

I was wondering, do you have any experience with biofilms?

[James Hodges]

Are you talking about biofilms with the organisms? Oh, sure. We've done research on trying to eliminate biofilms in various mechanisms, and looking at different stainless steel products. We don't take this situation very lightly, because our job is to produce safe food, it's not to defer that to the government. We've clearly stepped up, in my judgment, and I think the same thing has and will continue to occur in Canada. That's the reason I said I think you are headed in the right direction.

Biofilms are a problem because biofilms protect the organisms that are there. Yes, without going into a lot of scientific detail, I think that's enough.

[The Vice-Chair, Liberal, Wayne Easter]

Mr. Bellavance.

[André Bellavance, Bloc, Richmond—Arthabaska, QC]

I know you aren't here as a food safety specialist in the United States, but I think that, in view of the position you occupy, you're probably able to answer some of my questions. I'd like to compare the Canadian and American systems a little with regard to food safety.

I have a few specific questions. I won't ask you for too many details because we don't have much time. You aren't protected from bacteria in food either, since American food crosses our borders, or vice versa, and E. coli bacteria, for example, are discovered in it. It can come from the United States or any other country, but this happens and it happens to you as well.

When you answered Ms. Bennett a little earlier, you referred to a listeriosis crisis that had occurred in the United States. In that kind of case, what is the procedure, what is the code for managing the crisis? Is the government directly involved? When I say government, I mean both national and state governments; that may depend on the extent of the crisis. Who is responsible, the Department of Agriculture or the Department of Health. Are private sector officials involved in managing the crisis? How does that work exactly?

[James Hodges]

It's a very good question. There are a number of government entities as well as the private sector that are involved in protecting the public and assuring that food-borne illnesses are minimized.

The primary responsibility for the safety of the food, meat, and poultry products rests with the Department of Agriculture and the Food Safety and Inspection Service. In many cases, as was explained by the earlier panel, illness outbreaks are detected by the public health community--the local, the state. They do the primary work of detecting outbreaks, and most of that is reported to our Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta. It is through the public health communities that the USDA is alerted to meat and poultry.

For your clarification, other food products in the United States are regulated by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration--products other than meat, poultry, and some portions of fish and egg products. Once the regulatory agencies that are responsible for the safety of the food are informed of a potential outbreak, they will work hand in hand with the public health community to determine the products that may be involved and try to take as immediate action as possible to recall and remove that product from the marketplace in order to minimize potential exposure.

So there are really three primary focuses--the industry, the Department of Agriculture on the food side, and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the local health officials on the human health illness side.

[André Bellavance, Bloc, Richmond—Arthabaska, QC]

Perhaps you can give us some examples of what could happen in the United States if there was a bacterial problem or an outbreak of a fatal disease. Would the American population agree that the businesses where the bacteria appeared would be solely responsible?

Would it be acceptable for the president and CEO of the business to say publicly that it is their responsibility because it happened at their company, that the recalls were not done in time, regardless of how things turned out? The government or its agencies might not have acted appropriately, but they would stay calm and no one would call them to account. Would that be accepted by the public and the agri-food industry in general?

[James Hodges]

In response to your question, the ultimate responsibility for producing safe food rests with the manufacturer. The government, whether it be in the United States or Canada, does not manufacture food. They have a very important role in oversight and setting appropriate standards to protect the public health. They must have vigorous oversight to ensure that those standards are met.

To answer your question directly, I think it's a shared responsibility. The industry is responsible for producing safe food, and the government is responsible for being sure that the standards they set are appropriate and that proper oversight has been provided to see that the standards are met. Are there failures in the system by both the private sector and the government? Yes. But those failures need to be minimized through preventative programs that all of us have put in place and continue to improve over the years.

So my response is that it is a shared responsibility.

[The Vice-Chair, Liberal, Wayne Easter]

Mr. Allen.

[Malcolm Allen, NDP, Welland, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I'd like to carry on with not so much that particular question but the shared responsibility aspect in a different way.

Mr. Hodges, you said earlier that no two systems were more closely linked or aligned than the American and the Canadian ones. You talked about this upcoming training session in Chicago, which is oversubscribed, I think you said. There are a couple of parts to this. From that shared responsibility that we all see we have, is there a shared knowledge base that's going back and forth in a direct way, if you will, in the sense that folks are actually saying, “This happens here, we should share it here”? Or is it very much an ad hoc shared facility: “We're offering a symposium in Chicago, so for those who want to register from Canada, come down and see it”. Or do we have direct linkages for sharing that information back and forth?

[James Hodges]

We have direct linkages for sharing with the Canadian Meat Council. The session that is occurring right now in Chicago is co-sponsored by the Canadian Meat Council and the American Meat Institute. It's a very formalized process, but I failed to mention that this is not a one-time shot. I think it's the tenth or eleventh time--I should know this--that we've done this workshop over the years. It's a constant educational process. We'll do it again later this year, and probably a couple of times next year. It is a formal mechanism.

We also have a lot of our university systems involved. University extension folks have come to our course, learned, and taken it back to their own state.

I wouldn't describe it as a completely formal system, because it's voluntary that you go, but it's much more than just an ad hoc system. Our intent, and the only reason we do it, is to be sure that we share the best practices with as many people as we possibly can so that we minimize the possibility that the problem will occur.

The plants want to do that. They want to protect themselves, they want to protect their customers, and they want to make safe food. That's the reason we do that.

We'll look at webinars. We've looked at a whole host of educational venues to try to get the message out. We're continuing to try to do that, particularly to reach the small and very small operators.

[Malcolm Allen, NDP, Welland, ON]

I understand that. I do understand the linkage between you and the Canadian equivalent. What I was leading toward....

It's a little unfortunate, perhaps, to put you on the spot in the sense of trying to get you to speak for everyone else. Clearly there are things that you are doing and advocating for, as part of the AMI. That's fair. It's always difficult to ask witnesses to speak for other entities and groups that they may know about in general terms but not so specifically.

I really was asking about a more comprehensive piece. Is there an ability to share back and forth in a macro sense versus the more specific pieces you do as particular industry groups? It is understandable, and a good thing to hear, by the way; I appreciate getting that knowledge.

I probably have only a minute left, so let me ask this. I don't know whether you're aware of the recommendations. You may well be. From hearing what you've said so far, I think you're probably aware of the recommendations that your counterparts in Canada made to this committee when they made their presentation. I don't know if you were able to see those recommendations or not.

If you are aware of the recommendations, perhaps you could comment on whether you see yourself thinking those are good recommendations and you would be supportive of those recommendations, if indeed they were transferred to the U.S.

[James Hodges]

Let me answer your previous question.

We have conducted training sessions for both the Food and Drug Administration and the Food Safety and Inspection Service. We hope that we get the message out in a much more formal way, so it's not just an industry-to-industry communication. We've tried to communicate to all the entities what we are doing.

I have not studied the recommendations in great detail. However, I know the nature of our counterpart organization, as well as many of our member companies that manufacture products here in Canada. I think the general premise is that prevention, continual improvement, education, all those kinds of things, and many of the same things I mentioned are things they also support. Those are the kinds of things I've heard them say.

[The Vice-Chair, Liberal, Wayne Easter]

Thank you, Mr. Allen and Mr. Hodges.

The last questioner will be Mr. Hoback.

[Randy Hoback, Conservative, Prince Albert, SK]

Thank you, Mr. Easter.

I must say, you're looking rather dapper today.