Subcommittee on Food Safety Committee on June 10th, 2009

[The Chair, Conservative, Larry Miller]

We'll call our meeting to order.

Today we have with us representatives from the University of Ottawa and, as an individual, Mr. Wilson. From Option consommateurs, we have Ms. Anu Bose. We also have representatives from Toxin Alert.

We'll start with our witnesses. Please keep your opening remarks for each organization to ten minutes or less.

We'll start with Mr. Wilson.

[Dr. Kumanan Wilson, Associate Professor, University of Ottawa, Canada Research Chair in Public Health Policy, As an Individual]

Thank you.

I sent around my presentation beforehand. I hope everybody has a copy; largely, I'm going to read from it. My presentation will centre around two main points.

I've been studying public health in Canada for about ten years now as a Canada research chair in public health policy. I've studied problems with surveillance, disease outbreaks, and blood safety.

I'm going to focus on two issues related to listeria that also relate to those previous emergencies we've dealt with: the coordination of activities in health protection between federal and provincial governments and the effectiveness of the current governance system of the Public Health Agency and its chief public health officer in protecting the health of Canadians.

With respect to the first point, the issue of coordination of activities between federal and provincial governments has been an ongoing problem in Canada and the subject of multiple reports. Specifically, three Auditor General's reports have identified this as a shortcoming, the latest of which was in 2008. Also, following the SARS outbreak, this was a major finding of the reports that followed.

One of the issues that continues to recur is the problem of sharing data between federal-provincial-territorial partners. There have been efforts at developing data sharing agreements for I think 10 to 15 years now in Canada, and we've had very little success in developing comprehensive agreements. Again, three Auditor General's reports have highlighted this as a problem.

During SARS, this was a major issue, as identified in particular by the Campbell report. In fact, if we had had adequate ground-level surveillance and proper data sharing in place, we likely could have avoided the travel advisory, because the epidemiological evidence at the time suggested only in-hospital transmission.

More significantly now, we have approved the international health regulations, so it's now binding international law that we have these agreements in place. This does not mean simple letters of intent, but clear protocols on how data needs to be shared between provincial and territorial governments and the federal government.

We have looked at this in detail and specifically at how Canada is doing compared to other countries, including India, the U.S., and Australia. At least from what we've seen on paper, we're one of the least prepared, particularly to comply with the international health regulations. Australia, a parallel federal country, is in a much better position to administer this agreement and respond to public health emergencies. The practical situation may be different, though it is worrisome that little legislative, funding, or intergovernmental agreement progress has been made, given the multitude of reports we've had on this topic.

Again, during listeria--and I found this concerning--we saw the same problems recur. What was particularly peculiar with listeria, though, was that usually the information sharing issues had been between the province and the federal government, but, at least according to the Ontario report, the problem as they viewed it was that Ottawa didn't share information with the province.

I have a quote from the Ontario report. Specifically, it states, “Although the Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care asked the CFIA for comprehensive information on the distribution of the products implicated in the outbreak, this information was never received.” It later goes on to say, “If public health authorities had had timely access to this information, they might have been able to take additional targeted steps to reduce possible exposure among the general public.” These information sharing issues have real health consequences.

Again, it's unfortunate that it has to be said yet again that this issue has to be immediately addressed or else we're going to have yet another public health emergency that could have avoidable aspects to it. What may be different this time is that these agreements need to be bidirectional: not only do there need to be commitments from the provinces to share information with the federal government, but the federal government has to make an equal commitment to share information with the provinces and territories. If these agreements cannot be arrived at, I think legislation is the only other alternative. I'll leave it to Professor Attaran to discuss the constitutionality of that.

My second and perhaps more substantive issue that I would to discuss is that the Public Health Agency as it's currently structured is not designed to maximally protect the health of Canadians. I'd argue that listeria was the first major test for the agency since its creation, even more so than HINI, because it was an unusual, unexpected outbreak and we have had multiple protocols for things such as influenza outbreaks.

I remain uncertain about the ability of the Public Health Agency, particularly the chief public health officer, to act independently to address these types of emergencies independent of political and economic pressures in particular. I will make the caveat that this is not a simple question. Public health is interlinked with the mandates of numerous other federal agencies, and complete independence of the agency and the chief public health officer may not be desirable because public health officials have to work within government. But my conclusions are that the existing sets of arrangement are not satisfactory.

It's certain that the contamination of foods by listeria is a matter that falls under the jurisdiction of CFIA. However, once individuals start to fall ill from these foods and die from these foods, at that point, this is not a food inspection emergency. I would argue that it's a primarily a public health emergency.

In the listeria outbreak, the Public Health Agency of Canada, however, was not the public face of the response. The primary communication of the outbreak was conducted by CFIA and the Minister of Agriculture. I must say that I found it odd that the chief public health officer was not the chief spokesperson during the listeria outbreak.

As stated in the SARS report, the purpose of the chief public health officer is to “be a leading national voice for public health, particularly in outbreaks and other health emergencies, and a highly visible symbol of a federal commitment to protecting and improving Canadians' health”. This was clearly not the case during the listeria crisis, and my observations were echoed in Ontario's report as well.

I believe some of the explanation for what may have transpired lies in the Public Health Agency's less than arm's-length status from the government. Listeria was a prototypical example of why an arm's-length public health agency is needed. The outbreak crossed over two areas, food safety and public health, had political repercussions, given the presence of a federal election, and, as well, the outbreak had important economic consequences. Therefore, there may have been many opportunities to subordinate the role of the Public Health Agency and consequently public health concerns during the management of the outbreak.

The structure of the Public Health Agency was discussed in detail in the SARS report. I had the opportunity and the privilege to present to the head of the investigation. At that time, I argued that, to an extent, a Canadian Blood Services model may have been preferable to provide more autonomy for the decision-making with regard to public health safety. Our Canadian blood system is a textbook case of how to recover from a public health tragedy, one of much larger scope than both SARS and listeria. Currently, our Canadian blood system is viewed as an international leader. An important reason for that is its independence and autonomy, and it has the ability to attract highly qualified scientists and blood safety experts.

So I'd argue that the Public Health Agency, or at least a component of it, needs to have more autonomy. One mechanism is to create a separate health protection agency specifically designed to prepare for and manage public health security threats, such as foodborne illnesses, pandemics, etc. This can be staffed with high-expertise scientists, some of whom would be shared with provincial agencies.

Along with that, we would have to develop an independent chief public health officer. The chief public health officer at present is not truly independent. They hold the position of deputy minister and serve at the pleasure of the minister. As long as this is the case, we cannot be assured that a chief public health officer is speaking independently.

At the minimum, I believe that a chief public health officer should be provided with protection against dismissal without cause and should be provided with unambiguous authority to communicate directly with the legislature. Also, the Public Health Agency should have a protected budget.

Thank you very much.

[The Chair, Conservative, Larry Miller]

We now move to Mr. Attaran.

[Dr. Amir Attaran, Professor, Institute of Population Health, University of Ottawa]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I'm Professor Amir Attaran of the Faculty of Law and the Faculty of Medicine at the University of Ottawa. I'm also on the editorial team of the Canadian Medical Association Journal, and I'm trusting that our editorial of last year on the listeriosis problem has now been circulated to everyone on the committee. That editorial was written by me and six other members, indeed the full editorial team of the journal. We are Canada's leading medical journal.

In our joint assessment--not mine alone--listeriosis, as the title of the article goes, is the least of it. It is emblematic of broader problems, very well-understood and deeply neglected problems that each day threaten to kill Canadians. Let me be as blunt as that. Parliament, through inaction, is currently endangering Canadian lives through insufficient regulation but also insufficient structures for public health promotion, as Dr. Wilson has just outlined.

In the case of the listeriosis problem in particular, the seeds lay first and foremost in poor regulation. We researched Canada's standards for Listeria monocytogenes bacteria in ready-to-eat food and have compared Canada's standard to that of 30 countries, including the United States, Brazil--a developing country--and those in Europe. We found that of the 30 countries we looked at, Canada had the weakest, lowest standards. Of 30 countries, Canada is in 30th place. If today we were in 29th place, I could report progress to you. We are not. We are in last place. We allow 100 live bacteria per gram of ready-to-eat food; that's legal. The United States allows zero. All of the European Union allows less. Even Brazil allows less.

The seeds of this disaster also lay in poor cooperation, as Dr. Wilson has outlined, between the federal agencies responsible and the provinces. He is quite correct that the Auditor General has three times in about the last decade pointed to this communication breakdown between the federal and provincial governments as extremely alarming. It is. It would potentially be the cause of massive death in this country if a pandemic of a more serious nature took hold.

In the listeriosis epidemic, Ontario bore the brunt. That's interesting, because Ontario is the only province to have signed an information-sharing agreement with the federal government. The other nine provinces have not signed such an agreement, despite a decade of effort. So Ontario is the high-water mark of our ten provinces in terms of cooperation, and yet it was in Ontario that the disaster of listeriosis struck the hardest. If this is our high-water mark, I am terrified, as a Canadian knowledgeable about public health, to think what the low-water mark looks like.

We do not know if political interference caused so little information to be shared with Ontario, including information about the source of infected meats and where those meats had been distributed. Had that information been shared and acted on, the Ontario chief public health officer has said, it could have saved lives. I agree--it could have--but it wasn't shared.

The question often arises as to whether there is constitutional authority to do more federally in health regulation and health promotion. I will now speak briefly as a lawyer. The answer is, emphatically, yes. There's nothing in the Constitution Act, sections 91 or 92, that compels us, as Dr. Wilson has said, to be the slow kid in the class among federal nations in having the least effective cooperation between the federal and provincial levels of government in times of health emergency. That is not an imperative in the Constitution.

I'll give you an example. When recently pigs in Alberta on a particular farm acquired the H1N1 influenza virus, the federal government took principal authority over that outbreak. In 2006, when geese on a farm in Prince Edward Island were found to have bird flu, it was the federal government that quarantined the farm. The federal government today has a greater role in health protection and promotion for Canadian pigs and Canadian geese than Canadian people, and that's a travesty. In times of crisis, we really could all find our lives at risk because of unutilized federal jurisdiction. It must be utilized; it must be. During questions, I'll be happy to tell you where that residual authority in the Constitution could and should be utilized.

I paid close attention to Parliament's exercise over the last few weeks. You're all to be commended for trying to better understand what happened in the listeriosis crisis, but I do believe this has been a largely futile exercise, because you've not been able to have before you some key witnesses, or to compel evidence or persons to appear. That is why this matter needs an inquiry under the Inquiries Act. It's absolutely essential to maintain public confidence and public safety. The investigation, as it's called, that is now under way that was requested by the Prime Minister also lacks those powers to compel evidence and persons, and therefore is inadequate.

In an inquiry struck under the Inquiries Act, which is what we advocated in the Canadian Medical Association Journal--not myself but the entire editorial team--there will be several questions. I would simply outline three of them. First, why are Canada's standards for Listeria monocytogenes bacteria in food so incredibly low, the worst of 30 countries we looked at? Second, why was information not shared in an efficient, complete, and timely manner with the provinces? Third, what transpired politically, and did it amount to interference to the jeopardy of Canadians' lives? The third is the most important question.

From those three questions within the inquiry, I believe a picture can be sketched that would be protective of all Canadians' lives, going ahead. This should not be about partisan politics; it should be about saving people from known threats.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

[The Chair, Conservative, Larry Miller]

Thank you very much.

We go now to Ms. Bose, ten minutes or less, please.

[Anu Bose, Head, Ottawa Office, Option consommateurs]

Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, vice-chairmen, committee members, clerk of the committee, ladies and gentlemen, let me begin by thanking you for giving us this opportunity to appear before you on the question of food safety and the listeria outbreak of 2008.

With me today is François Décary-Gilardeau, who is an analyst in the head office in Montreal. We'll share the speaking duties today.

François.

[François Décary-Gilardeau, Analyst, Agri-food, Option consommateurs]

Thank you, Anu.

Option consommateurs was established in 1983. We are a non-profit organization whose mission is to promote and protect the interests of consumers and ensure that they are respected. Our head office is located in Montreal and we also have an office in Ottawa. We intervene in matters of public policy that involve the federal and Quebec governments.

As regards the listeriosis crisis, we have been very active in this file since the problem first came to light in June of 2008. We have repeatedly called for a judicial inquiry, very much like Mr. Attaran. Option consommateurs also launched a class action suit in Quebec against Maple Leaf Foods. As you know, similar actions were commenced in Saskatchewan and Ontario. Furthermore, a national settlement was recently approved by the courts. The claims administrator is now accepting individual claims. We have provided a copy of the relevant documentation to the clerk, Mr. Chaplin, for your perusal.

We are here today to give you the consumer's perspective on the handling of the listeria crisis and to make some recommendations on how the Canadian Food Inspection Agency might become a more consumer-friendly organization.

[Anu Bose]

On the role of government in food inspection, Option Consommateurs believes that the Government of Canada has a duty of care. In matters of food safety, the duty of care is to inform and protect citizens from harm by promptly informing the public when a contaminated product is identified and to order a prompt recall. We believe that government has a fiduciary responsibility to its citizens, that it stands in a special relationship of trust, confidence, or responsibility to taxpayers, and this has been diminished greatly by the loss of 22 lives and the untold suffering of many more.

Nik Nanos, of Nanos Research—a pollster familiar to all sides of the House—conducted a national survey of 1,001 Canadians, 18 years old and above, from April 25 to May 3, on behalf of the Agriculture Union, a wing of the Public Service Alliance of Canada, and it revealed that the consumers of Canada trust their government more than industry to guarantee the safety of their food.

We have outlined for you some of the findings. Only 12.4% of Canadians have a high level of trust in food companies to assess themselves when it comes to safety and compliance. Neither side fared well when Canadians were asked specifically how best to describe last summer's deadly listeriosis outbreak after contaminated processed meat made its way into the marketplace.

For the CFIA, regrettably, the consumer is invisible. Nowhere on the website is there a mention of the consumer, the citizen, the taxpayer, whose spending generates over 60% of the GNP of this country.

Minister Ritz has said:

The ultimate role for CFIA and for public health, provincial health agencies, and so on, is public safety, to make sure that the food supply is safe.

We ask, “Safe for whom?”

Ms. Weatherill, who is leading the other inquiry into food safety, has created an advisory panel of experts. There are academics there—some with ties to industry—and industry representatives, but no representatives of the very consumers who bore the brunt of the listeria crisis. We were able to track her down after much sleuthing.

You've heard from a representative of the Canadian Partnership for Consumer Food Safety Education, who says that consumers have to be taught about food safety and are looking for information. We agree with her and we say that we need impartial, clear, timely, and jargon-free information presented in simple English and French, so that people with literacy challenges and the newcomer population are not disadvantaged.

For consumers, CFIA is uncharted territory, but this is in stark contrast with Health Canada, which welcomes and facilitates consumer participation through joint committees and frequent consultations. A regulatory agency like CFIA does not have to be in an adversarial relationship with consumer groups. Indeed, in the U.K., Consumer Focus, which was formerly the National Consumer Council, and the Food Standards Agency co-exist quite well, and the NCC gives it very good ratings for openness. But we have been frustrated when trying to obtain information from the CFIA during the listeria crisis.

François, would you like to address CFIA's schizophrenic mandate?

[François Décary-Gilardeau]

Much of the problem likely has to do with CFIA's mandate, which might be described as schizophrenic.

According to Mr. Malcolm Allen, the Agency's role involves public safety, first, and second, economic viability for the stakeholders—which, as far as Option consommateurs is concerned, means the producers and processors.

However, let us talk about a similar case that was studied by the Royal Society of Canada, whose report was quoted in these terms by Mr. Allen:

If the same government agency that is charged with the responsibility to protect the public health and environmental safety from risks posed by technologies also is charged with the promotion of that same technology, and if its safety assessments are, by official policy, balanced against the economic interests of the industry that developed them, this represents, from the point of view of both the public and the industrial stakeholders, a significant conflict of interest.

Therefore, we believe that the Canadian Food Inspection Agency should develop a new framework, as did the Food Standards Agency in Great Britain in the aftermath of the BSE crisis, in order to better serve the interests of the consumer and industry in a balanced way. A crucial element of any safety or security assessment is to balance the low risk of an accident against its high potential impact.

[Anu Bose]

We believe that the principal function of the CFIA is to protect the consumer and that health and safety concerns should outweigh commercial considerations and minuscule savings in government expenditures. We are not against producers and processors earning fair and equitable profits, but not at the cost of the health of Canadians.

Let's take a look at the example of the recent financial crisis. Canadian banks have proven to be a shining example in the world, because they were prevented from indulging in innovative financing arrangements. The zeal for deregulation set the U.K. and the U.S.A. banks up for a fall—and fall they did. If an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure, then the stricter the regulation the fewer the chances for error. If regulation has served the country well in one jurisdiction, then why not in another? Canadian consumers expect inspections, not audits; they want inspectors poking around on shop floors, not wading through reams of paperwork. They expect a made-in-Canada version of the FSA. Their website says that everything they do reflects their vision of safe food and healthy eating for all: putting the consumer first, openness and independence, science- and evidence-based.

We recommend the following policy changes.

Overall, we say that Government of Canada must accept two fundamental principles: the duty of care, and the precautionary principle.

In order to regain public confidence, we recommend a major transformation in governance and the promotion of a culture of transparency and openness. And we recommend an advisory group to work on revising the CFIA mission and mandate.

The system of verification must be conducted and managed by government and must include adequate sampling.

In the event of a major crisis, the CFIA must establish a system of communication that answers questions from media, provincial agencies, and public health organizations.

Above all, the agency must establish a clear recalls process. This should clearly identify which party bears the responsibility for initiating and who does the follow-up. And the recalls process must be both rigorous and flexible.

The current management of the CFIA leads to a real democratic deficit. This is manifested by a culture of secrecy and lack of transparency. If the agency wishes to restore its credibility, it must review its structure and functions, and do so openly. A laissez-faire policy is not an option, not when there are 22 deaths, compounded by the suffering of parents, friends, and many other Canadians.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, Larry Miller]

Thank you.

Mr. Espy.

[Mike Espy, Chairman, Toxin Alert Inc.]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of this important subcommittee, for the opportunity to testify before you today.

In addition to being a former U.S. Secretary of Agriculture under the Bill Clinton initial administration, I served for seven years as an elected member of Congress from the State of Mississippi. In that regard, I know how difficult it is to manage schedules, and I really appreciate your making the time available for us to discuss this particular issue.

Appearing with me today is Mr. Bill Bodenhamer, who is the president of a small biotech company that we are here to discuss. We have a product that we think is incredibly valuable in the area of prevention and notice. Also appearing with me is Mr. Petroff, who is the vice-president of our company and our chief scientist. If there are questions that are more technical in nature, perhaps I can refer to them as well.

I'm not appearing as a former U.S. Secretary of Agriculture but as the chairman of the board of directors of a small Canadian biotech company called Toxin Alert, which is headquartered in Mississauga. This company has a technology to detect food-borne toxins. If fully deployed, it could provide valuable signals to the consuming public that the food they're about to consume has become compromised to the point that it is perhaps unsafe to eat.

The company is about ten years old. We were born in a bioreactor at the University of Guelph and have received plaudits from time to time from Canadian state agencies and entrepreneurial and science magazines as one of the “innovative” new companies to watch in the field of Canadian biotechnology.

We are certain that the diagnostic antibodies produced by our company will have the capability of detecting dangerous food-borne pathogens, and are engineered to emit a visible signal to the consuming public of the presence of pathogenic materials.

Once it's in the commercialization stage--we are not there at this point--we believe that our technology will hold tremendous promise in providing consumers the valuable option of having real-time information about the status of their foodstuffs. That will most definitely be helpful in ameliorating the serious food safety concerns that have given rise to this important hearing this evening.

The public official in me is still there, and I believe that the government has an obligation and a compelling role to play in warning the public against known health hazards and then, if possible, helping to advance, vet, and offer solutions. If any entity is able to viably provide real-time diagnostic tools into the hands of the public, then government should advance rather than impede the process, in conjunction with private enterprise whenever possible.

I felt the same way in February 1993 after I had been appointed by President Clinton. I had only been there about three weeks when we heard about an episode of hemolytic uremic poisoning from E. coli pathogen 0157:H7. It had been in tainted hamburger meat that children ate from a fast-food franchise restaurant in Washington State. Their parents had bought the hamburgers, and unfortunately several children ingested them and met their demise. I had never before heard of this pernicious strain of the E. coli pathogen. A month later in New York City I grieved with the parents of a three-year-old girl who had innocently asked her mother to cook her favourite dish for her birthday, spaghetti and meatballs. The meatballs were undercooked and the little girl died a painful death as a result of E. coli poisoning.

As a result of those episodes, which are still striking to me, I bring sympathies and condolences to the families here in Canada who were so tragically affected by the recent listeria outbreak. I have a bit of knowledge and understanding regarding the situation you are faced with, in trying to seize upon effective remedies, products, processes, and strategies to detect, control, and perhaps to even eliminate listeriosis and other pathogenic culprits.

I do understand that effective solutions are difficult to find, but I also believe, as I'm sure you do, that all public officials have a sacred trust to fulfill and must push forward undeterred, even if others push back when the public interest is in jeopardy.

After my abrupt introduction to the E. coli pathogen in 1993, I tried to find out everything I could about the food-borne pathogens in the U.S. I'm here to admit that in the U.S., 76 million people are still caused to be sickened every year; 325,000 are still hospitalized; and over 5,000 still unfortunately die on an annual basis.

Thankfully we have seen some comprehensive reforms in the U.S. over a brief period, from what I call the “dime standard”--and this was ridiculous to me--where an inspector, if you will, in one of our federal slaughterhouses could allow pathogenic contamination to be trimmed away only if an observable feces chip on a carcass was larger than a dime, to the more aggressive practice of trimming, applying microbial washes, and the introduction of HACCP practices in cooperation with regulated companies, to pathogenic-specific vaccines, and greater food safety standards. But we have much more that we ought to be able to do.

In the U.S. today we still have sort of a patchwork system of food inspection, with 12 different federal agencies all having some role and responsibility in the food inspection system, and where pizza is inspected by two different agencies, depending on whether it's cheese pizza or pepperoni pizza.

I am impressed with statements made by President Obama's current secretary, Mr. Vilsack, regarding his intent to move toward promotion of a modern unified food safety agency. However, much still remains to be done, from Upton Sinclair's work, The Jungle, to a more efficient standard of food safety. Still much more work has to be done to offer even greater protections and reforms to an expectant and deserving public. More needs to be done in both countries to help restore the public's confidence in the food supply.

Despite anticipated push-back from entities feeling threatened, greater reform in the area of rapid traceability, comprehensive inspections, and mandatory recalls should be aggressively pursued.

Mr. Chairman, from the standpoint of Toxin Alert, the small company headquartered here in Canada, we're here to humbly ask the question: If there exists a promise of another layer of protection, another weapon in our science-based arsenal, another tool in our box, then why should we continue to lay them aside and not pursue the application?

What we humbly offer is the possibility of another option, a detection device called Toxin Guard, which could provide even more confidence to the consuming public that their food is safe to eat, engineered to produce a visual signal that whatever is contained within that plastic wrap is generally okay to bite into. If the burden across the industry has shifted more to the consumer--to wash their hands more diligently, to cook their foods more thoroughly, to store with greater care, and to more diligently observe what can be seen within and among their foodstuffs--then why don’t we arm them with greater knowledge of unseen dangers if such can be made available without great harm and expense?

What we offer, Mr. Chairman, is the possibility and promise of science. The Toxin Guard technology could also greatly assist food inspectors, whether they are federal, provincial, or municipal, in carrying out their duties and ensuring a very high level of surveillance over packaged foods even after they have left food processing plants--in transit or on retail shelves. The consumer would be in a position to detect harmful pathogens right up until the point the package is opened prior to consumption.

So we are here to ask you to take a good look at the promise of Toxin Alert and its Toxin Guard technology. Simply put, when deployed on packaged foods and in the presence of harmful pathogens, be it salmonella, listeria, E. coli, or Pseudomonas--whatever antibody it has been engineered to detect--a visual marker alerting the consumer of the possibility of ingesting harmful bacteria would result.

I would hasten to say that I'm very proud of the technology. It's been proven by laboratories in the U.S. and also in Canada. But I would hasten to add that it's not that simple. Our product is still in the developmental stage and is not yet ready for commercial use. Although we have utilized commercial presses to imprint our antibody delivery device onto plastic material, greatly reducing the incremental cost in the process, we're still at least two years away from full commercial application in large markets.

In these days of economic downturn, we find that our research program could truthfully use a bit of a financial boost.

As I conclude, Mr. Chairman, I will tell you and the members of the committee that there has been high interest in this product in the United States. Right now our company has a contract with the U.S. Department of the Army in the Picatinny Arsenal in the state of New Jersey and Natick Labs in Massachusetts. The toxin technology is currently being tested as a way to confidently deliver food rations to troops in the field and to be able to detect the presence of spoilage and contamination. We look forward to the completion of the joint project with the U.S. army and the prospects of civilian application and private commercialization projects that could soon ensue.

Lastly, I have a word about HACCP. I'm not here to condemn HACCP or any company, but I have to say that HACCP is also currently employed in the United States, and it is, as we know, a process monitoring system, but it is only as good as the company that is monitoring it, the staff that has been deployed toward it, and the overall seriousness with effect to monitoring it. Both must be supported by a management structure that is strong enough and effective enough to ensure that the plan is followed in all respects and that nothing can fall through the gaps. This is critically important in enterprises that could possibly involve life and death, like food.

As I finish, Mr. Chairman, I will say that in the U.S. I've had chances to talk to slaughterhouse and abbatoir workers, and the acronym they use for HACCP is “Have A Cup of Coffee and Pray”. That's what they say.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

[The Chair, Conservative, Larry Miller]

Thank you. That's a new one we haven't heard.

We will start of our questioning with Mr. Easter.

A point of order?

[Brian Storseth, Conservative, Westlock—St. Paul, AB]

Just out of curiosity, I understand from reading the blues from the last meeting that Ms. Bennett was very concerned about bringing these witnesses forward. I was wondering if the committee wanted to adjourn until Ms. Bennett resumes with us so that she can have an opportunity to be here for them. It's up to Mr. Easter.

[Wayne Easter, Liberal, Malpeque, PE]

Just on that point of order, Mr. Chair, the fact of the matter is Mr. Anderson and Ms. Bennett, as I understand it, at the moment are both doing an interview on one of the networks over the crisis that this government has caused relative to isotopes and their not being available for cancer treatment and detection.

[The Chair, Conservative, Larry Miller]

Neither one is a point of order.

Mr. Easter, you have seven minutes or less.

[Wayne Easter, Liberal, Malpeque, PE]

She will be back.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Welcome, folks, and I thank all parties for coming. I do have a number of questions for each, and I'll likely run out of time.

First, Mr. Attaran, in the editorial you mentioned on October 7, 2008, the following statement appeared, and I quote: “Government policy errors helped bring about this epidemic”. That's a pretty damning statement. What policy errors are you referencing, and has any action been taken since that time to respond to the shortcomings, from your perspective?

[Dr. Amir Attaran]

Thank you, Mr. Easter.

I won't go into the full detail of what's already in the editorial, since it's in the record, but briefly, the errors fall into two categories. First, there is the error of maintaining inadequate standards, unprotective standards, low standards for the presence of Listeria monocytogenes bacteria in ready-to-eat food. To reiterate, in Canada we allow 2,500 bacteria per 25 grams of ready-to-eat food. That's legal. In the United States the legal number is zero. That initially is a problem, and that is a failure of government policy to let the standard be as low as that, lower than any of the other 30 countries we looked at, lower than what the World Health Organization recommends.

The second failure lies in what was revealed through I believe a leak of a Treasury Board document about de-emphasizing CFIA's role in inspection and putting more inspection in the hands of the companies that are regulated, pushing inspection, if you will, from a public sector function into a private sector one. The error of that is so obvious as to need no further explanation. Obviously the private sector has to be vigilant and do its own inspections, that's true, but as a supplement and not as a substitute for public inspections. It appears that in the recent past, private inspections did become a substitute to a considerable extent.

[Wayne Easter, Liberal, Malpeque, PE]

Thank you. I'm going to run out of time here.

Mr. Espy, on the Toxin Alert, I think you said a number of things that most of us on the committee can agree to in terms of your experience, requirement for mandatory recalls, etc. You've been in the hot seat on this issue, so you know what needs to be done to prevent serious issues from happening that put you in the hot seat, if I could put it that way. Could you expand on that a little bit?

On the Toxin Alert, what are the costs, and who should pay them, from your perspective? Is there any commercialization in the United States beyond the trial at some military establishments?

[Mike Espy]

Thank you so much, Mr. Easter. I appreciate the questions.

I have been in the hot seat. It's been very warm in that seat. In addition, I have been sued as serving U.S. secretary a number of times by certain companies within the industry regarding even slaughterhouse inspection and how fast the assembly line can be put and the number of workers on the line and all of this. So I've been there.

Regarding your question on Toxin Alert, I'll turn to Mr. Bodenhamer to answer most of that, but I will say that right now we are in trials with the U.S. army regarding fish products from the state of Alaska that will be shipped to our soldiers in Iraq. He'll discuss how soon we are on the path there. Also, the U.S. Senate produced a $3 million appropriation for the further testing of Toxin Alert to make sure it can be moved into commercialization in a more rapid fashion. So we are still in that process.

[William T., Bill) Bodenhamer (President and Chief Executive Officer, Toxin Alert Inc.]

Mr. Easter, we don't have a final fix on the cost, but our estimates, which are generally pretty good, and inflation hasn't been that bad in the last six or eight years, are that for between one and two cents a square foot, effective coverage could be put onto plastic film for one pathogen. You couldn't search for several at that cost, but that is orders of magnitude lower than any other antibody-based diagnostic out there. Our prior experience is in the medical field. Several companies have made antibody-based diagnostics, and we know what the prices are that are charged for those. If it were two cents a square foot, it is certainly orders of magnitude lower.

Other people who have looked.... We have not commercialized it with anyone yet. We're going into our third year of work with the U.S. army. We've had the test vetted at ETL laboratories in Columbus, Ohio, and forwarded those results to whoever would be interested. It has been vetted by 3M Korea and also by the military police hospital in Beijing, China, plus we have some submissions into agencies in Europe. And it appears, the way things are moving, adoption of this might take place outside North America first.

[The Chair, Conservative, Larry Miller]

Thank you.

Time has expired, Mr. Easter.

Mr. Bellavance, seven minutes.

[André Bellavance, Bloc, Richmond—Arthabaska, QC]

Thank you very much.

Ms Bose, you referred to your meeting with Ms. Weatherill and the fact that you had to make quite a lot of effort to be heard. I am curious to know how the meeting went and why the process was so difficult. How much time did you spend with Ms. Weatherill? Did you meet with her personally? Did she ask you questions?

[Anu Bose]

Thank you, Mr. Bellavance.

I am the one who played Sherlock Holmes. Mr. Décary-Gilardeau attended the meeting, because after doing all the sleuthing, I was too tired.

[François Décary-Gilardeau]

In fact, the meeting with Ms. Weatherill and her close collaborators took place one morning with three different consumer groups. The purpose of the meeting was to take the pulse of consumers with respect to the way the crisis had been handled. There was a lot of discussion about the recall process. Although the meeting took place three months ago and the details are a little hazy, we were there to express our views on the recall and, in particular, on the role of the Canadian Food Inspection Agency which, in our opinion, made mistakes.

One thing can never be overstated: the Canadian Food Inspection Agency is there to protect consumers. That has to be its primary role. However, history has shown that there has been some hesitation in that regard, and that is what must be avoided in future.