Subcommittee on Food Safety Committee on April 20th, 2009

[David Anderson, Conservative, Cypress Hills—Grasslands, SK]

Yes.

[Michael H. McCain]

Just to be clear, the M205 sampling plan, if I recall, required 10 samples twice per year--10 samples twice per year.

[David Anderson, Conservative, Cypress Hills—Grasslands, SK]

What did you have to do with those samples?

[Michael H. McCain]

For technical clarity, I don't think any scientist would say 10 samples twice per year would constitute an environmental monitoring program. So where that statistically falls out, you'd better talk to Dr. Huffman, but I just don't think that would be viewed by the industry as an environmental monitoring program.

Again, these aren't reflective of any particular period in history or time or regulation or deregulation. These are practices that have never been in existence, that we're aware of, over time.

Is there anything you'd add to that?

[Randall Huffman]

I'd just like to add that I'm not certain of the reference you have for 2005 and the changes that were made then. I'm not aware of any environmental testing that was required by CFIA prior to this most recent policy. However, there was a requirement to take product samples to be tested for listeria monocytogenes as part of export requirements, as part of the FSIS USDA government regulations. So there were product samples required for facilities that would be exporting to the U.S.

Just to be clear, testing of product for LM is quite different from testing the environment for the organism.

[David Anderson, Conservative, Cypress Hills—Grasslands, SK]

This was end sample product testing or sampling, right? What you're saying is there was no environmental monitoring, but there was in fact a sampling plan in place that did sample product. The end sampling plan, I understand from M200, was specifically for end product sampling; M205 had to do with sampling product as well. You're saying there's no environmental monitoring or sampling, but there was in fact an end product sampling plan in place that was removed in 2005?

[Michael H. McCain]

Are you referring, sir, to the M200 and M205 sampling plans that existed several years ago that required 10 samples twice per year? Is that the one you're referring to?

[David Anderson, Conservative, Cypress Hills—Grasslands, SK]

Yes.

[Michael H. McCain]

The M205 raises a very good point. The M205 sampling plan was a CFIA sampling protocol and not a requirement of the operator to have a sampling protocol, which is a very important point of distinction. The new regulation requires both an operator program and a CFIA validation/verification program, which we think reflects global best practice.

On the CFIA policy, going back to the very old CFIA standard that existed for many years, and I can't say with clarity just exactly how many, but on the M205 sampling plan that required a CFIA sample of 10 samples per year, when you're talking to the scientists over the course of the next several weeks and months, I would ask you to talk to them about the efficacy of that.

[David Anderson, Conservative, Cypress Hills—Grasslands, SK]

That was the one in place and it was removed. Any efficacy it did have would then not exist. You're saying that was taken out and your voluntary program was put in. Obviously that did not work all that well because you had positive samples through last summer, but then you apparently either did not have to report them or did not report them until we had an issue.

[Michael H. McCain]

That observation would be directionally accurate in the sense that we had a voluntary program for reasons that I think we've articulated. Any aggressive--and I emphasize this--environmental monitoring program in a food plant, if it's designed properly, I hope will detect positive findings for listeria, because it's ubiquitous. The learning from that experience was how we respond to those positives and how an operator and therefore the regulator responds to the positives that you determine by design, I hope.

[David Anderson, Conservative, Cypress Hills—Grasslands, SK]

What was the response through the summer prior to people beginning to get sick from it? You had numerous positive samples. What was the response?

[Michael H. McCain]

Our protocol at the time, I emphasize again, was a protocol we had confidence in because we felt it represented best practice at that time. Our program and protocol was that when we determined a positive listeria finding in the environment, we remediated or cleaned up the site where the data indicated we had a positive and then retested it in successive periods. When we got negative findings in successive periods we then assumed that positive finding was remediated and we closed the case.

[David Anderson, Conservative, Cypress Hills—Grasslands, SK]

The positive finding was not remediated then.

[Michael H. McCain]

No. As I say, an environmental program is a control indicator for your facility. That's what we did then. What we didn't do then is we did not look at those positives in the context of a pattern. So what's the pattern of positive findings either on a line, in a product group, or repeat positives? What we didn't do was scientifically investigate the root cause of each one of those positives, because a positive event is only an indicator. We didn't do those things, and I'll say again that it's important that we recognize we're doing that today. It is built into the program today and it is built into the new listeria management policy that was implemented on April 1. Had we been doing that then, we believe there would have been a very different outcome.

[The Chair, Conservative, Larry Miller]

Your time has expired, Mr. Anderson.

Ms. Duncan for five minutes, please.

[Kirsty Duncan, Liberal, Etobicoke North, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, Mr. McCain and your colleagues, for coming. We appreciate your openness and your accountability. This must be very difficult. And we appreciate your concern for the families who are affected.

What I'm struggling with is the lack of coordination regarding the investigation. We should have been in a much better position to deal with the outbreak, as Canada had already been through SARS, and PHAC and public health units and other departmental agencies have spent the last several years planning for pandemic flu--a different disease, but still planning. And the basics of any plan are the same: who takes the lead, what is the reporting structure, and what is the cycle of communication with the media and the public?

The point is, lessons were learned from SARS and lessons have been learned throughout pandemic tabletop drills, and yet we see the same mistakes occurring in the investigation of the outbreak. It would seem as if our country is less prepared for an epidemic than in the past.

I'm wondering if you could comment on that.

[Michael H. McCain]

Dr. Duncan, I can only say that we would welcome anything that would shorten the timeline in these types of investigations. Nobody wins by extending these timelines beyond what science will allow.

We would ask that we keep the process science-based--that's very important--but we would welcome any action by industry or government that would reduce the timeline and enhance the process of identification of a food-borne illness outbreak and a reaction to that.

Dr. Huffman has extensive experience around these things. As you know, he was a leader in this area, working in the United States. He's a world leader in food safety and has experience in many similar situations. Maybe he would comment on that.

[Randall Huffman]

Thanks, Michael.

You raise an excellent point, Dr. Duncan. The science of food-borne illness investigations and epidemiology into food-borne illness outbreaks is a very difficult one. It's one that our scientific community, our government communities, and the industry are getting much better at, but there is still plenty of room for improvement. We need to come up with better and more innovative ways of assigning cause and identifying the food that may be associated with a given cluster of illnesses. Molecular techniques and DNA fingerprinting techniques have greatly enhanced our ability to track food-borne illnesses and to identify their causes, but we've got a lot to learn. We still need to enhance and improve our ability to do that and reduce the timelines.

As a participant in the food industry that has a vested interest in selling safe food, certainly we would welcome any ideas and any additional resources that could improve that.

[Kirsty Duncan, Liberal, Etobicoke North, ON]

Thank you.

To pick up on the questions regarding data, you mentioned that you were collecting data, that the data was made available, and yet only 10 samples were required, I think twice a year.

Could you tell us how quickly listeria grows, and how often it would need to be monitored?

[Randall Huffman]

You've asked two questions. I'll answer the second first, if you don't mind: how often does a food processing plant need to be monitored for listeria to assess control?

That's actually the subject of a two- or three-day workshop to really get at the answer to that question. But to try to simplify it as much as I can for this purpose, it requires a tremendous amount of data and data analysis and sophisticated pattern recognition and understanding of the unique processing environment in which you're assessing.

One thing we've learned in the industry is that one size doesn't fit all with listeria control. So for one facility we may need x number of samples on a daily basis, yet in another facility it may be significantly more than that.

The plan that was laid out in the new policy that went into effect April 1 represents a level and frequency of sampling that is very appropriate as a starting point for a food manufacturer to feel confident about whether or not that process is under control. At the end of the day, what you're really trying to assess, as a manufacturer, is whether or not that particular line is operating under control. So we use statistical process control techniques, SPC, commonly used in the food industry. We use techniques like that, and other analytical tools, to assess whether or not the process is under control. The only way to do that, as we talked about in the earlier questions, is to have a reliable set of data, and assessing the amount of data that's needed in any one case really requires a look at the historical sampling of that particular line within that particular facility.

[The Chair, Conservative, Larry Miller]

Thank you, Mr. Huffman.

Your time has expired, Ms. Duncan.

Mr. Lemieux, you have five minutes.

[Pierre Lemieux, Conservative, Glengarry—Prescott—Russell, ON]

Thank you very much, Chair.

Thank you once again, Mr. McCain, for being here.

As you know, there are four separate reports that have been released in this last week with lessons learned--three by federal government agencies and of course one by the Ontario health department--and they all have their recommendations. I'm sure you're up to speed on the recommendations that have come out in each of them.

One of the criticisms that has come out in the media is that Maple Leaf did the recall and CFIA did not step in and do it for you. I would like to examine this a little bit further.

My understanding is that the minister, or CFIA, has the ability to order a mandatory recall. However, if it's not necessary, if a recall is already happening, then that's good. If they're able to work in a constructive way with a company, then in fact that is good. It shows teamwork and it shows corporate responsibility, as we've seen particularly on behalf of Maple Leaf.

I know you sent a letter out to committee members a couple of weeks ago, and it had your own statements and your timelines in there. One of the things that seemed to stand out for me, in reviewing that report, was that you were working cooperatively with CFIA, and that oftentimes CFIA would provide you with information or suggest something to Maple Leaf and Maple Leaf would be right onto it.

To give a couple of examples, I notice, for example, on August 16, Maple Leaf initiated a recall, but it was after CFIA provided confirmation that there was listeria present. On August 19, as well, Maple Leaf took further action, but once CFIA had informed you of more positive test results.

Certainly, I've been impressed with your corporate responsibility and with your personal responsibility regarding the listeriosis crisis, but I think what I'd like to get your viewpoint on is whether you agree that you and Maple Leaf followed the recall process, your own recall processes, to the best of your abilities.

[Michael H. McCain]

That's an excellent question and certainly something that's topical in both Canada and the United States, and that is the role of the voluntary recall.

It's important to recognize that what is referred to as a “voluntary recall” by a regulator and an operator is so in name only. The reality is that if what's required under the form of a voluntary recall is not completed expeditiously, the voluntary recall will become a mandatory recall in extraordinarily short order. And everybody in the industry knows that's the case. Whereas the word “voluntary” is used ubiquitously in the United States and in Canada, the reality is there are mandatory undertones and requirements that everybody knows exist.

That being said, what Maple Leaf did last year went well above and beyond what would have been a voluntary or mandatory requirement. Industry is required to recall product that is proven to be contaminated. That's what is required of any industry anywhere in the world--recalling the product that you know to be contaminated. We voluntarily went above and beyond that. That's not to say that the mandatory recall wouldn't have been sufficient. It may or may not have been. But we chose, for reasons that were important to us and our public trust, to recall all 198 products from that facility, even though only a very small handful were proven to be contaminated. It was that extra precaution that no government, that we're aware of, or regulatory framework would have absolutely required.

I'm not sure if that distinction is helpful.

[Pierre Lemieux, Conservative, Glengarry—Prescott—Russell, ON]

It's very helpful, in fact. You're sort of underscoring where I was coming from. I understand your comment that if a company doesn't undertake a voluntary recall, it quickly can turn into a mandatory recall. But in enunciating that, you pointed out that a mandatory recall was not required in this circumstance because not only did you and Maple Leaf Foods respond quickly and adequately, you went above and beyond what would have been required in a mandatory recall.

I'm just responding to things I've read in the media that said that CFIA should have used that heavy stick. All I'm trying to bring to light for the committee and for those who are in attendance is that because of the close working relationship you had with CFIA, because of your corporate responsibility, you acted more quickly than a mandatory recall might have produced results, and secondly, you went beyond the call of duty probably because of your corporate responsibility and the harmonious relationship you had.