Evidence of meeting #4 for Subcommittee on Food Safety in the 40th Parliament, 2nd Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was health.
A recording is available from Parliament.
6:10 p.m.
Senator, Senate of Australia
Unfortunately, there isn't a live test for BSE.
6:10 p.m.
Conservative
6:15 p.m.
Conservative
The Chair Conservative Larry Miller
I'd like to reconvene this meeting.
Thank you very much to our witnesses. We have witnesses here from the Public Health Agency of Canada and the federal Department of Health. Welcome to all of you, and thank you very much for attending.
First we'll hear from the Public Health Agency of Canada, Mr. Butler-Jones.
6:15 p.m.
Dr. David Butler-Jones Chief Public Health Officer, Public Health Agency of Canada
Thank you, Mr. Chair. I want to thank the committee for the opportunity to speak here and to acknowledge this very important examination into the listeriosis outbreak of the summer of 2008.
Here with me today are Dr. Frank Plummer, the Public Health Agency's chief science adviser and head of the National Microbiology Laboratory in Winnipeg, and Dr. Mark Raizenne, director general of our Centre for Foodborne, Environmental and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases.
The work of this subcommittee is an important step towards improving our ability to protect the food supply and the health of our population. While we did much right, there are lessons to be learned as we continue to improve the way we respond to such human health events.
The listeriosis outbreak was, without a doubt, a tragic event: 22 people died, and at least 57 more fell ill. Any--any--preventable illness or premature death is a concern for us at the Public Health Agency.
Speaking as Canada's chief public health officer, I can say that it is never easy, either personally or professionally, to deal with events such as this one. As a physician, I've spent countless hours with patients and their families. I understand the feelings of pain, fear, and concern that accompany the many illnesses and injuries a body can endure.
I know as well that those who were affected by this outbreak and the officials who managed it all want a better understanding of the circumstances around it. What we can do is ensure that we learn from these events and apply those lessons--using the right information, shared with the right people, at the right time.
Let me turn briefly, Mr. Chair, to how the Public Health Agency goes about responding to an outbreak.
Broadly, the Public Health Agency of Canada is mandated to promote and protect the health of Canadians and to build public health capacity across the country. This of course includes preparing for and responding to any outbreaks that threaten human health.
Public health is, at its heart, a local activity. Events happen in communities and, by and large, are managed locally. As you know, this particular outbreak was first identified in Ontario and was first managed by the Ontario public health authorities, as was appropriate.
When an outbreak spreads beyond a jurisdiction or exceeds its capacity, the Public Health Agency takes the national lead on the human health side. So when the National Microbiology Laboratory linked listeriosis cases in other provinces to the Ontario outbreak, the agency took the lead in coordinating the national investigation and response.
I'd like to speak for a moment about the role of the chief public health officer in an outbreak.
From the very beginning, I was actively managing the agency's response. As both deputy of the Public Health Agency and Canada's chief public health officer, I have a dual role to play during an outbreak.
As such, I directed our staff, including our medical professionals, our scientists, and our epidemiologists, as they conducted their emergency response activities. I also advised the ministers of health and agriculture on the outbreak itself. Finally, I spoke directly to Canadians, stakeholders, and public health partners about issues affecting their health.
We communicated frequently and in a number of ways to the general public and to those groups most at risk. But you can never communicate too much. For all our actions and preparations, there are always challenges inherent in any public health crisis. We anticipate and overcome those challenges as best we can.
Mr. Chair, I'd like to talk a bit about the challenges faced in investigating and responding to outbreaks.
When public health as a system is dealing with food-borne illnesses, the identification of a source is a particularly complex process. We might be sifting through evidence of cases in towns or cities separated by thousands of kilometres. We need to find the people with the symptoms and have cultures taken so that we can then fingerprint the bacteria to find out whether or not they may have come from the same source. We ask people to identify everything that was eaten over the previous weeks to find, hopefully, a common source. Then those sources need to be investigated to see if they can be connected back to the illness. In this case, we were dealing with an illness where the cause was food that was eaten a month or more earlier.
We were able to do this in this listeriosis outbreak thanks to recent enhancements to our tracking and surveillance systems and to the collaboration with our federal and provincial partners. If this had happened five years ago, we probably would not have found it--if at all--until there were many more cases and deaths.
The technological advances we've made, the systems put in place, and the collaborations we've established since the agency was created have made huge differences in our ability to share and compare data and to plan our responses.
One of the constant challenges with food-borne outbreaks is that authorities are only notified once people have already started getting sick. We usually know we're dealing with a severe outbreak only after there are reports of illnesses of much higher than normal numbers. By that time, it is already too late to prevent cases in those already exposed.
The listeriosis outbreak was more of a challenge than usual, because affected food was being consumed in large numbers by those people who were most vulnerable to infection, including seniors in long-term care facilities and hospitals. Unlike most causes of food-borne outbreaks, with listeria only a tiny percentage of those overall who ate the food actually became ill. It was through our ability to connect the dots across many institutions and provinces that the pattern suggestive of a common problem emerged.
The food supply chain is an intricate web that links many parts of food processes and chains together. From the time food is harvested, through processing, production, delivery, purchase, storage, and preparation, up until we put it into our mouths, there are many possibilities for contaminants. Fortunately, there are many people and organizations involved in our safety and health, from government departments and agencies to industry and individuals. We're all partners in food safety.
While we did find the source, and relatively quickly, much of the criticism has centred around the public's need to be informed even more quickly. Clearly, there are lessons to be learned and applied for each part of the system.
One point I would like to emphasize, however, is the importance of getting it right. Speculation on possible causes during an investigation has the potential to do more harm than good. Take the example of the salmonella outbreak in the U.S. that led to hundreds of people in many states, including some in Canada, getting sick. In the U.S., it was publicly communicated that the cause was thought to be tomatoes. These were removed from the market and people stopped eating tomatoes, thinking the problem was solved, only to find out later that the outbreak was actually caused by jalapeño peppers.
Ultimately, we all have to take stock after an event, especially one such as this. There are always lessons to be learned when we look at what went wrong, what went right, what can be improved, and what can be applied going forward. That's why following the outbreak I asked for the agency to develop a lessons learned report, a process that both Health Canada and the CFIA have also undertaken.
The report noted that we did many things right. For example, our outbreak and emergency management staff expertly managed the human health component of the outbreak. The partnerships between departments, agencies, and the levels of government were strong. Our public communications were important. But it's clear that much needs to be improved. It was found that the agency should approve its advance planning and formalize its outbreak policies and practices as well as its communication protocols. We must also work on clarifying our roles and responsibilities in outbreaks, for the public as well as our partners. We also need to strengthen capacity, for both day-to-day operations and surge capacity during outbreaks.
Going forward, I take each and every one of these recommendations very seriously. I've tasked the agency with the implementation of an action plan and response. We're reviewing our disease surveillance systems, updating our response protocols, strengthening capacity for epidemiological analysis and lab testing, and updating our communications protocols. We're also strengthening our capacity at the national lab, and we've been working with the Council of Chief Medical Officers of Health on a listeriosis working group to maintain public health messaging on listeriosis and food safety. Each lesson learned will be applied.
A coordinated approach is key. We will further engage all agencies and levels of government. A federal-provincial-territorial engagement strategy is planned. This will ensure that we get everybody's input in designing a strengthened system that is more effective and efficient for everyone to use.
In conclusion, let me say that I await with interest the recommendations of this committee and those of the investigator.
Independent investigation and analysis is tremendously important to us—as a complement to our own reviews and work.
Canadians expect that we will constantly improve our abilities and that we will learn from the past, anticipate the future, and respond to the unexpected. This is our work.
Thank you. Merci.
6:25 p.m.
Conservative
The Chair Conservative Larry Miller
Thank you, Mr. Butler-Jones.
We'll now move to the Department of Health and Mr. Rosenberg.
6:25 p.m.
Morris Rosenberg Deputy Minister, Department of Health
Thank you, Mr. Chair. I'd like to thank the subcommittee for inviting us to be here this evening.
I'd like to introduce my colleagues. I have with me today Ms. Meena Ballantyne, assistant deputy minister of Health Canada's health products and food branch; and Dr. Jeff Farber, director, bureau of microbial hazards in the food directorate, health products and food branch.
This evening, I would like to point out the support that Health Canada has provided to the Public Health Agency of Canada and to the Canadian Food Inspection Agency. These are services that we provide all year long and in situations involving foodborne illness.
The Government of Canada's food safety partners—Health Canada, the Public Health Agency, and the Canadian Food Inspection Agency—are committed to protecting the health and safety of Canadians. We are always looking for ways to enhance Canada's food safety system, which is already one of the best in the world. Despite our dedication, the fact is that we were unable to prevent the loss of lives during the listeriosis outbreak of 2008, and that is the bottom line.
The outbreak was, above all, a human tragedy. On behalf of everyone at Health Canada, I'd like to express my sympathy to the families who lost loved ones or had family members who became ill. I'm mindful also of the great anxiety this provoked in all Canadians, and we are deeply committed to learning from this tragedy.
At Health Canada, we're always asking ourselves how we can do things better. As a science-based organization, we are continuously asking whether our policies and practices are keeping pace with the best science available. The Lessons Learned report that we shared with the committee reflects Health Canada's commitment to learning from what worked and what didn't work. I also look forward in this regard to the recommendations that will come from this subcommittee and from Ms. Weatherill's investigation.
Health Canada's role in the federal food partnership is to help build a strong foundation of sound food safety science. Employing the best science available, we work closely with CFIA and the Public Health Agency by performing several key roles.
First, we develop food safety policies, guidelines and standards. For example, we have a policy on Listeria in ready-to-eat foods, which I will say more about shortly.
We conduct food safety research in our labs and carry out tests for the presence of contaminants in food. In the case of listeria, we work in collaboration with the Public Health Agency to operate the listeria reference service. This service maintains a database for listeria and tests food samples to determine whether there's a link between a suspected outbreak and a specified food source.
Upon the request of CFIA, Health Canada conducts scientific health risk assessments that inform the steps the agency takes to respond effectively and appropriately in a given food safety circumstance.
Through our It's Your Health web publications and other routine seasonal food safety advisories, we furnish periodic science-based information to Canadians so they can protect themselves from food-borne illness.
Finally, as part of our role in delivering public health services to first nations, we provide information to communities about food recalls.
In late July of last year, Health Canada received a routine request from Toronto Public Health to test food samples for the presence of listeria. Three of the eleven samples we tested were found to be positive. Those tests were done within the established timeframes expected for the completion of such testing.
Throughout the duration of the outbreak, Health Canada performed the genetic typing of samples necessary to link human outbreaks and a food source. In fact, Health Canada's laboratories tested over 200 samples from July to September. Some samples were also tested by the Public Health Agency's National Microbiology Laboratory in Winnipeg as part of an agreement to expand lab capacity when required.
Once CFIA and the Public Health Agency were able to make the link between the samples in question and the cases of listeriosis, Health Canada scientists used that information, along with existing scientific knowledge, to prepare several health risk assessments that began in August and continued into the fall.
Throughout the management of the outbreak, Health Canada participated in daily teleconferences with CFIA, the Public Health Agency, and Toronto Public Health to share information and manage the response to the outbreak. Dr. Jeff Farber was present as an expert spokesperson at the daily technical briefings held for the media throughout the outbreak. We reissued our It's Your Health article on listeria. The first nations and Inuit health branch's staff disseminated food recalls and alerts as appropriate in the communities where they work. Overall, our staff worked long hours seven days a week during the outbreak and produced lab results and health risk assessments within accepted time targets. All of our health risk assessments were turned around within 24 hours or less.
I'm aware that some questions have been asked about the time it took to complete lab tests. However, the committee should be aware that these tests were carried out within the timeframes required to obtain scientifically reliable results, and were within international norms. This has been confirmed by the chief medical officer of health of Ontario in his recent report, but it's important for the committee to know that we are also undertaking research to determine whether more rapid testing methods could be developed for the future.
Since the outbreak, we have conducted a lessons learned assessment of what we have learned from the outbreak. We focused on operational considerations.
We posted our assessment on Health Canada's Web site, and we have provided a copy to both this subcommittee and to the person responsible for Ms. Weatherill's investigation.
We're working with our federal and provincial partners to ensure that roles and responsibilities in an outbreak are clearly defined and that communications protocols are strengthened.
Health Canada has long had in place a policy on listeria. In his remarks to the committee, Michael McCain stated that “The Health Canada policy [on listeria] is based on sound scientific principles and is recognized globally as an appropriate approach to listeria control”. But in keeping with our organizational commitment to constantly review and improve processes, Health Canada is also in the midst of updating the listeria policy to reflect the latest scientific information available. We are undertaking broad-based consultations on the revision of this policy and expect to have it finalized by the end of this fiscal year.
As well, in September Health Canada issued an interim marketing authorization to enable the use of sodium acetate and sodium diacetate as food additives in certain ready-to-eat meats, as these additives can be used to inhibit the growth of listeria.
We are working to build greater surge capacity in our health risk assessment and lab testing functions. This means having enough people to do the work when urgent situations place a greater demand on our labs. During the outbreak, our technical experts worked day and night to perform the tests required.
Our approach will entail enhanced cross-training so that we can draw upon a greater pool of expertise over longer periods of time.
We have staff on call 24 hours a day, seven days a week, to handle risk assessments in order to help manage food safety situations. The food directorate is also taking steps to streamline testing procedures by standardizing the information we require, and by having one contact point for the rapid flow of information between the partners.
New measures have been implemented to strengthen the coordination of public communications and to enhance the focus on providing information for vulnerable populations.
We're also working to streamline our regulatory processes.
As I mentioned earlier, we take our mandate very seriously at Health Canada. We have an unwavering commitment to doing our part to protect the safety of Canada's food supply.
Through our Lessons Learned report, we have demonstrated our commitment to learning from this very difficult experience and to being accountable for our performance.
To conclude, our overriding goal now is to work closely with our federal food safety partners, this committee, and the independent investigator to make sure we have the procedures in place to ensure, to the extent science will allow, that an outbreak of this kind doesn't happen again.
Thank you for your attention. We'd be pleased to take your questions.
6:35 p.m.
Conservative
The Chair Conservative Larry Miller
Thank you very much, Mr. Rosenberg.
We'll move to Ms. Bennett for seven minutes.
6:35 p.m.
Liberal
Carolyn Bennett Liberal St. Paul's, ON
Thanks very much.
My questions are mainly around two things: internal and external communications. I am concerned that in the Lessons Learned report from the Public Health Agency of Canada, on Wednesday, August 6, Toronto Public Health informed the Canadian Food Inspection Agency of two listeriosis illnesses, and yet the first mention of fact is on Wednesday, August 13.
I'm concerned that in your opening remarks, Dr. Butler-Jones, you said that when outbreak spreads, or whatever, the Public Health Agency takes the national lead on the human health side. I'm concerned that somehow PHAC should have been involved right from the beginning, and the Canadian Food Inspection Agency should have let you know right up front. I think we all sensed the frustration of Dr. Williams at the press conference on Friday, that it just seemed nobody was talking to one another. Even in these documented conference calls, I would be shocked that the Ontario chief public health officer, in recommendation 4.4, said the federal chief public health officer designate should be the official media spokesman for a national outbreak. Yet that's your job. It's already your job.
Why is that recommendation coming from Ontario? Even in your Lessons Learned report, the first time you speak, your CTV appearance is the end of August. I thought your job was to speak directly down the barrel of a camera and let Canadians know what they can or can't do as soon as anything has entered the food chain. I do not understand from any of you at the table why Agriculture Canada and the Ministry of Agriculture were in any way the lead on this when it had already entered the food chain on August 6.
I am hugely frustrated that somehow everything we learned from SARS in terms of the need for Naylor's 4 C's: collaboration, cooperation, communication, and clarity of who does what when. What on earth happened that you weren't involved even in your own lesson learned? In August they order the conference calls led by CFIA about a week or so later. Why are the conference calls being led by CFIA when it's already in the food chain? I thought that's why we set up the agency and set up the chief public health officer. I don't understand why you weren't in front of Canadians every day, as your job description says. Why on earth was Agriculture in charge once it hit the food chain? We know on BSE that's an Agriculture lead. This had hit the food chain. Why was the Public Health Agency of Canada not the lead and the face of this outbreak to Canadians instead of Michael McCain?
6:40 p.m.
Chief Public Health Officer, Public Health Agency of Canada
Mr. Chair, thank you, and thank you, member, for the question and the commentary.
There are several pieces to that. The first is that on August 6 it was not a national outbreak. It was an outbreak within an institution that local public health was dealing with and should deal with appropriately and engage local CFIA appropriately. At the time of August 6, we did not know. It was not until August 13 that we had tests that would indicate there was something more than the occasional sporadic case or local activity.
6:40 p.m.
Liberal
Carolyn Bennett Liberal St. Paul's, ON
Just because I'm going to run out of time, I might as well just get you to explain.
By August 8 CFIA knew it was Maple Leaf Foods. We know that Maple Leaf Foods has a national distribution system and that the risk this could be national was immediate. How could we do this better in the future and not wait until the disease is all across the country--not wait to find out, as Dave Williams was saying, that he thought it was only institutional food and not at the deli counters? How could we do this differently such that from August 6 you are implicated in this because this has the risk of being a national outbreak?
6:40 p.m.
Chief Public Health Officer, Public Health Agency of Canada
With respect, we did not know it was Maple Leaf. It could have been the lettuce, the mayonnaise, or any--
6:40 p.m.
Liberal
Carolyn Bennett Liberal St. Paul's, ON
Your report of Friday, August 8, determines that it's Maple Leaf, established 1970.
6:40 p.m.
Chief Public Health Officer, Public Health Agency of Canada
That's just where the meat came from. That is not where the other constituents of the sandwiches that were sampled came from. The risk of cross-contamination is always there. You don't know until you actually have the sample directly from the meat and the process whether it was otherwise contaminated. At that time we didn't know that.
Perhaps I can address the question of my engagement and at what point. As chief public health officer, my job is to ensure we know what we know. We communicate to the public based on what is known, what is not known, what we're doing to find out, what we're doing to address the problem, and what people need to do to protect themselves and address the issues. Whether it comes directly out of my mouth all the time or not is less of an issue. Certainly it's flattering that people think my visibility before the cameras is important. I was in front of cameras in many interviews and on webcasting. My statement was in over 100 newspapers across the country, as well as open to media, etc. The media quoted Mr. McCain because that was a different kind of news story and was certainly of public interest--he's a very good communicator--but that's a different question. I was certainly there.
Early in the outbreak, when we were identifying it, we had technical experts out front expressing the issues at the time. I got engaged in more public ways after that. My job was not just to communicate with the public; it was also to manage the outbreak. It's my judgment--
6:45 p.m.
Conservative
6:45 p.m.
Chief Public Health Officer, Public Health Agency of Canada
In the federal system, when there is a food outbreak, the recalls, etc., are Agriculture and CFI issues. The human health aspects of it--the understanding and making sure of the advice to the system and the process on human health--are for the public health agencies. It's my responsibility and accountability to do that. That's what we did at that time.
One of the lessons learned is that there's an expectation of more visibility of the CPHO. Even when Dr. Raizenne or Dr. Plummer are in a better position to speak to this technically, there's an expectation that this role is more visible. That's one of the things we've learned.
Thank you.
6:45 p.m.
Bloc
André Bellavance Bloc Richmond—Arthabaska, QC
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Perhaps we got the sense that Health Canada was less present at the beginning because the captain of the ship, then health minister, Tony Clement, chose to remain at the Democratic convention in the U.S. rather than come home to handle the crisis.
Since it is time to take stock of the situation and since most of the stakeholders have submitted their reports, I would like to go back to what you said earlier, and I quote:
But the technological advances we've made, the systems put in place, and the collaborations we've established since the agency was created have made huge differences in our ability to share and compare data and to plan our responses.
That seems to slightly contradict the comments of the CFIA, which mentions in its report improving communication and coordination between branches. It also seems to contradict what Ontario's chief medical officer of health said, and I quote: “The lack of effective communication among the partners created a sense of lack of coordination.”
Despite what you have told us, do you get the sense that the agencies that deal with this type of crisis are on parallel tracks? They will not necessarily do a bad job, but they are not always as connected as they need to be to coordinate their efforts effectively. You do not seem to have observed what the CFIA and Ontario's chief medical officer of health noted in their respective reports. Do you think that is because you do not share the same view or because you did not see these weaknesses?
6:45 p.m.
Chief Public Health Officer, Public Health Agency of Canada
Allow me to answer in English.
You can never communicate too much, even when you communicate well. My experience over many outbreaks, many years, and many events is that no matter how much you communicate, there are always lessons to be learned and ways in which you can communicate better. There are always going to be some glitches, and we learn from those to ensure that those gaps in the future are more likely to be filled.
On the coordination of that committee, there was very good cooperation between us and public health in Ontario and with our federal partners. There were regular conversations. With the ministers there were daily conversations, updates, and discussions about what was happening. The ministers' concern was that we were doing the right things and addressing the issues through this. That was the focus of their questioning to me. My responses related to what we were doing to address and identify the issues, the scale of the problem, and how we could improve the situation further.
On the lessons learned, as we look at this we will continue to find better ways to improve. We are in a much better position than we were five years ago technologically and on collaboration, cooperation, and information sharing. Five years ago, one of the things that gave rise to the agency was SARS and the challenges around communications. We worked very hard at that. It's not perfect. We continue to try to improve that.
6:50 p.m.
Bloc
André Bellavance Bloc Richmond—Arthabaska, QC
Your answer suggests that you did not necessarily identify the same weaknesses as the CFIA and Ontario's chief medical officer of health. That leads me to believe that there was perhaps a lack of communication or coordination.
To follow up on what Ms. Bennett said, it is Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada that takes the lead in a crisis of this nature. Is that normal? As soon as public health is involved, is there a predetermined system, even before such a crisis hits, to tell us who deals with it, in cooperation with other partners and stakeholders? Or is it random? I would like to know whether there is really an established protocol. If not, the situation can surely be improved.
April 22nd, 2009 / 6:50 p.m.
Chief Public Health Officer, Public Health Agency of Canada
Indeed there is. Agriculture and CFIA deal with the food and the food investigation; we deal with the human health aspects of that. Health Canada does a bit of both. We're fairly clear at the federal level about what those are. One of the communications things we can be clearer about is ensuring that our partners understand that. On the comments from Ontario and elsewhere about whose role is what, we need to be clear about that. It's one of the lessons we've learned from this process.
In terms of Agriculture, in this case it was a food-borne outbreak, and the control of the food was the first priority to prevent further human illness. It was our responsibility to speak to the human health issues and make sure the public health perspective was reflected in all of those actions.
6:50 p.m.
Bloc
André Bellavance Bloc Richmond—Arthabaska, QC
When the time comes to take stock of the situation, obviously, the ball is tossed and everyone points fingers. This week, representatives from CFIA appeared before the committee. We saw that they were not willing to take much responsibility for the handling of the crisis.
I have a letter from the agency to Ontario's chief medical officer of health. I will need you to elaborate. The letter says:
[...] samples taken by Toronto Public Health were sent to Health Canada's Listeria Reference Service (LRS) laboratory in Ottawa for testing, rather than to the CFIA regional laboratory in Scarborough. Significantly, these were submitted as routine samples, with no indication of the potential connection to a disease outbreak and in the absence of important product identification information.
Therefore, the Ontario health system is being blamed for doing what it did.
Is there a protocol in place? Did Ontario follow the protocol it should have? The samples were sent to Health Canada's Listeria Reference Service laboratory in Ottawa. Was that the correct procedure? If not, why did Ontario send the samples there? What the CFIA seems to be implying is that an error was made—the samples were processed normally, and there was no indication of a potential crisis.
6:50 p.m.
Chief Public Health Officer, Public Health Agency of Canada
First of all, I would treat this in the context of lessons learned. Mr. Chair, lessons are learned at all levels of the system. This is not accusatory. I do not read this as blame or shifting the blame.
In terms of submission of samples, our expectation is that they would come to the Health Canada lab, and perhaps Dr. Farber might want to speak to that. In addition, in the preparation of samples, there's additional training I think we need to engage in to ensure local public health is taking the proper samples that will speed up our ability to do this. That's a lesson learned, which we all have a piece of, and the CFIA, we ourselves, Health Canada, and local and provincial public health can improve on that. That's what it's identifying in terms of the steps in the process that contributed to that. It's not about who's what. We all have something to learn through this.
6:50 p.m.
Conservative
6:50 p.m.
NDP
Malcolm Allen NDP Welland, ON
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thank you all for being here.
As we talk about who takes the lead, who takes the role of being the public face, what Mr. McCain said the other evening was—and it's in his report that he presented to us—that he was the public face of listeriosis during the outbreak. He has a reason to be the public face as far as Maple Leaf is concerned, but in my humble opinion, not when it comes to the Canadian public as a whole, when it comes to responsibility for food safety. He certainly has a responsibility for Maple Leaf products, which ultimately were indeed the source of the outbreak, as we've now all identified. He has quite openly said it was true.
But as we started to work through this process, through this timeline that you talk about, Dr. Butler-Jones, there were a number of things, and a number of recalls started to happen from different areas. We've got places like Shopsy's Reuben sandwiches and Mr. Sub, so it goes beyond, in the sense of...albeit those food substances did come from the Maple Leaf product and that particular Bartor Road facility.
The question is this. When did it enter the mind of the Public Health Agency that perhaps this had gone across the border, if you will, from province to province? There is evidence of when it might be pointed out or not. When did you think PHAC really needed to be the front face of this?
I'll be honest with you, as you articulated earlier about your communication process of webcasting, that doesn't get to Canadians in a good way. It gets to certain segments of the population, for certain—probably teenagers more than anybody else. It certainly wouldn't get to somebody like my mother. You're open to the media, and I appreciate the fact that you were open to it, but I would suggest what you needed to do was actually be proactive and be in the media's face so that you became the public face, or someone who was the designate. I use you, sir, as the point person. It doesn't necessarily have to be your face, as you said earlier. It doesn't necessarily have to be yours.
I'm mindful of what the late Dr. Sheela Basrur did in Toronto when the SARS situation happened. Clearly, in the province of Ontario where I come from, she became its face. She became the point where everyone said, “When Dr. Basrur speaks about this particular incident, we're listening.” In this particular case when Michael McCain speaks, we're hearing somebody who's the producer of this particular source, and the first question that gets asked by a lot of Canadians is, “Hmm, is he the person we really should listen to? He's being honest. He's being as fair as he possibly can. But ultimately, does he speak on behalf of the food safety system or does he speak on behalf of Maple Leaf?” That's a dichotomy nobody can really answer in their own mind without looking at it.
I asked a simple question. I think it's simple enough. When did you know? When did you think your organization or Health Canada should have been front and centre of this particular outbreak?