Evidence of meeting #14 for Foreign Affairs and International Development in the 39th Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was haiti.
Conservative
The Chair Conservative Kevin Sorenson
Do you get the idea maybe that there are so many good little projects going on—NGOs doing this, agencies doing that, groups doing this, faith-based agencies doing that—but there's no one wrapping this thing all up, working under one basic plan? I mean, many different plans can work, but sometimes many plans can't work at the same time.
So these are all good strategies, but are we missing that one strategy that ties it all together?
President, Rights and Democracy
Mr. Chair, I agree with you. That's why I mentioned earlier that in this phase—and I won't repeat that for us this has profoundly changed, with the election—we have to rethink what we are doing with our NGO partners in Haiti. We have to stop working with each little group and try to organize sectors—for women, for students, and for others--in such a way that, at the end of the day, what you just mentioned may happen; everyone will know a little more what the others do, and will be able to plan together.
Concerning our work in Haiti, we have worked a lot with NGOs in the past, and we'll do that in the future, but we're also looking to work with the new government. I mentioned earlier that we hope the high commissioner creates an office and does what they've been doing in other countries. We have a joint budget and joint program with the high commissioner in Geneva. We may use part of that money to help the high commissioner do the three things I mentioned: first, help create this national commission of human rights; second, help the government look at its law and see what is needed to ensure the protection of rights; and third--I should have started with this--make an inventory of the situation.
We'll do that with, I hope, the high commission in the context of helping the government develop institutions in that domain.
Conservative
The Chair Conservative Kevin Sorenson
Thank you.
We want to thank you for coming here. Certainly it has helped our committee, and we appreciate that.
We'll suspend for just one minute. Dinner will be brought in a little later on. We have other witnesses waiting here, and we have committee business, so we want to come back as quickly as possible.
Conservative
The Chair Conservative Kevin Sorenson
We'll call this meeting back to order.
For the second hour, we're pleased to have with us Stephen Wallace, vice-president of CIDA's policy branch; and Yves Pétillon, program director for Haiti, Cuba, and the Dominican Republic, Americas Branch, at CIDA.
We're interested in a lot of different components of what CIDA is involved in, and primarily a document entitled Canadian Cooperation with Haiti: Reflecting on a Decade of Difficult Partnership, which was published in December 2004.
We appreciate the minister being here, and Mr. Greenhill's attendance in the past. We want to discuss CIDA's experience with assistance to Haiti as a fragile state.
You have been here and listened to the committee in the last hour. You understand that we give our presenters ten minutes and then we go to five-minute questions and answers. That five minutes is for the question and the answer, to keep things moving.
Welcome, Mr. Wallace and Mr. Pétillon. The time is yours.
Stephen Wallace Vice President, Policy Branch, Canadian International Development Agency
Thank you very much. It's a real pleasure to be here.
Monsieur Pétillon, as director of the Haiti program, also lived in Haiti from 2001-04. He should be able to give you some on-the-ground perspectives about some of the developments you've been discussing over the last hour.
I'd also like to acknowledge the extensive work of the committee at a really critical moment for Haiti. We'll follow your deliberations with interest. If we can help in any way, we would be very pleased to do so.
We've tabled four documents with the committee: "Haiti-Country Development Programming Framework/CDPF"; "Summary of Lessons Learned by Donors in Haiti"; "Guidelines for Effective Development Cooperation in Fragile States"; and, lastly, "Canadian Cooperation with Haiti: Reflecting on a Decade of 'difficult partnership'". This last document, which you referred to, was prepared for the OECD.
My remarks will be fairly brief. I won't go beyond the five-minute limit so that I can hand the floor over to my colleague. My remarks will concern the last document, which analyzes the context of fragility prevailing in Haiti, identifies some of the key Canadian and international cooperation issues and states certain conclusions and principles regarding our overall approach to fragile states.
In referring to the analysis that we undertook for the OECD, let me start with a basic observation about fragility and development.
Many of the basics of aid effectiveness are quite clear: the importance of local ownership, donor coordination, alignment of priorities and resources, sustained engagement, and cross-government policy coherence. This committee, I think, has heard and discussed a lot of these across many issues.
The point we would make, which comes out of the study, is that these principles of aid effectiveness are especially difficult to apply in fragile states because of the fundamental lack of authority, legitimacy, and capacity. It's these fundamental shortcomings of authority, legitimacy, and capacity that manifest themselves in very different ways across fragile states. It is therefore not surprising that our studies show that understanding the local dynamics of fragility is a key determinant of effective engagement.
Even more importantly--and I think this was alluded to by one of the members, Mr. Chair--is that this understanding needs to be structured, it needs to be ongoing, and it needs to be shared, or it results in very ad hoc, very uncoordinated and sometimes mutually incompatible results, as we have seen elsewhere, particularly in the context of Haiti.
It is a very different environment from fragile state to fragile state. The warlords, terrorism, and poppy culture in Afghanistan are not the same as the ethnic resource wars of Sudan, and they owe little, in turn, to the historical, socio-economic, political, environmental, and security dimension of Haiti's instability.
We've found, therefore, in Haiti and elsewhere, that shared perspectives across governments and the donor community, leading to shared commitments to achieve stability and concrete progress toward millennium development goals, are basic conditions of success. That was our first and overwhelming conclusion, and it was taken up subsequently within the OECD as one of the fundamental principles of aid effectiveness in fragile states.
As for our second conclusion, our study also concluded that in a politically charged, corrupt, and high-risk environment, even greater attention is required to ongoing monitoring and evaluation to ensure due diligence and oversight, because if it can go wrong in fragile states it most often will.
Realistic targets must also be set. Sometimes "realistic" means just a arresting a decline, not making progress. But we need to set these realistic targets and determine early on if we're making enough progress and adjusting as needed, with the kind of flexible response mechanisms that I'll talk about in a second.
And we must reflect, as well, the mutual accountability that must govern the aid relationship. That was our second set of conclusions.
Our third conclusion in this study for the OECD was that effectiveness in Haiti and elsewhere requires a long-term commitment of resources. We all know in development that progress takes time, but stabilizing crises, building accountable institutions, and rebuilding trust and a social contract are among the greatest challenges of development. And in this context, on-again, off-again relationships with poorly applied conditionality can sometimes do more harm than good.
Mr. Chairman, this is not about ensuring that annual budgets are spent; it's about ensuring, in a flexible and responsive manner, an ongoing relationship based on dialogue, accountability, and mutual responsibility.
Our fourth of five conclusions is that it takes a lot more than effective programming to make a lasting difference in fragile states. Diplomatic dialogue at a bilateral and multilateral level, backed up by support for basic security and an activist approach to outreach, involving both state and non-state actors, are essential for achieving sustainable results.
Our last conclusion, Mr. Chairman, emphasizes that it is important to adopt iterative approaches to implementation. Here we're talking about involving various partners, providing for alternative solutions selected from a full range of delivery mechanisms and about forming a critical mass of resources in order to achieve tangible results.
We have seen in Haiti, as elsewhere, an international community that has a responsibility to prevent, protect, and rebuild countries in crisis, including difficult partnerships where will or capacity, or both, are lacking. This government has undertaken tangible steps in this area, but great challenges still lie ahead in fragile states such as Haiti. The work we undertook, therefore, in relation to this study is helping the international community and us to understand the need for a different and more effective approach to development assistance in fragile states.
Mr. Chair, that concludes the main aspects of the study that was undertaken. It was undertaken, as you mentioned, at the end of 2004. For a short update from 2004 to the present, and on how this was implemented in practice, I will turn to my colleague Monsieur Pétillon, with your agreement.
Yves Pétillon Program Director, Haiti, Cuba and Dominican Republic Americas Branch, Canadian International Development Agency
Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, thank you for inviting us to appear before you as part of the debate on Canadian cooperation in Haiti.
As my colleague said, Haiti is a country very dear to my heart. I lived there for a few years, and now I'm responsible for this program at CIDA.
The report we are talking about was written two years ago, and I would like to present the evolution of international cooperation, specifically the evolution of Canadian cooperation since 2004.
We took into account many of the conclusions that were presented in chapter 6 of the report, concerning aid allocation, service delivery, country ownership, alignment, harmonization, and policy coherence.
In 2004, less than three weeks after Aristide's departure, the first action that the international community took as a whole was to meet in Washington to decide on measures that should be taken. For once, the international community, donors, banks and bilateral cooperation organizations decided to work together and to establish a plan. That had not been the case when cooperation resumed in 1994 upon Aristide's return. Each of the donors had gone off on its own, without any coordination between those organizations or with government.
What was new in 2004 was this genuine will to coordinate efforts and to establish a single plan. Together, we proposed this approach to Mr. Latortue's transition government, and, in April 2004, at a joint meeting in the presence of the Port-au-Prince government, we decided together, donors and government, to design the Interim Cooperation Framework.
The Interim Cooperation Framework, which was based on an analysis of the situation in the country, guided the transition government and all the donors during those two years. Our cooperation program thus fits into the Interim Cooperation Framework. That had never previously been done in Haiti. So that was a very significant starting point in 2004.
In addition, at virtually the same time, Canadian cooperation defined a new strategic approach for Haiti. You moreover have the document, since it was distributed to you today. There are four key ideas in that strategic approach.
First, build on what's already there. What's working? What have we done right? What can we build on to do better, to continue what we've done right?
Second, pay special attention to conflict prevention and management, since this is a country coping with numerous deeply rooted societal conflicts.
Three, help build social consensus, in view of the fragmentation in this country.
Four, support the agents of change.
Those are the four leitmotifs of our orientation over the past two years.
As regards the allocation of aid, the report that you've read mentions and criticizes the major fluctuations in aid in Haiti since 1994. Depending on the circumstances, it recommends a long-term sustained commitment to achieve greater predictability of available amounts and greater stability. Aid from CIDA and Canada increased from $26 million in 2003-2004 to $99 million in 2004-2005, then fell to $98 million in 2005-2006. We responded extremely quickly, and we hope that the conference in Port-au-Prince in July will confirm Canada's long-term commitment so that there is greater predictability and our Haitian partners are more able to plan.
We were criticized because we had too many projects and too many small budgets. We have therefore undertaken longer-term project planning. The vast majority of our projects are currently planned over periods of five to 10 years and have budgets ranging between $15 and $20 million. This is a major change in CIDA's programming in Haiti.
We have also exercised our influence on other donors, something that perhaps can't be measured in terms of concrete results. Thanks in part to Canada, the World Bank has returned to Haiti. The World Bank simply left Haiti in 1999. We helped pay a portion of the arrears owed to the World Bank so that it restarted its program in 2004. We also paid Haiti's fees to join the Caribbean Development Bank. Consequently, there's a new financing organization that can meet Haiti's needs. That wouldn't have been possible without Canada.
The 2004 report referred to the inefficiency and conditionality of service delivery. My colleague mentioned that in his presentation. Allow me to give you an example. Extreme conditionalities were imposed during the military coup from 1991 to 1994. An economic embargo was declared on Haiti. That embargo didn't really achieve any results. On the contrary, it helped enrich those we had intended to punish. It took other methods to restore democracy to the country. So conditionalities in Haiti are a problem that must be delicately addressed. Instead we should opt for serious dialogue on policies with the government, while supporting the development of the institutions' capabilities in order to enable them to meet their obligations.
The report also recommends a diversified range of channels and methods for delivering aid, as well as targeting areas of excellence.
One of the key lessons learned from past experience of our cooperation in Haiti is that we have to support both the civil society and the public institutions. Therefore, CIDA supports various types of partnerships, combining the value-added of Canadian and Haitian organizations as well as organizations from the diaspora. CIDA's solid network of Canadian and local partners across Haiti should be outlined as a major value-added of our cooperation program.
Finally, in addition to supporting both the civil society and the public institutions in their respective roles, we support the dialogue between them, between the civil society and the government. I believe it's very important to support this type of dialogue
As regards delivery mechanisms, when it comes to delivering emergency humanitarian aid or any type of humanitarian aid, we call upon the multilateral institutions, such as the World Food Program, which we mostly fund in Haiti for food aid, aid for children and aid for pregnant women.
The report also recommended that we establish a new mechanism based on local funds. That's what we've done. In 2004, we put in place a fund management centre, which became an extremely important mechanism in our cooperative effort, with a budget of approximately $15 million a year, which enables us to take quick and flexible action and to provide rapid support for organizations that bring about change in Haiti when the opportunity arises. This is a new mechanism which is useful and which benefits a lot of organizations. For example, the organization of those who preceded us here is financed in part by these local funds.
In addition to funding organizations and managing funds, this team that we have in Port-au-Prince is working on the institutional reinforcement of Haitian partners, both in government and civil society. Projects that are put forward very often do not meet criteria because the organizations do not have the necessary capability. An effort is thus being made to develop those capabilities, and an effort is also being made to manage funds, as well as to network organizations. All too often, partners and organizations are isolated, and this effort to network organizations that work in the same sector, be it education, health or human rights, is very important.
The sectoral approach was one of the other aspects raised in the report. Canadian expertise is widely recognized in key sectors such as energy, local development, health, education and support for the general women's movement for change.
In the past two years, CIDA has begun developing sectoral orientation frameworks to better target its operations in each of those areas of excellence. In addition, where we think it is possible, and where we think there is value-added, we try to twin Canadian funds with the funds of other donors, which can have a multiplier effect. We used this method, in particular, in the elections. All funds were pooled and managed by the UN Development Fund, and that was much more effective. As our predecessor said, together we all managed to carry out this electoral operation that few people believed in.
As regards local ownership, coherence and coordination,
the report recommends aid effectiveness principles be adapted and applied, especially regarding ownership, coherence among donors and the Haitian government, and coordination among donors. Since 2004, significant progress has been made in these areas. The international community mobilized itself, and donors agreed as well, to a long-term commitment to Haiti so that country could work toward sustainable development. To do so, all development partners recognize the importance of working together to develop a common analysis. As early as May 2004, donors and Haitian authorities prepared a detailed needs assessment to address Haiti's stabilizations and the constrictions. An interim cooperation framework was based on this detailed assessment.
In addition to working together on this needs analysis and this joint effort to arrive at a common plan, we've worked with the transitional government to put in place sectoral frameworks in health, education and so on, to achieve the best possible coordination between donors in the implementation of the joint plan.
I must say that the new Préval-Alexis government, which has just entered office, has confirmed the validity of this model. With the new government, we are continuing to develop the model and are working to extend the Interim Cooperation Framework for an additional year, with virtually the same coordination framework. So that's an asset that's been taken into consideration by the new authorities. I believe that's quite positive.
Local ownership isn't just the government's business. It's also the business of people in civil society. We are working hard to support those people and to develop local development plans in the communes and communal sections. This is what's called the Local Development Program, which is one of the highlights of our program in Haiti.
I'm going to summarize because I believe my presentation is a little long.
The 2004 report also raised the question of the coherence of Canadian policies. It stated that Canada had made notable progress in coordinating its policies in Haiti. I must say that, since 2004, the coordination between Foreign Affairs, National Defence and the RCMP has improved. The elections are a perfect example of that. The diplomatic efforts made by Foreign Affairs, the technical assistance and funding provided by CIDA, the increased security supplied by the RCMP, as well as a coordinator put at the disposal of MINUSTAH authorities by National Defence are a very good example of how we've coordinated our efforts here in Canada to achieve this good election result. I believe it was good. Of course, it requires constant effort. All the people from those various departments met at least every two weeks to exchange information in order to better target the future of our cooperation in those countries.
Thank you.
Conservative
The Chair Conservative Kevin Sorenson
Thank you.
We will go into the first round of questions.
Mr. Patry, you have five minutes, and you'll be splitting your time.
Liberal
Bernard Patry Liberal Pierrefonds—Dollard, QC
Thank you for being here, Mr. Wallace and Mr. Pétillon.
We know perfectly well that we all want winning conditions in Haiti. We also know that all the problems have been studied in all possible ways.
I'd like to ask two or three brief questions.
First, you talked about the coordination among donors. I'm very pleased to hear that the coordination is being done very well. There's also what you call local ownership. In that perspective, you referred to the communities and government. Before your report was published in 2004, we saw that there were major difficulties at the local level. Have those local problems been ironed out? Are things working well? You referred to communities in certain regional sectors. Can you tell the committee what regions you're in and what fields you're working in right now? That's my first question.
Second, we know that Haiti's debt is in the order of $2.1 billion. In Canada's case, Haiti only owes $2.5 million to the Canadian Wheat Board. Canada is not seeking repayment of that debt, only interest.
As Haiti is not a highly indebted poor country, an HIPC, it is eligible for debt relief or extension of its debt by the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund. Have any changes been made in that regard? This country is so poor that it will never repay its debt, and that's not hard to understand.
I'd like to ask you one last question, and you can answer me in writing. Canada paid Haiti's fees to join the Caribbean Development Bank. That's excellent. Has the Caribbean Development Bank made any investment, and, if so, in what areas? I'd like to have those answers in writing because I want my colleague to have an opportunity to ask a question.
Conservative
Liberal
Albina Guarnieri Liberal Mississauga East—Cooksville, ON
Thank you very much.
You mentioned earlier that you wanted a long-term commitment of resources and you talked about realistic targets. You also mentioned, if I'm not paraphrasing you incorrectly, that you didn't necessarily make tangible progress.
In the 18 years that I've been a member of Parliament, the question that taxpayers always have with respect to CIDA is, where does the money go? Obviously there needs to be public confidence to get the public support for additional resources. What are you doing to communicate stats or any kind of plan about what you're doing and to tell the public what portion of your budget actually leaves the country? How rare is it that funds fall into the hands of corrupt governments or circular financial schemes?
I recall an incident where some moneys were supposed to go to Mali and they ended up with a businessman here in Canada. They were told to go sue the businessman, so that didn't inspire a lot of public confidence.
What is your strategy to try to encourage public confidence?
Thank you.
Vice President, Policy Branch, Canadian International Development Agency
Thank you. I think Mr. Pétillon is going to handle some of the Haiti-specific elements of it.
With respect to the issue of results, let me deal with some of the aspects of the study.
We're quite conscious in the development area of the kind of framework of results that is a bit more sophisticated in the way it is operated, and Mr. Pétillon can show you what that actually looks like. We would be happy to share with the committee our results report on Haiti, which gives the specifics that you mentioned.
I think the issue with respect to results, which is the challenge here, is not so much development results, but fragility results. If legitimacy, authority, and capacity are the key drivers of fragility, how do you measure progress? You can measure development progress in sectors, and you can measure economic and social development in ways that I think have a pretty good background to them, but measuring authority, capacity, and legitimacy actually require new ways of looking at it. We've been doing some work with Carleton University that is being looked at internationally with a considerable interest, because people haven't gone there yet, and we're developing indexes for those three.
From the development perspective, perhaps Mr. Pétillon could give you that sense.
Program Director, Haiti, Cuba and Dominican Republic Americas Branch, Canadian International Development Agency
We recently prepared a report, not on impacts, since impacts are measured over the long term, but on outcomes. Here I have a document, which is not final and which we can submit to you in the next few weeks, and which is intended as a summary of results in the context of the Interim Cooperation Framework. Each of our projects is measured on the basis of results achieved.
We're also trying to conduct an analysis of the program as a whole over the last two years. This is a document we're finalizing. I nevertheless brought it along today in order to show you. I promise you we'll send it to the committee as soon as it's finished—it won't be long.
I explained the Interim Cooperation Framework to you. At the Brasilia conference, which the member attended, a draft report on all donors was submitted. In other words, all donors, in partnership with Haiti's interim government, prepared a report on the implementation of this common framework.
We contacted the authors of the document today to see whether it was final. That's not yet the case, but it will be very soon. So I'll be pleased to table it with the committee as well once it's considered final. It isn't our document; it's a joint document of the donors in partnership with the Haitian government.
Liberal
Albina Guarnieri Liberal Mississauga East—Cooksville, ON
My question was not a hostile question. For those of us who want to inspire more confidence in investing in foreign aid, those are the questions that the public often come up with.
I guess the real issue is that the public always want to know if the money actually ends up where it's meant to go to get value-added and actually ensure that.... You know, it's not just feasibility studies that people are interested in; they want to actually see productive use of that money being spent.
It was not meant to be a hostile question. I detected a little undertone there. I just wanted to clarify that.
Conservative
The Chair Conservative Kevin Sorenson
Yes, that's on the record, and I didn't take it as a hostile question. I've never taken anything that you've ever done as hostile.
Anyway, we'll move to the next—
Liberal
Conservative
Program Director, Haiti, Cuba and Dominican Republic Americas Branch, Canadian International Development Agency
They're planning their future program in cooperation with the new government. They preferred to wait for an elected government because, as you know, there were some sensitivities between the CARICOM countries and the former government. Now that there's a new elected government, the planning has to be done, and the loans will follow.
Bloc
Caroline St-Hilaire Bloc Longueuil—Pierre-Boucher, QC
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen.
I'd essentially like to speak to you, Mr. Pétillon, but not in your capacity as an official. You said that you had lived in Haiti for two years.
Program Director, Haiti, Cuba and Dominican Republic Americas Branch, Canadian International Development Agency
Three years.
Bloc
Caroline St-Hilaire Bloc Longueuil—Pierre-Boucher, QC
Three years, that's worse, or better.
I understand that you're playing a specific role this afternoon, but when we hear about Haiti, we think we also want to hear about hope.
This afternoon, figures and a lot of abstract things were mentioned. You referred to a future report, which committee members might read by the lake this summer. For the moment, can you give us any examples that, as my colleague said, might reassure us? I'd like to have some concrete results and examples of what CIDA and Canada are doing. That's my first question.
Second, I'd like to have an overview of how the money is being allocated because that's important. This week, we talked about a report, and we were wondering whether CIDA was giving more money for military operations or humanitarian aid. Can we have an overview of how the money is being allocated in Haiti? Is there more money for security and less for humanitarian aid?
Those are my two questions for the moment.
Program Director, Haiti, Cuba and Dominican Republic Americas Branch, Canadian International Development Agency
Thank you very much. I'd like to talk about hope in Haiti. With your permission, I'd say that hope in Haiti resides first in the Haitians. Fortunately, Haitian society is evolving; it isn't static. That evolution entails a number of positive factors. Let me give you four examples of that.
As you no doubt know, Haiti emerged from dictatorship not so long ago, officially in 1986. However, there followed a succession of military regimes. Only very recently has it been in good hands.
That's my first example. Prior to 1986, during the Duvalier dictatorship, among other things, the right of association was utterly non-existent in the country. There were no duly constituted organizations. What do we see today? Tens if not hundreds of organizations of youths, women, farmers, merchants, rights defenders and others are springing up. That's an asset. This is important for Haiti, particularly since it has always been a destructured country. As in Africa, there is no traditional structure based on chiefs, for example. None of that exists because the society emerged from slavery. The fact that these institutions are gradually being constituted shows us that social capital is beginning to form. For us donors, that's very important. For that society, these are so many new relays and agents of change.
Now here's my second example. Until 1986, the right to communication was non-existent. Everything was controlled by the state. What do we see today? People who have gone to Port-au-Prince know that, even if it's only there, there are now at least 25 radio stations that are free to communicate. Some are good, some are bad, but they exist. Today, all families, no matter how poor they are, can at least hear the news on their radios. This very significant progress. Of course, this right was hard won: journalists paid for it with their lives. Nevertheless, I don't think this right can ever be taken away from Haitians. It also constitutes the basis of democracy.
Now I'll move on to my third example. Part of the private business sector has started a change. Until now, the business sector has always been content to enter into agreements with any government. Now young businessmen and women have decided to get involved. They're even taking more political than social action. This is also a very significant agent of change.
As for the fourth positive example, I'd say it's the women's movement. The speakers who preceded us referred to it. It's a very real phenomenon. I'm pleased and proud to be able to say that Canadian cooperation has provided the most support for the structuring of the women's movement in Haiti. There can be no doubt: this is also an agent of change. Everyone recognizes it.
There are other positive examples, but I've told you about reasons for hope that, I think, show that this is a crucial stage for Haiti leading to something even more positive.
Conservative
Peter Goldring Conservative Edmonton East, AB
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Pétillon, in your report of April 22, 2004, on lessons learned by donors, you had mentioned here that, "...we see a lack of continuity in donor activities. Instead of persevering and 'talking tough' to Haitian authorities where necessary, donors have tended to beat a hasty retreat when difficulties arose."
Has that been the case since then, too, particularly involving the interim cooperation framework guideline on projects that were expected to be carried forward? Were there a number of donor countries that did not stay to complete their commitments?