I think the essential reason is because one key feature of the Chinese system has not been changed and will change only very slowly--that is, it's a one-party state.
The check on the behaviour of governments comes partly from what governments themselves learn, but it comes more from the knowledge that if they don't learn it, they'll be removed from power and somebody else will be put in power. Where that check doesn't exist, there's a real impediment to governments learning lessons.
There's no question in my mind that, in time, to address deeply some of the changes that are needed in China democratically will require the changing of the political system itself and the opening of that system to pluralism. That does not mean that nothing we've done over the last ten years with that investment has been valuable, because I think the effect of the exchange between Canada and China--the diversity of linkages that have taken place in the legal sector, the parliamentary sector, and in civil society--is beginning to make Chinese society a more complex society.
I can't describe to you how fundamental is the difference between the kinds of conversations I have with Chinese now and had ten years ago about the world out there and the kinds of changes that need to be made eventually for China to be a fully effective part of that world. But it is slow change, and the regime has made it very clear that the question of multi-party democracy is the last one they're prepared to discuss.