On the issue of the relationship between military force and reconstruction and the disbursement and use of reconstruction aid, clearly there is an inseparable relationship between the security conditions and our ability to deliver reconstruction aid and fund reconstruction projects. The first point I would make is that what is sometimes presented as a choice between a military approach or a developmental approach, I think, is a false choice, because in the absence of security, it's really not conceivable that we would be able to conduct the kind of development projects that we and other donors and the Afghan government have in mind.
My understanding is that, in fact, a lot of the development projects have been held up precisely because of the security situation that exists in much of the country. From what I read recently in a UN report, it identified one-third of the country as unsafe for development personnel. So I think you need to do both, essentially, if I understood your question correctly.
With regard to corruption, there are some excellent suggestions in the most recent International Crisis Group report, which I had an opportunity to read last night. The principles of transparency and accountability are applicable here, as in other areas when we're concerned with the possibility of corruption. At the very start, I think one needs to take the accountability mechanisms that have been created and make sure they're observed.
For instance, when President Karzai made a number of appointments that sidestepped the vetting process that had been created in order specifically to filter out unqualified candidates, he was not using the mechanism that was in place. So I think Karzai has to be clear that he's going to use the systems that are in place. At the local level, I think similar systems can be established as well, in conjunction with training for local police. The police judiciary, the internal ministry, are really the key, I think, in terms of tackling corruption in Afghanistan, as a start.