If you don't mind, I'd like to answer that question in English, because my French isn't very good.
I want to start by saying first that I don't want to have words put in my mouth, and I think two committee members have done that. I do not believe the Canadian Forces should withdraw. They are going to be required to stay and to fight, and so they should. But in my view, this is an unwinnable war. What we should be looking for is a way to withdraw that gives us a weak central government and strong provincial power. This is what will happen.
As far as the Canadian Forces are concerned, I could have made the same statement Mr. Martin has made. There are no better armed forces in the western world. They're extremely good. They're the best at doing this sort of work—they and the British. That is true.
What I'm saying is that the western armed forces, as they are currently configured, are not very well placed to do counter-insurgency work. If you want to look at a military tradition that is better at doing that, then you have to go back in years, to the colonial era, and see how the military did things then. No military does that now, and we have to learn how to do it.
Now, as far as the question is concerned, the problem with Kandahar relates to what happened in 2002. Two things didn't happen that should have happened. One is that there was no stabilization program. The Americans announced that they were going to continue to fight al-Qaeda, and at that point there was no stabilization program. And by “stabilization”, I mean the simple putting in place of security that allows normal people to function and to appeal to some force to redress their grievances on such things as rape or robbery or whatever else. The Canadian Forces could play that role and could play it very effectively, and they should have played that role in Kandahar in 2002.
The second thing that needs to be done whenever you have conflict ending is that you need to provide employment for young men who have, en masse, been doing the fighting. That was not done in Kandahar in the way it was done in Kabul, the way it was done in the Shomali Valley, and the way it can be done if we fund our humanitarian agencies adequately and put them to that task.