At the level of a governor, which is the Minister of Finance who participates at the governors' meetings, all the decisions that are taken are public decisions, and we release summaries of those public decisions. Other countries can as well.
The way the IMF and the World Bank operate, though, at the executive director level--about which the closest analogy I can draw is the cabinet level--it was set up with a view to ensuring a full and frank exchange of views among members. And Canada was a founder of these institutions.
For example, at the IMF, when a country comes up for review, other countries are making hard-hitting assessments of where their economy is heading, what they need to do and where they need to go. That sort of exchange, if it were made public, would be damaging to the relations between the two countries because it would be seen as publicly attacking the other country, as opposed to the way it's done within the committee, in which there's a full and frank exchange within the committee of how we do.
Confidentiality requirements have been created by the two institutions around the employees of the institution, and the employees include our two executive directors. To require them to provide us with summaries of each representation they make would cause them to breach their confidentiality requirements and make it impossible for them to do their jobs.
Again, what we've done with our report, along with DFID, the U.K. agency, is to push the limits of how much we can publicly report and still be consistent with this broad principle of cabinet confidence. What we're signalling is that counsel has concerns, as do we from a policy perspective, that the language in paragraphs 9(1)(d) and 10(b), which are identical, would both force us to move beyond what is potentially accommodated by the confidentiality requirements of these institutions.