Yes, a simple question, but it goes to some of the points I was making.
One of them is sequencing. I think Kandahar, in particular, makes two points. One is that it matters what you do in the very early days after a peace agreement or at the end of a conflict. Part of the argument, I think, about why Kandahar and that region is where it is today relates to the fact that although there was early strong response, it then faded out quickly, or relatively quickly, while resources got diverted elsewhere. But it also raises the question about whether you can do any of these other tasks—democracy development, engaging with civil society, and so on—when you're in a fundamentally insecure situation.
I think you can do some things, but this is an example where security matters a great deal and the economics of the equation matter a great deal, because the security is fundamentally tied, at least to the extent I understand it, to things like the poppy growing as well as to border issues with Pakistan. Until we—we meaning not only Canada, but more broadly the international community—get a better grip on that, I think there is a limit to what we can achieve on the other fronts. But it's not an argument for not staying the course on those other fronts, so that we're there when the next stage is ready.
I don't think that answered you, but....