Good morning to you all. My name is Marc-André Boivin. I work for the Réseau francophone de recherche sur les opérations de paix, or it might be easier for you to say the Francophone Research Network on Peace Operations. This group is based at the University of Montreal. I have focused my studies on the international intervention in Afghanistan.
I first would like to thank you for allowing us to appear this morning. I hope that what we have to say will help guide your deliberations. I think that this is a major issue, as we were painfully reminded over the last week.
I would like to suggest this morning a few observations on the objectives of our action in Afghanistan, the nature of our activities there and the way that those objectives are part of a broader international framework.
The situation in Afghanistan poses very complex challenges to the international community's involvement. I have no doubt this fact has been amply illustrated by my numerous predecessors. Afghanistan is not only complex; in many ways it's a very particular case.
It must be said that before 9/11, Afghanistan was virtually non-existent as a foreign policy preoccupation, not only for Canada but for many of its current partners in Afghanistan. The current international post-conflict stabilization mission should have happened at the beginning of the 1990s after Soviet forces retreated from the country. It is little known that a United Nations mission was sent to oversee the post-Soviet transition and broker a peace between rival mujahedeen factions. This mission was severely under-resourced, and obviously failed to bring about peace.
Keep in mind that when they're assessing the international presence, the Afghans recall this period bitterly. Lakhdar Brahimi, then head of the mission, resigned at the end of the 1990s to protest against the world's obvious indifference to the Afghans' plight and the unabated regional meddling fuelling the civil war.
The 9/11 attacks changed all that, but we need to be reminded that the international intervention was fundamentally set up to thwart terrorism, not to stabilize Afghanistan. The intervenors, most importantly the United States, came to see Afghanistan stabilization as their long-term guarantee against terrorism's prevalence. But it took two years before they admitted to nation-building schemes as a necessity and started to allocate the consequent resources.
Fighting terrorism and a post-conflict stabilization endeavour are two distinct objectives, which can be at odds. The tensions between Operation Enduring Freedom and the International Security Assistance Force, and between their different participants, reflect this. In many ways, the failed state concept became the bridge between these two objectives, and was used accordingly in the latest international policy statement to justify the Canadian presence in Afghanistan. But internationally the divisions remain.
Terrorism is first and foremost a tool that is used to maximize the symbolic impact of otherwise limited capacities to act. It's not new and it's not solely associated with Islamic fundamentalists. Anarchists in Russia used the equivalent of roadside bombs to assassinate Alexander II in the middle of the 19th century. Successfully fighting terrorism has a lot more to do with criminal investigations than with all-out military operations.
A recent book called Beyond Terror, published by the Oxford Research Group, emphasized that fighting terrorism with military force can actually produce the opposite effect and fuel terrorism. But because the phenomenon has such a high profile, it is tempting to over-react and actually play into the hands of the terrorists by generating an adverse political backlash that is out of proportion with the original action.
As the spectacular images of the 9/11 attacks slowly recede from our minds, the real scope and nature of efforts needed for successful transition to peace in Afghanistan are becoming clearer. The recent development aid announcements by Canada and the United States, and the expansion and reinforcement of ISAF, tell how the Afghan mission is turning more into a post-conflict stabilization effort. But with the initial anti-terrorism impetus gone, this more long-term approach is also faced with the renewed insignificance of Afghanistan on the world scene.
Calls for the prompt withdrawal of Canadian troops are, in my view, as much if not more the reflection of this public opinion fatigue as issues with how the Canadian involvement is proceeding. Herein lies the conundrum. While the character of the international intervention in Afghanistan today makes it more likely to succeed, the political will to sustain it is fading.
As regards Canada's involvement in Afghanistan, the media's obsession with casualties among soldiers, while understandable, clouds certain other aspects of our presence there. In terms of numbers, Canada is the fourth largest contributor of international aid in Afghanistan, providing more than countries like France and Germany. CIDA has played a key role in programs like the Microfinance Investment Support Facility for Afghanistan, the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, and the National Solidarity Program, which, in terms of development, have been very successful.
Canada is also guaranteed considerable political influence over what happens to the international presence in Afghanistan. It has been one of the driving forces in the transition of ISAF to NATO and the extension of ISAF to the entire country, a task not fully completely until October 2006. The first Canadian Ambassador to Kabul, Chris Alexander, is now the Deputy Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General who is in charge of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, the UNAMA. Moreover, Canada played a key role in developing the Afghanistan Compact, which establishes a road map for reconstruction and stabilization in the country, both for the Afghan government and its international partners, until 2011.
On the military side, the bulk of our contingent is operating under ISAF, a UN-mandated and supported mission whose role is to stabilize Afghanistan and help the Afghan government achieve full sovereignty over its territory. This mandate falls clearly within those typically adopted for the most recent UN peacekeeping operations. Some claim that Canada has strayed from its traditional peacekeeping missions by throwing itself into a war in Afghanistan. Apart from the fact that the mandate for the mission under which our troops are operating contradicts this statement, some critics fail to clarify that many peacekeeping missions today are carried out by regional organizations like the African Union or the European Union, which operate under UN mandates. However, it is clear that international troops in southern Afghanistan, in practice, are facing an insurrection that quickly deteriorated in 2006. A simple inventory of advances in Afghanistan—and there have in fact been some significant ones—is not enough to hide the fact that on a daily basis, Canadian troops have had to face insurgents in full defiance of the stabilization process put in place by the international community.
Throughout the 1990s the Canadian military has acquired a wealth of experience in peace operations. The major reforms being implemented and the new investments in defence will both lead to a much more flexible and deployable military force and show how seriously the Canadian government has come to look upon our involvements in failing, failed, and fragile states.
Afghanistan has also been a showcase for a better integration of the Canadian foreign policy tool box, integrating the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Department of National Defence, and CIDA in the planning and enacting of our involvement. This is referred to these days as the whole-of-government approach.
Although far from perfect in practice, this approach promises a much more far-sighted involvement in countries trying to escape cycles of violence, when provided with coherent and sustained political guidance by the government.
In many ways the Canadian intervention in Afghanistan has shown a great deal of resolve, focus, and sophisticated understanding. Most of the problems come from balancing the reasons we are there with the costs involved. And these are related to wider issues that supersede Canada's role, per se.
First and foremost, there is the question of the role played by Pakistan. Kandahar is directly in the path of border infiltrations from Pakistan, and Canada's contingent has borne the brunt of the insurgents' activities in the south.
Canada's voice in Islamabad has a very limited echo, but its British and American allies have much more sway and will need to confront more directly the Musharraf government.
Regional tensions involving all of Afghanistan's neighbours have historically played a key role in destabilizing the country. Canada should ensure that all regional players have a stake in a stable Afghanistan.
Canada's significant and sustained effort has certainly not been emulated by a number of its NATO allies. What's worse, the gap between the countries involved in the south—such as Canada, the U.K., or the U.S.—and most of the European countries operating in the north seems to be widening. While the first group has recently made major announcements in further investments in troops, the second group is fumbling. Very recently the Italian government barely survived a vote asking for the support of their troops deployed in the region of Herat, in western Afghanistan. The Germans just sent Tornado fighter jets to Afghanistan, but their role is strictly limited to reconnaissance.
There are clearly major rifts between key international players regarding the ultimate objectives, the way to achieve them, and just how important Afghanistan is in their international agenda. Canada has a role to play in bridging these.
The current insurgency and misery in the south are intimately linked to the political exclusion of a significant part of the Pashtun population during the Bonn process. The Pashtun are the most numerous group in Afghanistan and are the traditional rulers of the country. They were also the power base of the Taliban.
Peace in Afghanistan is directly related to the inclusion of this important disenfranchised part of the population. Hamid Karzai has recently admitted to talking to emissaries of the Taliban. A Pashtun himself, he understands that any long-term solution to the violence is much more likely to come from a political settlement. This should be encouraged, for a simplistic, us-against-them approach is ultimately self-defeating.
The explosion of poppy production is a clear indicator of the severe long-term government issues faced in Afghanistan. Short-term poppy eradication policies have catastrophically failed and there clearly is need for innovative solutions.
More generally, the intervention in Afghanistan cannot be realistically conceived as a short-term, quick-results project. Countless stabilization missions have shown just how complex and long-term the outlook must be.
In conclusion, there is some tension between what is happening in Afghanistan and what must be accomplished before the country can achieve peace and what Canada is prepared to do to help Afghanistan, which depends much more on the vagaries of our national policy. Canada has certainly gained the respect of the international community for its role in Afghanistan. The Canadian Forces have earned a reputation for their professionalism and their robustness. We are among the rare donor nations that have honoured their commitments to the degree that we had initially promised, and our insistence on including international action in a multilateral framework has become a long-term vision.
However, we must recognize that the Canadian people, like the people in our partner nations involved in Afghanistan, are showing signs of impatience. Sooner or later, this will catch up with our political class, who, ultimately, are elected. Canada cannot save Afghanistan on its own. For us to be able to have a serene discussion on how Canada can help Afghanistan, politicians must achieve a balance between the long-term requirements of this type of involvement and what the Canadian people truly expect from their foreign policy.
I do not envy your job.
