Foreign Affairs Committee on April 17th, 2007

[Pierre Beaudet, Professor, International Development and Globalization Program, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ottawa]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I prepared a few remarks. Because you have read up on the issue and have heard from many witnesses, you know that few people are optimistic about the current situation in Afghanistan, with the exception of the Minister of International Cooperation and the Chief of Defence Staff.

Most people and analysts hold a rather sombre view of the current difficulties. I will not comment on the military side of things, except to say that I believe we can call into question the idea that the war is being won because 500 Taliban have been killed. History has shown that that is not the way to win wars. As well, most observers say that for each Taliban killed, another 500 are recruited. That was what I had to say; I will leave those issues for the military.

I first want to talk about reconstruction in Afghanistan, something that is of greater interest to me. From the outset, I have to say that the situation is complex. Since the Bonn conference and, more recently, the London conference, Canada has participated in the concerted effort to rebuild Afghanistan. However, most analysts point out that the current level of reconstruction aid is far too low, almost ridiculously so, given Afghanistan's needs and challenges.

You have perhaps read about a number of comparisons between investments made in Kosovo and Afghanistan for the reconstruction of those countries. The ratio is of one to seven or one to eight. Consequently, funds allocated by the international community are clearly insufficient to rebuild Afghanistan. Military funding is 10 times greater than that for reconstruction. Such numbers call into question any real commitment to rebuild Afghanistan.

Let us now consider the situation on the ground. The socio-economic circumstances in Afghanistan are not improving. I am pleased to see that money from CIDA, taxpayers' money, is used to open schools and assist a number of people, but no one who is intellectually honest can say that the overall picture in Afghanistan is improving. Things are actually deteriorating, in terms of poverty and marginalization.

In the past few weeks, I was amazed by the proliferation of informal refugee camps. Some of the regions in the south and elsewhere are so badly off that people are fleeing and ending up in the desert with a few tents and very little assistance, because this is happening in a completely disorganized and chaotic fashion. That is not a good indicator.

The minister and the Canadian government have decided to invest in the National Solidarity Program, which is intended to rebuild villages and small communities. That is what they call the "quick impact". That is the good news. The bad news is that several analyses have shown that the program is improvised and disorganized and that a number of interventions lack preparation. I am not blaming the military personnel or provincial reconstruction teams, because they might not have been trained to do community development and assess the circumstances of a village or a community.

I do not know the practical results of all this, but I do know that CIDA is refusing, despite access to information requests, to release information on the estimated and partial results of those operations. You know how things work in Ottawa: all information is eventually made public. A number of documents that are currently circulating show that these initiatives are not achieving their expected objectives. The aims were perhaps worthy, but the circumstances prevented us from achieving them.

If you add up everything I have just spoken about, it is impossible to get the sense that the reconstruction program in Afghanistan is moving forward in a systematic manner. I believe it was Ms. McDonough who mentioned earlier that Afghan citizens were quite aware of what was going on. Afghans are rather well informed, contrary to what we might often think. Websites and the Al-Jazira network are disseminating a lot of information, and people are angry, not only in Kandahar, in the south, but also in Kabul and in other regions where people find that the socio-economic conditions have not improved significantly.

Where is the money going? The issue of corruption was raised earlier. I hope that aid programs, including Canadian programs, will not be caught up in murky business. I would like for CIDA to be transparent and provide us with the information, because it does exist.

I will conclude very quickly by asking the following question: In the face of such chaos, what can we do? I do not believe that there should be an immediate, total withdrawal from Afghanistan tomorrow morning, because I think that efforts need to be made. There are two totally fundamental issues that need to be re-examined. The current strategy, not the tactics, is not working. You are aware of where the current strategy originated. It arose out of the vision that was established, even prior to 2001, to restructure that part of the world. I am not making this up, there is an abundance of materials on the various strategies drafted in Washington. The strategy is not working, it is a failure both in Afghanistan and in Iraq, as well as in other areas in conflict, and it has to be changed. Canada has to speak out against the strategy. We have to question, criticize and distance ourselves from it. It will not be easy, but I think we have to do the honourable thing, as we did in the case of South Africa, some 20 or 25 years ago, when the Conservative government at the time was bold enough to call into question the approach taken in Washington and London on the issue. We must negotiate with the Taliban or with those that my colleague from the University of Ottawa, Roland Paris, calls the Neo Taliban. As Nigel Fisher said earlier, the Taliban and Neo Taliban are not like Al-Qaida. They might not be nice people, people who share our value system, but we do have to negotiate with them, we have to reach a political accord. I think the British military commanders were right when they said that the war cannot be won militarily, that there needs to be political engagement.

Lastly, we need to adopt a regional approach. Afghans are aware of what is happening in Iraq, Iraqis know what is going in Palistine, and the same applies to all peoples in the region. Without a comprehensive vision and a view to achieving peace, which are opposed to the Bush administration's endless, global war, I think that we, unfortunately, will not achieve our objective and Afghans and Canadian Forces will pay the price. Other assistance programs and policies in that area of the world might also be negatively affected once all the circumstances have been made public.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you, Mr. Beaudet.

Monsieur Boivin, you have ten minutes, please.

[Marc André Boivin, Assistant-director, Réseau francophone de recherche sur les opérations de paix]

Good morning to you all. My name is Marc-André Boivin. I work for the Réseau francophone de recherche sur les opérations de paix, or it might be easier for you to say the Francophone Research Network on Peace Operations. This group is based at the University of Montreal. I have focused my studies on the international intervention in Afghanistan.

I first would like to thank you for allowing us to appear this morning. I hope that what we have to say will help guide your deliberations. I think that this is a major issue, as we were painfully reminded over the last week.

I would like to suggest this morning a few observations on the objectives of our action in Afghanistan, the nature of our activities there and the way that those objectives are part of a broader international framework.

The situation in Afghanistan poses very complex challenges to the international community's involvement. I have no doubt this fact has been amply illustrated by my numerous predecessors. Afghanistan is not only complex; in many ways it's a very particular case.

It must be said that before 9/11, Afghanistan was virtually non-existent as a foreign policy preoccupation, not only for Canada but for many of its current partners in Afghanistan. The current international post-conflict stabilization mission should have happened at the beginning of the 1990s after Soviet forces retreated from the country. It is little known that a United Nations mission was sent to oversee the post-Soviet transition and broker a peace between rival mujahedeen factions. This mission was severely under-resourced, and obviously failed to bring about peace.

Keep in mind that when they're assessing the international presence, the Afghans recall this period bitterly. Lakhdar Brahimi, then head of the mission, resigned at the end of the 1990s to protest against the world's obvious indifference to the Afghans' plight and the unabated regional meddling fuelling the civil war.

The 9/11 attacks changed all that, but we need to be reminded that the international intervention was fundamentally set up to thwart terrorism, not to stabilize Afghanistan. The intervenors, most importantly the United States, came to see Afghanistan stabilization as their long-term guarantee against terrorism's prevalence. But it took two years before they admitted to nation-building schemes as a necessity and started to allocate the consequent resources.

Fighting terrorism and a post-conflict stabilization endeavour are two distinct objectives, which can be at odds. The tensions between Operation Enduring Freedom and the International Security Assistance Force, and between their different participants, reflect this. In many ways, the failed state concept became the bridge between these two objectives, and was used accordingly in the latest international policy statement to justify the Canadian presence in Afghanistan. But internationally the divisions remain.

Terrorism is first and foremost a tool that is used to maximize the symbolic impact of otherwise limited capacities to act. It's not new and it's not solely associated with Islamic fundamentalists. Anarchists in Russia used the equivalent of roadside bombs to assassinate Alexander II in the middle of the 19th century. Successfully fighting terrorism has a lot more to do with criminal investigations than with all-out military operations.

A recent book called Beyond Terror, published by the Oxford Research Group, emphasized that fighting terrorism with military force can actually produce the opposite effect and fuel terrorism. But because the phenomenon has such a high profile, it is tempting to over-react and actually play into the hands of the terrorists by generating an adverse political backlash that is out of proportion with the original action.

As the spectacular images of the 9/11 attacks slowly recede from our minds, the real scope and nature of efforts needed for successful transition to peace in Afghanistan are becoming clearer. The recent development aid announcements by Canada and the United States, and the expansion and reinforcement of ISAF, tell how the Afghan mission is turning more into a post-conflict stabilization effort. But with the initial anti-terrorism impetus gone, this more long-term approach is also faced with the renewed insignificance of Afghanistan on the world scene.

Calls for the prompt withdrawal of Canadian troops are, in my view, as much if not more the reflection of this public opinion fatigue as issues with how the Canadian involvement is proceeding. Herein lies the conundrum. While the character of the international intervention in Afghanistan today makes it more likely to succeed, the political will to sustain it is fading.

As regards Canada's involvement in Afghanistan, the media's obsession with casualties among soldiers, while understandable, clouds certain other aspects of our presence there. In terms of numbers, Canada is the fourth largest contributor of international aid in Afghanistan, providing more than countries like France and Germany. CIDA has played a key role in programs like the Microfinance Investment Support Facility for Afghanistan, the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, and the National Solidarity Program, which, in terms of development, have been very successful.

Canada is also guaranteed considerable political influence over what happens to the international presence in Afghanistan. It has been one of the driving forces in the transition of ISAF to NATO and the extension of ISAF to the entire country, a task not fully completely until October 2006. The first Canadian Ambassador to Kabul, Chris Alexander, is now the Deputy Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General who is in charge of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, the UNAMA. Moreover, Canada played a key role in developing the Afghanistan Compact, which establishes a road map for reconstruction and stabilization in the country, both for the Afghan government and its international partners, until 2011.

On the military side, the bulk of our contingent is operating under ISAF, a UN-mandated and supported mission whose role is to stabilize Afghanistan and help the Afghan government achieve full sovereignty over its territory. This mandate falls clearly within those typically adopted for the most recent UN peacekeeping operations. Some claim that Canada has strayed from its traditional peacekeeping missions by throwing itself into a war in Afghanistan. Apart from the fact that the mandate for the mission under which our troops are operating contradicts this statement, some critics fail to clarify that many peacekeeping missions today are carried out by regional organizations like the African Union or the European Union, which operate under UN mandates. However, it is clear that international troops in southern Afghanistan, in practice, are facing an insurrection that quickly deteriorated in 2006. A simple inventory of advances in Afghanistan—and there have in fact been some significant ones—is not enough to hide the fact that on a daily basis, Canadian troops have had to face insurgents in full defiance of the stabilization process put in place by the international community.

Throughout the 1990s the Canadian military has acquired a wealth of experience in peace operations. The major reforms being implemented and the new investments in defence will both lead to a much more flexible and deployable military force and show how seriously the Canadian government has come to look upon our involvements in failing, failed, and fragile states.

Afghanistan has also been a showcase for a better integration of the Canadian foreign policy tool box, integrating the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Department of National Defence, and CIDA in the planning and enacting of our involvement. This is referred to these days as the whole-of-government approach.

Although far from perfect in practice, this approach promises a much more far-sighted involvement in countries trying to escape cycles of violence, when provided with coherent and sustained political guidance by the government.

In many ways the Canadian intervention in Afghanistan has shown a great deal of resolve, focus, and sophisticated understanding. Most of the problems come from balancing the reasons we are there with the costs involved. And these are related to wider issues that supersede Canada's role, per se.

First and foremost, there is the question of the role played by Pakistan. Kandahar is directly in the path of border infiltrations from Pakistan, and Canada's contingent has borne the brunt of the insurgents' activities in the south.

Canada's voice in Islamabad has a very limited echo, but its British and American allies have much more sway and will need to confront more directly the Musharraf government.

Regional tensions involving all of Afghanistan's neighbours have historically played a key role in destabilizing the country. Canada should ensure that all regional players have a stake in a stable Afghanistan.

Canada's significant and sustained effort has certainly not been emulated by a number of its NATO allies. What's worse, the gap between the countries involved in the south—such as Canada, the U.K., or the U.S.—and most of the European countries operating in the north seems to be widening. While the first group has recently made major announcements in further investments in troops, the second group is fumbling. Very recently the Italian government barely survived a vote asking for the support of their troops deployed in the region of Herat, in western Afghanistan. The Germans just sent Tornado fighter jets to Afghanistan, but their role is strictly limited to reconnaissance.

There are clearly major rifts between key international players regarding the ultimate objectives, the way to achieve them, and just how important Afghanistan is in their international agenda. Canada has a role to play in bridging these.

The current insurgency and misery in the south are intimately linked to the political exclusion of a significant part of the Pashtun population during the Bonn process. The Pashtun are the most numerous group in Afghanistan and are the traditional rulers of the country. They were also the power base of the Taliban.

Peace in Afghanistan is directly related to the inclusion of this important disenfranchised part of the population. Hamid Karzai has recently admitted to talking to emissaries of the Taliban. A Pashtun himself, he understands that any long-term solution to the violence is much more likely to come from a political settlement. This should be encouraged, for a simplistic, us-against-them approach is ultimately self-defeating.

The explosion of poppy production is a clear indicator of the severe long-term government issues faced in Afghanistan. Short-term poppy eradication policies have catastrophically failed and there clearly is need for innovative solutions.

More generally, the intervention in Afghanistan cannot be realistically conceived as a short-term, quick-results project. Countless stabilization missions have shown just how complex and long-term the outlook must be.

In conclusion, there is some tension between what is happening in Afghanistan and what must be accomplished before the country can achieve peace and what Canada is prepared to do to help Afghanistan, which depends much more on the vagaries of our national policy. Canada has certainly gained the respect of the international community for its role in Afghanistan. The Canadian Forces have earned a reputation for their professionalism and their robustness. We are among the rare donor nations that have honoured their commitments to the degree that we had initially promised, and our insistence on including international action in a multilateral framework has become a long-term vision.

However, we must recognize that the Canadian people, like the people in our partner nations involved in Afghanistan, are showing signs of impatience. Sooner or later, this will catch up with our political class, who, ultimately, are elected. Canada cannot save Afghanistan on its own. For us to be able to have a serene discussion on how Canada can help Afghanistan, politicians must achieve a balance between the long-term requirements of this type of involvement and what the Canadian people truly expect from their foreign policy.

I do not envy your job.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you.

We'll go to the first round.

Mr. Wilfert, five minutes.

[Bryon Wilfert, Liberal, Richmond Hill, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you for coming, gentlemen.

I think we would all agree that we have seen or we have certainly read about some short-term success stories in terms of capacity-building and the opening of clinics, schools, etc. The issue in terms of development aid seems to focus more on the long-term capacity of the Afghan government to in fact be able to maintain these social well-being projects, if you will.

The Government of Afghanistan has clearly not even been able to spend the development aid it received. I think the figure was around 44%. It has not been able to spend it, and it has not been able to spend it in a clear and coordinated approach.

Back in the fall of last year, the American commander said he'd like more development money for the military and that it could be used. Is that really the answer, given the fact that they're not able to spend the money they have?

What would you suggest would be the tools needed to develop longer-term capacity-building, rather than the projects there now that may not be sustainable down the road?

[Pierre Beaudet]

As I said in my presentation, there's a lot of obscurity about what's going on there, partially because the government has decided to keep the information outside of public scrutiny.

But there are certain reports coming in, including the one I have about some of the recent experiences over the last six months of the PRTs and the national solidarity program: lack of genuine community participation; no real participation by women; village committees are held by the same powerful, influential, and relatively well-off persons who are in charge of these villages; continue with the status quo; monitoring and evaluation are non-existent; a negative impact on social capital; exacerbate strife and disunity—It goes on and on. It's based on a series of interviews that have been conducted in the Kandahar region over the last six months, and it's very worrying.

The conclusion is that it's not the way to go. The Canadian military, as well as other militaries, is very well trained to perform certain tasks but not in social and economic reconstruction. It has never been done successfully.

This is the first move. It has to move. It has to shift from an emphasis on the PRTs and what they call the “quick impact”. There's no quick impact. The quick impact is negative, so why do you continue? It should be mandated to CIDA and some of its partners through the approach they've learned on how to do social development.

You don't arrive there on a Monday morning, convene three people in a village, ask them in a half-hour session what the priorities are and what they're going to do, and then leave $5,000. It's not the way to do it. It's not the way to go.

It should be changed and modified, going back to the lessons learned and the more traditional practices of development and long-term reconstruction. Is it easy? No, it's not easy. It's very difficult. Is it dangerous? Yes, it's very dangerous.

It's not going to be possible unless there are political negotiations to calm down the strife and calm down the fighting to get at least a part of the Taliban or the neo-Taliban to a negotiating position. If we do that, it will be like Mozambique and other situations, where the situation changed after a very tough and bloody civil war. It didn't change in one week, and it didn't change by trying to kill the insurgents and by trying to do a quick-fix approach.

You have money. You need to spend it, and you'll be happy and satisfied. But look behind it.

[Bryon Wilfert, Liberal, Richmond Hill, ON]

Can you again tell me the report you quoted from?

[Pierre Beaudet]

It's a report by two independent researchers, Omar Zakhilwal and Jane Murphy Thomas. It's part of the North-South Institute study on humanitarian and development programs in the context of wars and conflicts. It's still a draft.

I believe there are many critical reports inside CIDA at this point. I'm afraid that when they come out erratically, some people will get their fingers burned. Why do they do that? I don't understand.

[Bryon Wilfert, Liberal, Richmond Hill, ON]

Mr. Chairman, could we ask that a copy of that—

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

It's still a draft, the way I understand it. Is it public?

[Pierre Beaudet]

It's public. It's on the web.

[Bryon Wilfert, Liberal, Richmond Hill, ON]

Could we have that tabled with the committee?

[Pierre Beaudet]

Sure.

[Bryon Wilfert, Liberal, Richmond Hill, ON]

Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

You do have another 30 seconds, if you want to make some more—

[Bryon Wilfert, Liberal, Richmond Hill, ON]

I have another 30 seconds.

[Marc André Boivin]

I want to add, then, to the question being asked.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Yes, okay, we'll let Mr. Boivin finish.

[Marc André Boivin]

I had the pleasure of being here when Barnett Rubin came a few weeks back. He wrote a book called The Fragmentation of Afghanistan long before anybody was interested in Afghanistan.

One of the key findings that he put forth in his book, looking at the last two centuries, was that Afghanistan has only been able to sustain a political apparatus when it has had outside funding sources, whether through occupying part of India, having a deal with the British, being sustained by the Soviets, or having Iranians playing off one donor against the other.

The question you were asking is a very important question. Lakhdar Brahimi, who was the former head of the UN mission that was there in the 1990s, mentioned this to me in a private conversation, saying that his biggest worry was actually sustainability of what we were trying to accomplish in Afghanistan.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you, Mr. Boivin.

Madame Lalonde.

[Francine Lalonde, Bloc, La Pointe-de-l'Île, QC]

I would like to thank you both very much for being here.

I think a lot about the fact that the Canadian troops will very soon be replaced by Quebec troops. From that moment on, Quebec will be much more on the lookout for what is happening in Afghanistan.

I believe that Quebeckers would agree with their participation if they saw we had a strategy yielding positive results and which will lead to other ones. However, there is a fact which is not pointed out enough. Mr. Boivin mentioned it at the end of his intervention, namely the fact that it is important for Quebeckers to be convinced that the Canadian and Quebec participation not be disproportionate to the participation of other NATO countries, especially if many soldiers are killed. It could be argued that this is not how we should approach the situation, but the fact remains that this is not Canada's war. It is the war of the United States and NATO, and Canada agreed to participate.

I would like to know what you think about this.

[Marc André Boivin]

Do you want to know how to convince Quebeckers?

[Francine Lalonde, Bloc, La Pointe-de-l'Île, QC]

It seems to me that Quebeckers must agree on a strategy which strikes a balance between security and reconstruction, which yields positive results and which will lead to other good things. Of course, we must also feel that our participation is not disproportionate.

[Marc André Boivin]

I will again quote Barnett Rubin. When he was here, he was asked whether it was possible to be successful in Afghanistan or whether the situation was desperate. Barnett Rubin, always quick with a comeback, immediately replied that it depended on what objectives had been set. I think that is the answer to your question.

Since 1956, lofty objectives were systematically set for peacekeeping operations, but the troops on the ground were not necessarily given the resources to fulfil those ambitions.

[Francine Lalonde, Bloc, La Pointe-de-l'Île, QC]

That seems to me to be the problem.