Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, gentlemen, for being with us today. I just want to say at the very outset that my party and I are very much in agreement with the point you've driven home, as have many others, that there is absolutely a key role for Canada in Afghanistan today and far into the future, one that could well last twenty years or beyond.
The major concern that I think is shared by a great many Canadians, and certainly very much expressed by my party, is the mess that we've gotten ourselves into in Kandahar, which I think jeopardizes our effectiveness and our role in the many other aspects of the work desperately needing to be done.
I want to start first with you, Mr. Sedra. You stress that really the whole business of nation building—and I know your expertise is in security sector reform—is all about entrenching the rule of law and human rights and about achieving justice. Yet our situation in Kandahar is one of having tightly associated ourselves in the first instance with Operation Enduring Freedom, which is the antithesis of justice, human rights, and rule of law.
In fact, it is basically a mission of revenge and retaliation that we simply signed on to and in which we have become indistinguishable. We can talk all we want about being Canadians, having different priorities, having different values, having different ways of going about things. Now we've morphed into part of an international force and so on, but the reality is that it's very difficult to extricate ourselves from the very concerns that are driving more and more people into the arms of the Taliban.
Secondly, I think we also are very concerned that we've become so tightly associated with the corruption that is so massive, right up to senior officials in the Karzai government, that we end up again, for different reasons, being seen as associated with a great source of fear and insecurity in the lives of large numbers of people in Afghanistan, especially in Kandahar.
I guess I have two questions for both of you, having expressed those concerns about how we are seen in a way that jeopardizes the other important roles we need to play. I want to talk about our diplomatic effort, because you both really talked about the importance of the three-D approach and closer coordination of those and so on. Have we not made it extremely difficult for ourselves to be seen as a credible partner in robust diplomacy because of our association on the one hand with Operation Enduring Freedom and on the other hand with a corrupt Karzai administration, so that people don't see us as an honest broker, don't see us as having a balanced approach?
And secondly, I'd like to know what you both might have to say about the virtual absence of any meaningful comprehensive diplomacy that brings in the many different parties to these immensely complex conflicts. Is it not a problem that we have such a major exclusion of so many of the parties, both in the tribal sense—the Pashtun being a key one—and in the regional sense, so that there's nothing with which we can really be credibly associated as honest brokers in the diplomatic process, and there's not much going on that you can describe as comprehensive diplomacy?
I'm sorry. I know that's a big question, but I'd be very interested in your using up the time to address those two questions.