Foreign Affairs Committee on May 8th, 2007

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you.

Mr. Goldring, please.

[Peter Goldring, Conservative, Edmonton East, AB]

You mentioned that one of the difficulties is that men in the smaller villages and so on will turn to working, if you like, or soldiering for the Taliban for an income. Keep in mind that in the country at the present time there's a high level of insecurity, obviously, and it might be difficult to say at this moment in time, but obviously the country itself cannot hire all of these people into the government or into public service, and the country doesn't have the money to do it.

You mentioned small businesses, like the cellphone businesses, but those are all consumer-oriented businesses that need people with family sustaining incomes to really take part and buy cellphones, if you like. This is being done in the short and longer term for creating family-sustaining jobs in quantities that would be brought in by special industries, and I'm thinking in the context of Haiti, where Gildan has 5,000 people employed in a segment of an industry.

Is there anything that's been done to encourage that? And what are the prospects for Afghanistan and what types of industries and businesses could it support, if they were encouraged and a little more stability was brought to bear?

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you, Mr. Goldring.

Madame Patel.

[Seema Patel]

Economic growth is going to be the name of the game for the long term of Afghanistan. Poverty does fuel insecurity. There are, I found, a number of opportunities in the economy for growth, not only the kind coming from foreigners, but also locally led growth. Businessmen are plentiful; they've come back from Pakistan, from Iran, and are setting up businesses in Afghanistan, but they need to be supported. The micro-financed loans and the NSP are providing a lot for the poor segment of society, but how can we encourage the entrepreneurship of the business class, the middle class? Credits and liquidity are going to be critical for them. This is one of the largest problems in Afghanistan, I find, in terms of economic growth. Afghan entrepreneurs don't have access to the medium-term loans, the two- to five-year loans at a reasonable interest rate so they can set up a business and start earning a profit from which to repay.

[Peter Goldring, Conservative, Edmonton East, AB]

Are you looking at it for major business development? Really, you're talking about large quantities--5,000 jobs here, 5,000 there--major businesses. What are the prospects?

[Seema Patel]

These businesses need to build industry so that the development zones, where you have a factory, have an industry for providing that development zone with a surrounding infrastructure, thereby creating another industry. I think we need to build momentum, so each new player in this market has created subplayers in the market that feed off it. Businessmen in construction, for example, have been a good player. Agri-business as a medium-term opportunity is going to be critical because it will expand the agricultural markets in general, to be able to provide to those businesses. So we're looking for the types of businesses that can create offshoots or other opportunities.

But credits will be the name of the game, medium-term credits for the entrepreneurs, credits for the farmers so they can sustain themselves throughout the harvesting period. And we play the role that right now is being played by a lot of illicit actors, which is to provide farmers with enough credit, early in the year, so that they can repay that loan with in-kind goods. Setting up this kind of a banking system, be it informal or formal--I think we should go both routes--will really push the economy onto a self-sustaining route. Other than that, opening up regional trade will go a long way, because these markets have to get out to people who will buy.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you very much.

We'll move to Madame McDonough for seven minutes.

[Alexa McDonough, NDP, Halifax, NS]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

You presented a lot of information and a lot of opinions, and it's hard to know where to address one's brief questions.

I have to say I'm somewhat surprised to hear you say clearly and categorically that currently the United States dominates the mission in Afghanistan. I think the official position of the Canadian government, which has been presented again and again in Parliament and outside of Parliament, is that our reason for being there is almost entirely to support the Karzai government. Yet if I understand you correctly, you were making the case that the Karzai government is extremely corrupt and is losing the confidence of people for a variety of complex reasons. You also indicated that the biggest donors and those who have the biggest military presence should have more of a role in directing operations. And then you indicated that the UN couldn't play a major role because it has had such a small footprint and that it really should be restructured under NATO Command.

I guess my question is, what's the “it”? Does NATO actually have a mandate and the experience or the resources? Is it an appropriate role for NATO to be directing an operation that is supposed to have to do with reconstruction and development in a secure environment for the people of Afghanistan?

Secondly, I'm wondering if it's true that the Americans now dominate the mission in Afghanistan, which I think is not the public perception at all. What would you see happening further with the influx of American troops from Iraq, which seems to be very much where a great many of them are headed and where the American government is headed?

I know you went to pains at the outset to say you're not a spokesperson for the American government, and I want to respect the fact that that is so. I'm aware of that, but I just want you to respond to those questions from the point of view of your organization.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you, Madame McDonough.

Madame Patel.

[Seema Patel]

To answer quickly, by “dominating the mission”, I am referring exclusively to it serving as 50% of the international assistance funding in the country. I don't mean it is in terms of a leadership role but actually in terms of money spent.

Yes, I think the Karzai government has lost a lot of headway in this past year. In our first report, Karzai and his government were looked at as honest brokers. There was a lot of confidence in the Afghan people for him. But this year has been a negative year for Karzai. Bringing back officials or people who are known to be connected to the drug trade or to have private militia who are corrupt, bringing them back into the folds of government and allowing them to have positions of power has had an impact on Afghan perceptions about this government's ability and willingness to be that fair and honest broker on behalf of the Afghan people. That's not to say that there isn't good leadership there and there aren't good things happening. There are a number of leaders who are quite effective. We need to continue to push Karzai to look for good administrators and to not play as much power politicking as has been happening more recently.

I believe the UN can play this role, but I think it's going to be more important for NATO and the U.S. to push the Karzai government to develop short-term strategic planning in line with them. It has to be a joint process. This is a sovereign government now that we are dealing with. I'm not suggesting that we take over the mission or take over the recovery process from the government, but there needs to be a push on his administration to look at the short-time horizon as well as the long-term development plan. We cannot continue to accept that in time things will get better. I don't think the Afghan people can continue to accept that from their government. So I would like to see the most involved countries take that position.

Regarding a U.S. influx of troops, I will very quickly say that if they're the right troops, I think it would be helpful. NATO has put out requests for more troops, for special operation-type forces. If U.S. troops meet those demands of the NATO commanders, then I think it would be a positive step in the right direction. Obviously it has to be negotiated amongst them whether those troops are the kind needed on the ground.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

You have more time, Madame McDonough.

[Alexa McDonough, NDP, Halifax, NS]

One of the views that has been expressed by many--not all, because obviously there are a variety of perspectives--is that because of the way the war on terrorism was launched in the first instance, really as Operation Enduring Freedom, in some respects the increased presence and dominance of the U.S. is probably the best friend of the Taliban, not in intent but in practice. There is a sense that it simply fuels the Taliban. There has been the suggestion that one of the very positive things about Canada going into Kandahar is that it has diminished the presence of Operation Enduring Freedom--although it still exists, with a good many troops--and that this might create a greater possibility of building confidence.

With the increased presence of the U.S. troops, is this not a concern? I'm wondering how you perceive that.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you, Madame McDonough.

Madame Patel.

[Seema Patel]

Again, I think it goes to what the soldiers are going to be used for. There are dual, sometimes competing missions on the security front in Afghanistan. There is Operation Enduring Freedom, following the counterterrorism, and then NATO, following counter-insurgency and stability. If those U.S. troops come in under NATO command and fulfill the needs that NATO commanders have requested, then I think it would be positive. If they fulfilled the role of OEF, I'm not quite sure.... I think that's a question for military officials.

When Canada came into Kandahar, it was a welcome presence. It was a presence that was needed. I don't think it's necessarily because the U.S. presence fuels the Taliban. I don't think that's the case. It's because the U.S. presence on the ground was shallow and it was not necessarily there to maintain stability. It was there to do counter-terrorism. It was shallow. There were only a few troops in Kandahar before Canada came to do the mission that is needed in the south--the stability mission.

I hope that answers your question.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

You mentioned specific special operations and special types of troops. What types of special troops are they? Are you aware of the kinds of special troops that have been requested?

[Seema Patel]

The skills that are needed on the ground in Afghanistan--in the south and east particularly--are the ability to respond quickly to calls of help from local communities, local police, and local army officials at the village level. We need the types of troops that are able to basically parachute into villages. We need the helicopters. Like I said, that's the mobility we need to be able to respond quickly. We're going to need better intelligence on the ground. It's very rumour-filled: the role of cross-border insurgents, the role of Taliban leadership, the criminal elements of this insurgency. So we need better intelligence agents on the ground. Those are forces I would like to see. And I would like to see them with PRTs manned with the forces that can do tougher policing and aren't available right now. That's not just force protection from the PRTs, but also the kind of people who can maintain crowds, patrol in communities, and stay in communities if necessary.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

It's the difference between policing and militia or policing and troops.

Mr. Casey, do you have a question?

[Bill Casey, Conservative, Cumberland—Colchester—Musquodoboit Valley, NS]

Yes, Mr. Chair. Thanks very much.

You're doing a great job. I want to compliment you on the work you do, plus your ability to speak about it.

You mentioned that in your opinion, security and development by Canada was the correct approach--I forget exactly how you said it. You suggested that we're a little light on diplomacy. I wonder in what area you would you see us develop in the diplomacy field. What could we do better on the diplomacy side?

[Seema Patel]

I'm glad you asked that. This recommendation is something that's dear to my heart.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

As much as it's dear to your heart, could we have a fairly quick answer? We have one more question and then we must conclude. Take your time. Just so you know, the second round is shorter.

[Seema Patel]

There are two pieces. One is the role of Pakistan. The U.S. is not going to be able to make great political or diplomatic headway in Pakistan in the next year or two, given its current relationship with the country. So the other countries that are involved in Afghanistan that are in harm's way need to continue to push Musharraf to address the tribal areas, not just militarily but also in terms of fragility. It is also a failed territory, and the tribal areas need a diplomatic and reconstruction response from the Musharraf government so that it builds its constituency. I'd like to see Canada push them toward that role.

Secondly, on counter narcotics, eradication is not working. It feels like a sailed ship in the U.S. that eradication is going to go ahead. We'd like to see some of the other countries that have noted the devastating effects eradication can have on maintaining stability and on the local population in terms of winning their support.... So we would like to see a push for Canada to affect U.S. policy on eradication. Those two—

[Bill Casey, Conservative, Cumberland—Colchester—Musquodoboit Valley, NS]

What's the alternative to eradication?

[Seema Patel]

There are a number of different proposals brought forth. The Senlis Council has suggested one of them. We suggest that we can use eradication funds more effectively by a combination of credits, subsidizing other value-added products, providing loans, possibly even buying up the opium at the farm gate with a very limited timeframe to prevent continuous growth.

But in the U.S. I have not seen any of these alternative plans costed out, planned out. It hasn't been given attention by people within the administration in the U.S., so if other countries can come up with alternative strategies for counter narcotics besides eradication, cost them out and present them, I think it would help to push the debate in the U.S.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you very much.

I think Mr. Dosanjh has a concluding question.

[Ujjal Dosanjh, Liberal, Vancouver South, BC]

Thank you.

My question is regarding Pakistan. I'm actually somewhat surprised by your contention that the U.S. can't influence Pakistan and you think Canada and NATO can. Pakistan has been for a long time, until recently, almost a client state of the United States of America, in very blunt terms. What you're suggesting is very novel, that a country that provides so much aid and assistance to Pakistan and has had so much influence over the long term has very little influence because of the current relationship between the U.S. and Pakistan.

I'd like you to elaborate on that. How is it that a country like Canada, which has almost no influence in that region, can be more helpful vis-à-vis Pakistan and the U.S. can't?