Yes, I must have misspoke on rotation. I don't believe in rotation. You waste all of the time and energy and money you've invested into contacts and knowledge of the area and getting to know the local people, the people who are going to win the insurgency. The rotation, in my world, is always the nation itself rotating its own troops in and out, which is exactly what we're doing.
As far as moving from combat to training, that's exactly what's going on now. On my first trip to Afghanistan, I'll tell you, I was pretty uneasy standing among about 200 soldiers all armed with live ammunition, AK-47s. A year later when I went back, I participated in a rundown, a live firing exercise, at platoon level. I was as totally at ease as I would be with Canadian soldiers. They're coming a long way. You don't have to teach Afghans how to fight; they know how to fight. What you have to show them and mentor them on is combined operations where large groups are operating together and maybe injecting some indirect fire or artillery or whatever, controlling air. But as far as sneaking through the hills or running across the fields and attacking people, you don't have to teach the Afghans how to do that.
So we're doing that. We're weaning ourselves from the combat role, by way of percentage of energy expended, to the training role, and it has actually been quite successful. There's a problem with the training. For some reason, NATO has the Germans doing one thing, the French doing another thing, the Americans doing another thing, us doing another thing. We all have slightly different tactics, and when they come together, it could be done better.