I'll just make a couple of points on that package of questions.
In the first place, what we have to appreciate about Afghan society is that we have a very limited view of it, because we are focused on Kandahar province, one of the most rural and deprived areas of the country. Those of us who have worked there find that Afghan society is far more diverse than you would get the impression of by looking at it from here.
This is an Afghan-led process. During the presidential elections in October 2004 and the parliamentary elections in September 2005, the vast majority of Afghans voted in favour of a moderate Islamic republic; they voted against the extremes. We haven't been able to follow through properly on that vote of confidence.
One of the biggest problems—and I think it goes to the question of this culture of impunity—is that when Karzai first formed that government, it was the result of classic brokerage politics. It was like forming a Canadian cabinet in the early 1900s; you needed some from here and some from there, and some from everywhere. The big difference was that their “some from here, there, and everywhere” had guns, and some had pretty bad track records.
Grant is far more qualified than I to talk about the elected people with some pretty bad track records. But key to getting rid of this culture of impunity is that as the international community presses President Karzai's soft spot and says, clean up your act, we have to figure out the mechanisms to support him at the same time. I'll tell you what, if I were President Karzai—God forbid, I don't know why anyone would want that job, as it's second only in terms of security risks to Musharraf's—or if I were an Afghan cabinet minister, I'm not too sure how confident I would be that what we had said when we signed the Afghanistan Compact was true. I'm not too sure how confident I would be, in particular, in the west's real commitment to Afghanistan. All of this wobbling sends a very, very strong signal to Kabul.
I think, Dr. Martin, we're going to disagree on tribal reconciliation forever. Many of the problems in the Pashtun belt.... There are some problems because certain Pashtun tribes—Pashtun is an ethnic group, but with various tribes—feel left out of the process, because they didn't get in the process in the first place. A huge percentage of the problems down there are Pashtu tribe on tribe—and that's a very complicated exercise. There are several prominent Pashtu in the government, including the president and Minister Atmar, and it goes on and on and on.
I guess I'll end it there. I could go on all afternoon on a little rant.