My comments will focus on certain aspects of the Canadian engagement which, in my opinion, need to be clarified, are confusing and weaken Canada's effort in Afghanistan. I will do so by referring to certain aspects of the Manley report, and providing a number of comments and recommendations.
Let us begin with the Manley report. It is difficult to criticize either the report or its findings. Indeed, I believe it has something for everyone, to a certain extent. Unfortunately, however, it is superficial in a number of areas. For example, it would have been nice to have been given a more detailed assessment of the consequences of a potential unilateral Canadian withdrawal from the mission, both in terms of our alliance and our commitment to the UN and Afghanistan.
In addition, Canadians must be made aware of the nature of our current alliances, particularly the fact that these commitments are consistent with our values. I am not sure that this view is what is currently being conveyed to Canadians or is even shared by most Canadians. It is important to demonstrate, for example, the humanitarian significance of support for the reconstruction process in Afghans, as long as Afghanistanis require it. As well, Canada has to set specific objectives with respect with what we are prepared to do for the people of Afghanistan and what is likely to become a very lengthy process for the international community. And that should be done, not in terms of a specific time frame, but in terms of actions that can be measured.
Do I need to remind you that we are now at our fifth UN mission in Haiti—and the situation has only deteriorated? We spent 34 years in Cyprus, and I believe the UN mission is still in place there. Should we treat the Afghans differently because it is a more dangerous environment for us and for them? Canada obviously has to be consistent in terms of its commitments.
The first thing I said to myself when the independent panel was appointed was that none of its members had any military background, even though they were tasked with assessing the military component of the mission. In my opinion, it would have been appropriate to select a retired member of the military, possibly someone who had been part of the land force, with considerable knowledge of NATO processes, and whose contribution would probably have clarified the military requirements set out in the report and had credibility in that regard. As I understand it, members of the independent panel asked the military in theatre in Afghanistan if they had any specific needs, even though they did not have the necessary expertise to comment on them.
The Manley report recommends sending 1,000 additional soldiers. The term used is “battle group” without there being any definition of what such a group would comprise. Is it a battle group made up of mechanized combat soldiers, armoured vehicles, military engineers or artillery? What is the extent of the support provided, and should that amount of support be included?
As you know, to support a battle group, we are talking about several hundred individuals who focus only on that. As well, the more heavily mechanized the battle group is, the higher the ratio of logisticians and the greater the numbers. Why 1,000? Why not 1,500 or 500?
One also has the impression, reading that part of the report, that this was added following complaints from the military about the delay or pushed back timeline for delivery of the tactical helicopters, and from the politicians about the lack of commitment on the part of our allies to fulfilling their obligations. That seems to have been added in order to satisfy all Canadians.
I still believe that particular commentary was added at the last minute. I will give you a specific example. The Manley report refers to an additional 2,500 Afghan soldiers in Kandahar between August 2006 and February 2008, and ti an increase of 120 Canadian soldiers for the purposes of setting up mentoring teams. The same report, on page 16, predicts that within a year, there will be an additional 10,000 Afghan soldiers joining the ranks in Kandahar. Who will be doing the mentoring? And it's the same thing for mentoring—on a smaller scale—Afghan police officers. Who will provide these resources composed of the most qualified military personnel? Will it mean cutting back on our operational staff? Our combat staff? Who will take responsibility for it?
The other aspect of this that has been completely ignored—recognizing that this was not specifically part of the independent expert panel's mandate—has to do with the ability of the Canadian forces to maintain such an intensive commitment after 2009. There are currently 300 more soldiers there than in February of 2006, and preparation no longer takes just six or seven months; it takes more than a year. In addition, one has only to consider the number of militia that are part of the current rotation—I'm told there are about 500 of them, or almost 20% of the entire military establishment, to realize that it will not be possible to sustain that level of engagement for a very long period.
To those figures, one must factor in the commitment made to soldiers that they will not be forced to do a second tour of duty in Afghanistan. One also has to consider the Vancouver Olympics in 2010, which will necessarily require military support. Again, soldiers will have to prepare themselves and train for that.
I can tell you that I, personally, have not yet seen any evidence that we have the necessary staff to fulfill our obligations, considering the number of soldiers who are currently deployed. I hope I am wrong and that all of that has been considered.
Last Tuesday, I took part in a debate on Canada's mission at Concordia University. I must admit there were few government representatives there to support National Defence. As usual, the poor military man had to answer all the tough questions. As happens every time I take part in a debate on this subject, there was a large proportion of participants who are opposed to the mission—not because they are die-hard pacifists or are against the military, but simply because they do not see the mission as being legitimate and because it is primarily perceived as an occupation of Afghanistan to promote western and American interests in the region. There are many reasons for that. Operation Enduring Freedom is confused with the ISAF mission, which is supposed to be focussed on assistance.
In that regard, it would be a good idea for the government to confirm and explain its contribution to that operation. Let's not forget that on April 18, 2007, MCpl Klumpenhouwer, a member of the Special Forces, died somewhere in Afghanistan. Is Canada still contributing to operation Enduring Freedom or are we only concerned with the ISAF mission?
Despite their presence there, the UN does not seem to be doing much coordinating, as it does in other missions. There seems to be confusion as regards both the priorities and the areas where efforts should be focussed. Everyone has their own priorities. However, we may be forgetting Afghan priorities. In the final analysis, one is left with the impression that the Americans, with NATO, are the ones making the decisions and dictating their strategy to the Afghans. The Afghans do not seem to be playing the role that they should within the process. Are they truly sovereign? Are we really in Afghanistan because the Afghans asked us to be there? The leadership role that Canada should be playing is misinterpreted. And, is Canada truly playing a leadership role in Afghanistan?
There is no doubt that the Manley report presents a number of possible avenues to be explored, but it seems to me that some areas have not been fully developed. For example, since the report was tabled, we have been awaiting greater transparency. It is increasingly difficult to stay abreast of the situation and find out exactly what is going on in Afghanistan. That only helps to feed rumours. On the contrary, we should be stimulating debate, holding regular briefings on our strategy, on changes that are occurring and benefiting fully from the centres of expertise that regularly conduct studies, getting people involved and making this mission Canada's business, rather than the business of a small elite.
The fact that this is a mission carried under the aegis of the UN has not been fully exploited. People seem to forget that NATO has to report to the Secretary General several times a year as regards renewal of the mission. It is essential that the United Nations play the role it should be playing. In addition to the Secretary General's Special Envoy, tasked with really coordinating all military, development and diplomatic efforts, by all the players, with a view to securing the long-term success of the mission, the United Nations must also take advantage of the mechanisms that have been in place since the mid-2000s. In 2005, for example, the UN established the Peacebuilding Commission—the organization with primary responsibility for providing advice on restructuring. Are we taking advantage of that organization? There have been a lot of initiatives since the mid-2000s, as I was saying, with a view to enabling the UN to better coordinate these very complex missions, through better mechanisms.
As well, there is a need to restore dialogue with regional partners, as was the case when the former Special Advisor to the Secretary General, the Algerian diplomat Lakdhar Brahimi, set up a task force with six countries bordering Afghanistan. The idea was to properly integrate Afghanistan within the region and collaborate on building bridges with all of its neighbours, so that when the mission was completed, Afghanistan would be in a position to stand alone in relation to its neighbours. It is also important to ensure that Afghanistan is present and has its say within all the different coordination and decision-making centres. Canada has to do what it says it's going to do. That means the 3Ds in its area of operation, but it also means making its presence felt there politically, and not only within NATO.
Canada has to be at the decision-making table and politically influence the process, rather than always having to react. It has to do what it has always done well in the past: join with countries of a similar mind, show leadership and act as a counterweight to other powers, in order to ensure that no one forgets the real reasons why we are in Afghanistan.
There is also a need to explain to the people of Canada that Canada's presence makes a difference on the ground—a difference that can be made only by Canada, that our standards are high and that our respect for human values has an impact on our allies. Withdrawing Canada prematurely from Afghanistan would have an impact on those standards. That is something I noted in the many operations I contributed to: Canadians do things differently. We do things well. That is an advantage for Canada on the ground.
Two other observations show that we may have strayed from Canada's actual mandate in Afghanistan. I would like to read you an excerpt from the mandate given to ISAF in 2003 by the Security Council, which has been renewed annually since:
[...] to support the Afghan Transitional Authority and its successors in the maintenance of security in areas of Afghanistan outside of Kabul and its environs, so that the Afghan authorities, as well as the personnel of the United Nations and other international civilian personnel engaged in particular in reconstruction and humanitarian efforts, can operate in a secure environment, and to provide security assistance for the performance of other tasks in support of the Bonn Agreement; [...]
The Manley report mentions the following:
Canada's action should focus on clear Canadian priorities and meet a dual goal: 1. to provide the security needed for development to occur in Southern Afghanistan; 2. to assist the Afghan government to enforce the principles of good governance and build a better future for its citizens.
The goals set by the United Nations and NATO, as described in the report, are as follows:
—that all NATO countries assist Afghanistan's efforts to create the security conditions necessary for development, as well as to build a better life for all of its citizens; —that Afghanistan no longer serve as a haven for international terrorism.
Is this a roundabout way of saying that we are still engaged in Operation Enduring Freedom? I believe that it is the kind of thing we have to look at, to ensure that we are acting in accordance with the UN mandate.
My final point relates to the lack of clarity regarding our role and the problem of setting clear priorities around our efforts.
We cannot solve all the problems simultaneously, and I believe that this is a reality that is gradually becoming an obstacle or, at the very least, weakening our efforts in a context where resources are increasingly scarce.
The priority should be to restore order and establish institutional structures to support it. Social justice is an essential factor for the future of a society that takes the welfare of its citizens to heart; unfortunately, however, that cannot be accomplished where there is no order and, too often, we seek to provide justice before there is order. All of this results in there being no priority whatsoever, because, where justice is concerned, everything is a priority: freedom of the press, access to health care and education, a fair legal system, an adequate detention system, and so on.
We seem to be forgetting that in our democracies, progress towards greater social justice did not happen before there was order in society.
Thank you for your patience.
