I have a brief response to that final point. I agree with much of what you said. Certainly southern Sudan is a different case and should not be penalized for the actions of the National Congress Party in Khartoum. I glossed over it in a brief presentation, but we've discussed it in detail in our report. Both the governments of southern Sudan and Khartoum rely on oil revenue. If you cut off the oil revenue, the CPA collapses and the south collapses.
Having said that, the risk of the CPA collapsing is not coming from southern Sudan or from the SPLM. It's coming from the National Congress Party, who are systematically undermining elements of the agreement, and that's where there's a need for pressure. They've signed up for things. They've committed themselves to things. They are refusing to implement because they view it as a threat to the status quo. That's where the international community needs to push.
I respectfully disagree with you on the need for economic development in Darfur. Yes, it's absolutely part of the solution, but it's not the solution today. It's a solution down the road when you have a government that is willing to provide the political space for Darfurians to come together, turn off a military offensive, and allow access for the UN and for humanitarian communities. We need progress on the political process in order to get there. We need equal attention given to reviving the peace process that we're giving to the peacekeeping force if we're going to get to a position where we can talk about development, because certainly it's fuelling conflict in Darfur. It's part of the solution, but it's not the solution tomorrow; it's the solution a couple of years down the road.