Sure.
What I would say is that it has helped take away some—some—of the freedom of the Taliban leadership to reside inside of that federally administered tribal area in Pakistan, where governance really is non-existent, security is very much limited, and development is just not visible, and where they have been able to hide, plan, recuperate, and to recruit and pay and get folks to go back into Afghanistan to mount attacks, or else to mount them inside with the existing Taliban.
The increased number of troops up there has helped in the past to do that. It's also helped directly through the operations that have been conducted to remove some of the Taliban leaders. In the last year, we had the number three man in the chain of command of the Taliban, Mullah Abdullah, taken out; and as result of joint operations, we had Mullah Dadullah, probably their pre-eminent commander, killed because of that kind of joined-up operation.
Lastly, you start to see an effect on the border itself, where you see constraints on the number of fighters who are coming in to join the Taliban; difficulty for their commanders moving back and forth, which is most important for us; and constraints on the routes they can use, which makes it easier for Afghan forces, or us, in supporting the Afghan forces, to interdict them and prevent them from getting into places where they can launch attacks.
I don't need to make excuses for Pakistan's forces. They are not used to fighting a counter-insurgency operation. They really are focused on a big armoured threat from the continuing Pakistani-Indian tensions, and they have great difficulties doing that. We need them to do all they're doing and we need them to do more, and if they can do more in a joined-up fashion with the Afghans, I think that would bring a great deal of effect.