Thank you, Mr. Chairperson. I'm privileged to be with you today.
My name is Graeme MacQueen. I'm from the Centre for Peace Studies at McMaster University.
This is part two of this presentation and will follow directly from Stefan's.
What changes might we Canadians make in our approach to peace and security in Afghanistan? Once we are clear that our chief goal and highest priority is the well-being of Afghans and Afghanistan, we must acknowledge that this goal cannot be achieved until the root conflicts in Afghanistan have been identified and addressed. We have heard much over the past few years about the need to increase humanitarian assistance, to contribute to the reconstruction of the country, and so on. l support these aims. But there are reasons countries are reluctant to increase these forms of assistance: they do not want their new building blown up; they do not want their aid workers killed; they do not want their contribution to come to nothing. Before we can expect these positive contributions—meaning, for example, humanitarian aid—to increase, we must address the country's root conflicts.
Having acknowledged this, we must next admit that seeking military victory is not the best way to address Afghanistan's root conflicts. This may be a painful acknowledgement, but it is time we made it. We need not debate the morality of seeking victory, because the fact is that victory is daily becoming less likely. It is time for a new approach.
As we adopt the new approach, we must change the public discourse about our mission in Afghanistan. Why not stop speaking of victory? Why not abandon counter-insurgency language such as “winning hearts and minds”? Why not emphasize the goal of sustainable peace, the need for a serious peace process, and the necessity of a comprehensive peace agreement?
A planned, phased peace process for Afghanistan need not take the familiar three-stage form of ceasefire, face-to-face negotiation, and peace agreement. Rather, we might think of the process as dialogue and problem-solving, first stage; negotiation, second stage; and reconciliation, third stage. It would probably be very unwise, in fact, to go directly to negotiation between leaders of main belligerent groups. This would encourage undemocratic backroom deals, which is not what we are advocating.
A serious peace process might start with numerous dialogue and problem-solving sessions throughout the country. Afghanistan is a complex society with many conflicts and many grievances. The process of identifying these and seeking solutions should not be restricted to elites and armed adversaries but should be extended widely. It should reach all ethnic groups and political tendencies, and it must, in accordance with justice and in the spirit of UNSC 1325, include women.
If all this sounds ambitious, it is; but it need not be chaotic. The dialogue process can be carefully framed, given clear guidelines, set on a timeline, and led by trained facilitators. The purpose of this phase of the peace process is to give people safe spaces in which to express their feelings and be heard, to begin building trust, and to encourage a culture of listening and problem-solving instead of the culture of anger and blame that tends to dominate societies, not just Afghan society, that have suffered long-standing warfare.
Everything suggested here, by the way, everything I have mentioned, belongs to the best practices of peacemaking developed over the years by conflict practitioners and set forth in numerous publications and practical manuals. But are such dialogue and problem-solving sessions really possible in Afghanistan? Can Afghans get together in groups and speak about their conflicts? The organization to which l belong, based at McMaster University, participated in numerous dialogues of this sort with Afghans during the period 2001 to 2003—actually, that's incorrect, because it began in 2000; we began to work well before the events of 9/11—with financial support from CIDA. We have found Afghans to be creative and enthusiastic in addressing their conflicts.
It's important to note that this stage of the peace process should include not only groups inside Afghanistan but also regional powers, as well as other states, such as those in NATO, that have decided Afghanistan is important to them. What would be the point, for example, of coming up with a proposal that Pakistan would immediately reject? It is better to listen to the perceived needs of Pakistanis at the outset.
Only after the dialogue process has had time to unfold should the more formal phase of negotiation begin. The aim of the negotiation is to strive for a comprehensive peace agreement, especially among armed belligerents, that will address key conflicts that have been identified. Negotiations should build on the prior stage of broad-based dialogue and problem solving, and the negotiation partners should be accountable to the wider society.
Now a key question: should the Taliban be partners in the negotiations? Answer: yes. While we recognize the concerns of groups that wish to exclude them, the Taliban must be included as valid stakeholders if there is to be a meaningful peace agreement. Impartial and expert third-party facilitation will be a key element at this stage of the peace process, which should result in a peace agreement that lays the political, security, and socio-economic foundations of a sustainable peace.
Thirdly and finally, a process of national reconciliation should be launched in order to address the deep individual and social wounds of the last three decades of war, and to bring Afghans together in striving for a common future. The 2005 action plan on peace, reconciliation, and justice in Afghanistan by the government of Afghanistan is an excellent step in this direction. It will have more meaning, however, once the crucial conflicts of the country have been identified and addressed. Reconciliation engages the human heart, but it requires that the mind also be engaged in actively resolving key conflicts and outstanding issues.
Thank you.
Now we turn to Gerry Ohlsen for Canada's specific role.