Foreign Affairs Committee on March 23rd, 2009

[Dr. Elliot Tepper]

That was indeed my last point.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you.

Mr. Bush, please.

[Dr. Kenneth Bush, Assistant Professor, Conflict Studies Program, Saint Paul University]

Thank you very much, Chair.

I'll keep my comments brief. I see my role here as one of responding to questions and queries from the committee.

My relationship with Sri Lanka is now, I'm embarrassed to say, almost 29 years long. I first went to Sri Lanka in 1980. Much has happened since then.

Currently, I'm a professor of peace and conflict studies at Saint Paul's University. Over the last 15 years I've gone back and forth to Sri Lanka, and in the last five years, probably three or four times a year. I go back to undertake a variety of different types of policy-focused research. I work with different international development organizations, as well as bilateral organizations.

I will keep it short.

It is not worth our while for me to repeat some of the excellent reporting that has been done on Sri Lanka. So I will refer you to a number of reports that I've been reading over the last six months. The first is the Human Rights Watch report, War on the Displaced, which is very detailed and empirical, and generates, I think, a very useful set of recommendations worth our attention.

The second two documents that I think are worth reading, if you haven't already done so, are from the Human Rights Council, first, the report of the special rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment and punishment. That was published in February 2008. The Human Rights Watch report was published very recently, in February 2009. And the second, and the last, official document I'll refer you to is the report of the representative of the secretary-general on the human rights of internally displaced persons.

I think empirically, and having sat through the presentations by the Red Cross, you should have a fairly clear idea of where the situation is right now on the ground. It's very fluid.

My starting point is to sketch out a little bit of the context, as I see it right now, in terms of Canada and other international actors trying to effect positive change on the ground for the protections of civilians and the protection and promotion of human rights.

First of all, I have to say that over the span of the last 29 years, I haven't seen the situation in Sri Lanka quite as dismal as it is today, in terms of the levels of disappearances, systematic human rights abuses, and a regime that has rabid antipathies towards the international community. We're seeing international organizations' development workers thrown out of the country, we're seeing international NGOs accused unfairly of having LTTE sympathies, we're seeing the killing of NGO workers on the ground, and certainly we're seeing the blocking of access by the media and humanitarian assistance to areas in the north and the east.

One of the very important contextual factors we have to keep in mind as we think through what the various roles Canada might play in Sri Lanka is something that I started seeing develop in Sri Lanka over the last two years, which is that ODA does not have the political leverage it used to have. It used to be that overseas development assistance could be used conditionally to effect the incentives and disincentives of decision-makers in Sri Lanka, and we saw that in their change of Sri Lankan policy in 1990.

Here, however, what we see is a regime that doesn't care about overseas development assistance, or puts a lower priority on it because it sees the much larger quantity of resources coming into the country through remittances. It also sees investments coming from East Asia, to the point where overseas development assistance no longer has the leverage it once had.

I think the suggestion by Professor Tepper that there is a need to demarcate development aid to ensure it goes directly to the Tamil people is a very good one. In fact, all development assistance that goes to Sri Lanka should be assessed on whether or not it contributes to bringing communities together or pushing them apart.

We all had stories 25 years ago about the way a project might affect the environment or gender relations. Today, we have various stories of the way overseas development assistance, tsunami assistance, contributed directly to the war-fighting capacities on either side, but we don't have the means, or we're just developing the means, to evaluate our development assistance through a peace- and conflict-sensitive lens. So one of the most important possibilities that opens itself up is to look not just at the overtly political role Canada might play in Sri Lanka, but to look at the ways in which our humanitarian and development assistance could help to bring communities together. I have many examples from Sri Lanka, on the ground, that might illustrate that point, but I do want to stop there and open the floor to questions.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you very much, Mr. Bush.

We'll move into the first round. We'll go to Monsieur Patry.

[Bernard Patry, Liberal, Pierrefonds—Dollard, QC]

I just have one question. I'll share with Mr. Pearson and Mr. Rae.

My question is for Mr. Tepper.

At the beginning of your presentation you mentioned that the Singhalese population, the Buddhists, see themselves as a minority, mainly because of India and all these factors. Knowing that the religion of the state is Buddhism, and that all the bills passed by the government need to be, in a sense, rubber-stamped by the religious authority, do you think it's a religious war? Do you think all the religions should get together to try to find a solution?

[Dr. Elliot Tepper]

That's an excellent question. The member has touched on a central point. Religion, in this case, seems to be closely related to identity. The religious wars of Europe are not an example for the religious wars of Sri Lanka. I would put it that way. The identity of the individual populations seems to be caught up with their religion, but it's as much culture as it is religion. Keep in mind, there's a significant Muslim minority to complicate things, that speaks Tamil. So when you're counting who's a Tamil in the country, it gets a little more complicated.

The Catholic Church has been there a very long time, and it has members and devotees on both sides of this communal divide. When I was in Jaffna, I was successful in gaining an interview with the archbishop. He was known to have access to the thinking of the Tigers, and he of course was a Tamil himself. We met in his cloister, and we went on for quite some time before I reminded him that I was waiting to hear from a Catholic archbishop and not a Tamil spokesman. That is, I asked him if his religion could crosscut the conflict, and it was clear it could not. So I think even though there are Catholics on both sides, ethnicity and culture seem to be the bigger divide.

[Glen Pearson, Liberal, London North Centre, ON]

Professor Tepper, just to follow up quickly, you mentioned an evocative word about equitable redevelopment. Could you expand on that a bit?

[Dr. Elliot Tepper]

This was part of my final approach, saying that if Canada had a program approach to certain key states, such as Pakistan or Sri Lanka, the program might be more effective than the individual sectoral approaches through CIDA, through Foreign Affairs, and other sources.

Equitable redevelopment means that both the key parties to this dispute have to have a stake in it and have to be rewarded by it. It has to be seen to provide dignity and fairness on all sides. It also has to have—if I can put it this way—a clear Canadian content so that our approach is recognized as one of accommodation, inclusion, and power-sharing. I think there's great scope here for evolving out of this particular crisis an approach to doing Canadian foreign policy that would be distinctive and dynamic and effective. But it will take some work to put that package together.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you, Mr. Tepper.

Mr. Rae.

[Bob Rae, Liberal, Toronto Centre, ON]

Thanks.

I just have to say to members of the committee that I want to congratulate the presenters today. I think it's been very stimulating.

Dr. Tepper, there is one thing I want to not challenge you on but just sort of engage with you a little bit.

[Dr. Elliot Tepper]

Of course.

[Bob Rae, Liberal, Toronto Centre, ON]

I certainly agree that the Prabhakaran thing has become a cult. I don't think there's any question about that. But when you stress that we're not going to find a solution as long as he is seen as the leader or as long as he's given that position of authority—and maybe Mr. Bush could come in on this, too, because of his experience—my perception is that in the last two or three years there really has been a reversion in the Sinhala community, whereas we had a period of time, for about 10 years, when there was a great deal of openness to various possibilities.

I'm not saying anything happened, but I'm just saying there was a lot of openness. You know, you could talk the F-word—that's federalism—you could do a lot of things, and you could get to some interesting dialogue. The Rajapaksa brothers are not interested in this stuff, you know, and I wonder whether there isn't at least a case to be made that there has been a dramatic hardening on both sides, and that's really the challenge that we've faced over the last little while.

[Dr. Elliot Tepper]

As you know, I have great respect for your views on this matter. I think we have “on the one hand/on the other hand”. On the one hand, it is a judgment call as to the role of Mr. Prabhakaran. My judgment, based on long observation, is that he remains committed to his goals and his people remain loyal to him. So as long as he has operational control...if he can be elevated to a figurehead or be sent abroad to write some brilliant books on tactics or in other ways be removed from the scene, it would change the equation, because no other leader in his movement, I believe, has the glue that he can provide.

On the other side of it, though, I think one of the concerns that we perhaps have a role in addressing is—how can I put this gently in open forum?—Sinhalese triumphalism. There has been an educational process in the Sinhalese community over the years. I, too, have used this joke about the F-word. In 1983, I was being vetted—this is absurd—as one of three wise men who was supposed to go to Sri Lanka and tell them about Canada. I was told never to use the word “federalism”, just tell them all about it. It was very tricky.

The current mood—and Ken Bush can indeed jump in on this—on the Sinhalese side may be in the triumphalist mode, but my feeling is this: everybody is sick and tired on all sides of this war. There's a demand and a desire for peace. If proposals can be put forward that have, as I said earlier, equitable components, all the leaders will be forced to come to some terms on this.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you, Mr. Tepper.

Mr. Bush.

[Dr. Kenneth Bush]

It's even more complex than Elliot presented it. We're not just talking about a double minority complex; we're talking about a triple minority complex, if we include the Muslims in the east. We have to look at the heterogeneity within the Tamil and the Sinhalese communities.

If we talk about Prabhakaran as the great leader of the Eelam movement, after 2004, that was challenged with the splintering of what subsequently became the pro-government Tamil paramilitaries in the east. There are social caste reasons for the grievances among eastern Tamils. But when we talk about Tamils in Sri Lanka, we need to talk about Jaffna Tamils, east coast Tamils, Plantation Tamils, and Tamils in Colombo that have lived there for generations. So it's very complex.

When we're thinking through the various possibilities and modalities for a post-conflict scenario, we should be talking about questions of governance and leadership. We do ourselves a disservice to hang it all on this one figure.

On the question of investment and equitable development, we have to start from where we are right now. Governance structures, economic and political, have been decimated. But on the economic front, we have to realize the dependency of the economy of Sri Lanka on this conflict. Economic figures that I have seen in Sri Lanka from early 2000-01 indicated that 31% of the economy in the southern part of the country was dependent upon military remittances. Soldiers—men, women, and children—send remittances back to those villages. That's three times larger than the largest poverty alleviation program in Sri Lankan history. War has become a business that perpetuates itself. If we could snap our fingers and declare peace, we'd still have a massive economic problem to deal with. That's something we have to bear in mind at the outset.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you, Mr. Bush.

Mr. Dorion.

[Jean Dorion, Bloc, Longueuil—Pierre-Boucher, QC]

My question is for both of the witnesses.

Thus far, we have not said much about India's role in this conflict. India has a very large Tamil population. In fact, it is home to a Tamil state. Is India interested in continuing its efforts to try and bring the parties in Sri Lanka closer together or, on the contrary, is it thoroughly disheartened with the outcome of its previous efforts to intervene? Can you comment briefly on India's role?

[Dr. Kenneth Bush]

There's no question that the whole area is Indo-centric. India has had its hands burnt in its dealings in Sri Lanka. In 1987, an agreement was signed that sent almost 100,000 Indian peacekeeping troops onto the island. Within weeks of arriving to implement the ceasefire peace agreement, the Indian troops found themselves fighting directly against the LTTE.

It's important to point out something that hasn't been said. It was between 1987 and 1990 that the most violent period of Sri Lanka erupted. I would estimate that between 60,000 and 80,000 people were slaughtered. You found them on the street corners or running down the rivers. This was not a Tamil-Sinhalese conflict; this was a Sinhalese civil war.

This was precipitated by the arrival of India onto the island. So within Sri Lankan politics, there is a great sensitivity towards anything resembling Indian influence. The Rajapaksa regime and previous governments have played this card very well, and have mobilized political support by raising the Indian bogey-man.

That being said, nothing will be done internationally unless India is on board. They are a player in all kinds of ways. In the early 1980s, they were arming and training the various Tamil factions, the five or six major ones. They are there; they are present. Having lost a prime minister to the LTTE, and having lost a significant number of men during the peacekeeping phase, they're very tentative about stepping in again. But they are definitely there, and for any type of concerted effort they have to be brought on board.

[Jean Dorion, Bloc, Longueuil—Pierre-Boucher, QC]

However, if one day a Tamil state in northern Sri Lanka is created, might this not spur the movement for the independence of Tamil Nadu State in India?

[Dr. Kenneth Bush]

Most definitely. We've seen that historically. We've seen flows across the Palk Strait dividing Sri Lanka from south India.

We saw the influence, in the early eighties and the mid-eighties, of some of the blowback, if you like, of the training and the explosives training from Sri Lanka going back into south India, where they have their own nationalist Tamil movements. As a federal state, you have the tensions between Tamil Nadu, way down here in the south, and Delhi, way up there.

So there is that sensitivity, most definitely. We've seen that.

[Dr. Elliot Tepper]

That covers much of it. After the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, his widow, of course, has become the most important politician in India now. There's an outstanding death warrant, as they call it, against Mr. Prabhakaran, if he could ever be caught.

But Indians have shifted. Right now the party....

This is very complicated, as I alluded to earlier. When you get into particulars, you get into personalities and interest groups. Inside India, within Tamil Nadu, there are two political parties. There used to be one, and they split. The one that used to support the Tigers is now part of the federal cabinet. An offshoot is now opposing them, and they are more pro-LTTE.

There's a huge dynamic inside India. The member is absolutely right that India is not an uninterested player here. It's not a bystander.

[Bernard Patry, Liberal, Pierrefonds—Dollard, QC]

Are there any further questions?

Mr. Obhrai.

[Deepak Obhrai, Conservative, Calgary East, AB]

Thank you very much for your analysis. For all practical purposes, the background I have fits in with what you've been saying.

In terms of what you've been saying, then, what you've said, all these things fit. The challenges are great, are too much, are very strong. But I'll allude to one point: the international community, everybody, is tired of this constant warring. I would not hesitate to say that even India is tired of the constant eruption of humanitarian crises and so on.

We in Canada have a strong Tamil community or diaspora. I think it's the largest outside of Sri Lanka and India. With regard to the role of the diaspora, going back to my last question, there are new people, new players. I think the LTTE is probably on its way. It carries too much baggage or something like that. I do not dispute what the last speaker said, that he felt it is gone, and if the political situation is not resolved, somebody will replace it.

It is critically important that we resolve the political issue. If it's left festering, somebody else will come in and replace this, and it'll carry on and on. This young, dynamic community outside of Sri Lanka has a very strong, key role to play. Many of them have alluded to putting in the Canadian federation system there, or whatever; you alluded to it.

I agree that the current Sri Lankan government is a hard-stand government, no question, as compared with the previous one. Whatever reasons they have for being that way, it doesn't change the fact that it's time now for the international community to put pressure, whether through ODA or not. But collectively speaking, we have to use the diaspora. We have to use it but we have to come up with a solution, a new kind of solution. The time is right now. I believe the time is right; you alluded to that a bit.

This is the question I have for your academic circle, and it's the same thing I asked the Tamil community: has debate started within the community around the goalposts now, around the LTTE almost being gone, around the hard-line government, around where we go from here?

[The Vice-Chair, Liberal, Bernard Patry]

Mr. Bush.

[Dr. Kenneth Bush]

Over the last two and a half years, a number of research projects have been undertaken in Britain, in Sweden, and in Australia looking at the role of diaspora in the peace-building process.

I mean, everybody knows that diaspora plays a negative role. That is...and I'm talking diaspora writ large. I'm not just talking about Tamil diaspora, or Eritrean. It's right across the board. Increasingly, though, attention is being paid toward the peace-building roles they can play.

Now, within the Canadian context, specifically within the Canadian Tamil context, it is important that we look at first-, second-, and third-generation Tamil youth here in Canada. But we're in a very weird space here. The control that the LTTE exercises in Toronto is powerful. It's very weird. And I can tell you how weird it can be. I can tell you stories of meeting people who have fled Sri Lanka because of the intimidation and murders by the LTTE and who've come here to escape that, and then of hearing the daughter in the university talk about the sympathies she has with the LTTE, who killed her uncle.

There is a role for the diaspora in peace-building here in Canada, but we have to be very careful about who we deal with and how we deal with it. It's very opaque, it's very difficult, and it's very political. I think it's an opportunity, a big opportunity, that we can take advantage of very sensitively.