Foreign Affairs Committee on May 13th, 2009

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you, Ms. Brown.

Mr. Sunquist.

[Ken Sunquist]

Thank you very much.

I'm sure my colleagues from CIDA can also help on this one.

I think you're absolutely right that Canada's efforts in Africa are made by NGOs, companies, and governments. In fact, what makes it work is that they're all working with the same ideals in mind.

You talked about corruption. Well, where companies may want to make sure that there are level playing fields, transparency, and no corruption, clearly within the CIDA program around governance you want to minimize it at first, but then get rid it. One of the greatest failures in much of Africa is around corruption, and the fact that resources don't flow to those who should be receiving them.

So it's working with educational institutions, judiciary, and governments at all levels. I'm sure you can find programs from either Foreign Affairs or CIDA, or in really different places. If you go to Angola, the Canadian Commercial Corporation is working with them in terms of procurement issues and making sure that there's transparency. That's a little thing just sitting out there, but it's working.

In fact, that's why we kind of look at the study that this group is doing, those kinds of areas that we should be pursuing, and the priorities the group has here. It's all designed to make sure that Africa, as a continent, is a partner for us. It's not just something out there for aid. The reason we want to be there is to help them help themselves.

I don't know if that gives you the answer. As The Economist would put it, I think it's civil society; it's governments; it's business; it's how it all comes together.

One of the biggest problems we can see is that, for instance, there are some countries in the world that believe in a little bit more corruption. If you look at Africa today, you find that there are some places where their public policy is swayed by those kinds of things. We fight against it. We bring it to the attention of the people who can do things and to the attention of the people.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you, Mr. Silva.

Madame Deschamps, did you have another question? It's just about 4:30, so it would have to be a very quick one.

[Johanne Deschamps, Bloc, Laurentides—Labelle, QC]

Do you I have time for a quick question?

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

You can have a very quick one.

[Johanne Deschamps, Bloc, Laurentides—Labelle, QC]

I have heard that Canada's current contribution is approximately 0.29% of its GDP. That isn't very much, in my view, to enable African countries to achieve one of the millennium objectives for development and to reduce the dire poverty currently afflicting Africa by 50% by 2015. In the global economic context, with the crisis countries are facing, won't the reduction in aid from Canada represent a major setback for these countries that are beginning to emerge? In the global economic context, are we not inflicting more suffering on these countries, all the more so since some of them have been removed from CIDA's priority list?

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Mr. Culham.

[Allan Culham]

On the financial crisis, we initially thought that Africa was going to be spared the impact of this. But what we are seeing in the past month is that it's starting to accelerate and deepen the impact on many African economies. We're in danger now of people sliding back into poverty who had actually emerged from poverty through very hard-won efforts over the last 10 years.

The same is true of the food prices. Food prices skyrocketed. They have come down, but the impact on the poorest members of society has been absolutely devastating in some parts of Africa.

Within CIDA, we're looking at our programs to try to help mitigate the impact of the financial crisis by getting some of our resources into general budgetary support for the government more quickly so that social services will not suffer as greatly as their own revenue sources begin to come under stress. We're looking at these issues right now. We will try to manoeuvre our programs to try to mitigate some of the impact of this crisis.

I'm not minimizing it in the slightest. In fact, it's a real tragedy in that as this financial crisis begins to bite, people tend to be slipping away from the development goals that were set for them.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

We're pretty well out of time.

Mr. Patry has a question he wants you to respond to in writing, because we simply don't have time today.

Ten seconds or less.

[Bernard Patry, Liberal, Pierrefonds—Dollard, QC]

Canada provides funding to the African Union. At its most recent meeting, it seemed to bring together increasingly important players, including Libya, with its leader, Colonel Khadafi. He appears to control the African Union's agenda.

I would like to know a little more about that. You can provide me with a written response, because it is very serious seeing this region... Mr. Khadafi wants to do many things in Africa. That does not mean it's the direction Canada would like to see Africa taking.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you, Mr. Patry.

Thank you to the departments for coming. As you can tell, we probably still had questions that we weren't able to ask. Perhaps we will have you back again sometime.

We're going to suspend for about 15 seconds to let our guests exit their seats and allow our new guests take their seats. We'll begin very shortly.

One other thing, committee, is that because we're having steering committee tomorrow, unless anyone has anything for committee business today, we will omit committee business today.

[Some hon. members]

Agreed.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

That sounds good. We'll have steering committee tomorrow. That gives our next guests a little more time.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Welcome back, everyone. We're going to move right into the second hour of our study.

Our first guest is Denis Tougas, the director of programs for Africa. We also have today, from Development and Peace, Serge Blais, program officer, Africa International Program Services; and from Alternatives Canada, Michel Lambert,executive director.

We welcome you here. We apologize for the confusion of some guests leaving and you coming.

As you've already heard--I notice that you were sitting through most of their presentations--we're really beginning today our study on the Great Lakes region in Africa. We are beginning today to also recognize that it is a key element of Canada's foreign policy.

We certainly welcome the three of you to the first part of this study. We look forward to your comments. If you each have an opening statement, we'll probably only have one round, but we look forward to that. We would ask you to keep it under 10 minutes, if possible.

We'll start with Mr. Tougas.

[Denis Tougas, Director of Programs for Africa, Great Lakes Region of Africa Issue Table (Burundi, DRC, Rwanda), Entraide Missionnaire inc.]

Thank you. I will make some brief general remarks.

First of all, I can only emphasize the importance of the standing committee's study on the Congo. I assume that you are already aware of the importance of the DRC, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in Canadian policy. We are very happy to be here.

There are good reasons to study Canadian policy as it pertains to the Congo. I came in late, unfortunately, and so I did not hear the presentations made by your guests from the Department of Foreign Affairs and CIDA. As far as we are concerned, on the civil society side, we note and deplore Canada's loss of interest in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and we don't understand it. We deplore it and feel the situation must be rectified.

If I may, I am going to go back in time a little to make some comparisons, but very briefly, without giving any history lessons. In recent years, for 10 years, Canadian policy has focused on building sustainable peace and dialogue with other partners. That is because Congo is very important for stability in the region, but also because Congo plays a major role in rebuilding and kick-starting economic development in the continent.

Despite that, we seem to be seeing, and I reiterate, a loss of interest by Canada. One might think that since the last election, stability and peace have returned to the region and to the Congo, especially since the agreements, the Rwanda and Congo joint peacekeeping mission in North Kivu to combat the FDLR. On the ground, we are hearing that is not really the case. We hope that is the case, but we cannot say that peacekeeping and sustainable peace are there to stay.

There have been significant improvements over a large part of the territory, but I remind you that in one of the five territories of the province of North Kivu, 100,000 people have been displaced over the past month. Those numbers may seem negligeable for the Congo, because there is always a tendency to exaggerate, the problems are so enormous, but that is the case.

I want to take a step back to point out how Canada's involvement has been consistent and regular. May I remind you that in 1996, Canada launched a military and humanitarian mission to mitigate the crises: the humanitarian crisis and the security crisis in the Rwandan Hutu refugee camps in eastern Congo. That was a Canadian initiative. I won't go back over that mission, which was doomed to fail, and we could see why. Today, Canada's involvement in MONUC is limited to a military contribution of some eight or nine officers. In that regard, the contribution is somewhat lacking.

Since the signing of the Lusaka peace accord in 1999, Canada has been quick to provide political and financial support for the work of Botswana's former President Ketumile Masire, the facilitator organizing the inter-Congolese dialogue. Canada provided that support until the conclusion of the inter-Congolese dialogue, which led to the creation of a transitional government. That was up until 2003. From 2003 to 2007, at the invitation of other influential foreign countries involved in the Congo, Canada participated in the Comité international d'accompagnement de la transition (Congolese transition support committee), which existed to closely support the government. At the same time, Canada became massively involved with the Netherlands as a coordinator of the Group of Friends of the Great Lakes Region, from 2003 to 2006. In 1998, Canada appointed a special envoy who had the status of an ambassador.

In July 2008 that position was abolished, and since then, Canada's diplomatic position in the Congo has been unclear. What remains at present is an ambassador-at-large position, as it is called, or an advisory position that is now linked to Central Africa, with considerably less power, of course. That led to a considerable loss in terms of understanding of broad political issues in the region, what is happening, and knowledge of political players, which we had during that period.

I will conclude by saying that one of the reasons why we don't understand Canada's loss of interest is that Canada, as you know, has become a mining superpower on the African continent. That is how statistics from Natural Resources Canada present the situation. Thirty-three to thirty-four per cent of all investments in mining on the African continent come from Toronto, Canada. The only other country that invests as much—a little bit more—is South Africa, but it is investing in its own country. I will give you an example, and I am talking about the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In 2001, Canadian assets were worth $340 million. In 2007, Canadian assets in the Democratic Republic of the Congo were $2.6 billion, or eight times higher. In the Congo, Canada is the leader in mining. When we introduce ourselves, when we travel around now, people who do not know us and who learn that we are Canadian ask us if we work in mining.

Of course these investments come from agreements signed during rather troubled times. The contracts signed by Canadian companies—there are now about a dozen—were signed during the transition period, at a time when the government or the authorities were dealing either with people from Kinshasa or rebel groups. That is why the legitimacy of these contracts leaves a lot to be desired, and has resulted in the Congolese questioning, and lumping together all of these contracts saying that these contracts are leonine ones which have clearly lost some legitimacy, as I was saying.

There have been several reports, three, including a United Nations report by the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which singled out nine Canadian companies from among the 90 foreign companies involved for having violated OECD guiding principles. The United Nations Security Council did not want to take further action. But the Congolese government did. The Congolese government set up two commissions of inquiry. The Lutundula Commission, during the transitional period, raised the rather dubious aspects of most of these contracts. The report was never debated in the Congolese parliament. However, Mr. Kabila's new government, which was formally elected, set up a commission for negotiation, a commission of inquiry, on 60 mining contracts including eight or nine Canadian contracts. None of the 60 contracts were spared criticism, but on the list of contracts to be rejected completely were four from Canadian companies. The renegotiation process is underway, at present, and there seem to be some problems. Arrangements have been made for the majority of contracts. Among the last six contracts, where companies are slow to reach an agreement, are four Canadian companies.

I will conclude by saying this: Last year was a record year on the stock exchange. Mining securities hit unprecedented highs. What was the benefit in the Congo for the people of the Congo? Nothing. There were very few benefits for the Government of the Congo.

So for the Congolese whom we meet with regularly, life in the mining zones depends on foreign markets, the Toronto or the London stock exchange. As a result, during the period I mentioned a little earlier, Canada was seen as a middle power but an effective one. At present, Canada is part of the problem.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you.

We'll move to the next one.

Monsieur Blais.

[Serge Blais, Program Officer, Africa, International Program Services, Development and Peace]

Good afternoon. My name is Serge Blais. For the past 17 years, I have been working for a Canadian organization called Development and Peace. Since the early 1980s, I have also been working with African and Canadian civil society organizations. I salute this initiative and, with our African partners, we feel that it is time to ask questions about Canadian foreign policy and Canadian cooperative policy in Africa. As someone who has regularly visited Africa for the past 30 years, I see that the situation throughout the continent is now worse than it was 30 years ago, in terms of development, security and the humanitarian situation. We are talking in particular about Central Africa, since we will be using the Democratic Republic of Congo as our reference point.

Living conditions are getting worse. Infrastructure has become large-scale ruins and we can question Canadian diplomatic policy, in my opinion. When we meet with our civil society partners from Central Africa, these questions get asked.

Today, massacres occurred in North Kivu. There were some yesterday. For the past week there has been an increase in the number of people killed in North Kivu. Rebels were pushed out of North Kivu about a month or a month and a half ago, but they have regrouped and built new headquarters in South Kivu.

Canada had applauded the agreement between the Congolese and the Rwandan armies which was presented as a solution to the problems being caused by the rebels, who are creating insecurity, terrorizing the populations, raping women and trafficking in natural resources.

Once again, we feel that this is a short-term approach, a sort of half measure, like all of the solutions that Canada has supported with regard to resolving the problems in Africa. I don't want to go back too far in time, but with regard to Central Africa, we can all look to what happened in Rwanda.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Dagmar, we're missing some translation.

Okay. We found the technical difficulty. It was the wrong button.

Continue, Mr. Blais, from your last sentence or so. I'm sure you know exactly where you were.

[Serge Blais]

As a Canadian civil society organization in discussion with African civil society organizations, particularly civil society in Central Africa, we are asking questions about Canadian foreign policy which, like that of a number of wealthy countries, is promoting half measures to resolve deep-rooted problems. If we look at Central Africa, we should realize that this series of half measures that we have supported since 1994 has resolved nothing. At present, people are being killed and raped, houses are being burned and villages are being emptied, after having subscribed to the belief that support for a joint initiative between the Rwandan army and the Congolese army would be a solution.

We know that combatants are responsible for the massacres, and Canada, like the entire international diplomatic community, supports initiatives that seek to integrate rebels who are responsible for killings and rapes within the Congolese army. We then see that the Congolese army is unable to resolve the problems caused by the rebels.

We supported a joint initiative with an army that supported other rebel groups. So, each time we appeal to the international community, for example to reinforce the United Nations peacekeeping mission in the Congo and to ensure increased participation by wealthy nations, we wind up with a short-term solution being passed off as a local solution.

Denis talked about initiatives that Canada took in 1996. Following the disaster in Rwanda, more than one million refugees wound up in the Kivu regions. At the time, the Canadian government initiated a peacekeeping mission. It claimed that there was a local solution that would enable the problem to be resolved. This local solution was supporting the Rwandan army when it bombed refugee camps to force some of the refugees to go back home and when it pursued those refugees throughout the Congo. In fact, this destabilization continues in the Congo and has led to five million deaths and left the country in ruins.

So something that was presented as a local African solution—in fact a less costly solution for the wealthy nations—could not have turned out worse. For example, when we engaged in the inter-Congolese dialogue, we supported the inclusion of the various rebel groups within a national unity government. So, people who are criminals can become ministers, can share the power and not adopt policies on good governance or policies to fight impunity, to the extent that no progress is made.

Now, integrating the rebels within an army is being proposed, only to then see how powerless this army is in resolving the problem. Then we are told that this is a failing state. We believe that it is essential to reflect on these policies and on the refusal of wealthy nations to make a clear and effective commitment to peacekeeping missions in Africa.

After Rwanda, everyone said that peace missions in Africa were under-equipped, too small and underfinanced. Denis said that there are no more than five or six Canadian soldiers taking part in the largest peacekeeping mission on the planet. In fact, all western nations together, out of 18,000 troops, have provided no more than some 100-odd soldiers over the years.

Generally, when the situation on the ground becomes truly troubling, when there are problems, the troops there will hole up in their barracks. Canada and wealthy nations are paying, but they are refusing to get involved. Consequently, we wind up with peacekeeping missions on that continent which are quite ineffective. Afterward, local governments are blamed.

I would like to reiterate the request made by representatives of civil society organizations and churches in Ottawa to members of Parliament and the Minister of Foreign Affairs for Canada, which is for the Canadian government to more actively take part in this peacekeeping mission involving a large part of Africa. The Democratic Republic of Congo shares a border with nine countries and has vast resources. A destabilized and weak Congo has negative consequences for a large part of Africa.

I would also like questions to be asked about Canada's policy on cooperation in that region. The Democratic Republic of Congo is a country that shares one of our languages and it is the largest member nation of the francophonie. It has immense resources in which Canada has interests or, at the very least, expertise, and could contribute to development both there and here. I am referring to mines, forests, energy, electricity and transportation. I would note that this region is experiencing the worst humanitarian crisis since the Second World War. Yet, since the mid-1980s, not one single Canadian minister has set foot in that country.

With regard to the envelope for cooperation, we salute the fact that, after about a decade of attempts, a program framework for Canadian cooperation has been developed and adopted. We feel that this is important. Last year, the regular program envelope, excluding humanitarian aid, for the Democratic Republic of Congo was lower than it had been during the years under Mr. Mobutu. Despite the fact that we're talking about a country that has a key role to play, and despite the fact that it has been stated that we need to double Canada's aid to Africa, the envelope was lower in 2008 than during the 1980s.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you, Monsieur Blais.

We'll now move to Michel Lambert.

[Michel Lambert, Executive Director, Alternatives Canada]

Thank you.

Going last is both an advantage and a disadvantage. Many people have already said the things that I had wanted to speak about, but I fully agree with them. If I may, since I agree with what my colleagues have said, I will continue on from where Serge left off. Perhaps he would have gone on, had he had more time.

CIDA's current cooperation framework was put in place, and we are extremely pleased with it. We hope that it will have a significant impact in the areas of health, governance and women's rights, which we talked a lot about during the previous meeting when we arrived a little late.

This is not just about the Congo; it's a much broader issue. However, since I have but few opportunities to appear before you, this is the time to say it. In some way, this code of cooperation excludes players with important political knowledge about the Democratic Republic of Congo. We can talk about the Congolese civil society, which plays an extremely minor role in the implementation of Canadian initiatives and, of course, Canadian civil society.

I really feel it is important to mention this, since Canadian civil society organizations—mine, that of my colleagues and many others—have not been involved in implementing the choices that Canadian cooperants have made recently with regard to implementing programs such as Alesse, in the context of women's rights. Instead they have chosen to turn to multilateral organizations under the UN, which are clearly quite efficient in some ways, but which have at least two small defects. First, they are quite expensive. That little detail is often forgotten. Second, they are not required to report back to the Canadian government. There are few to no Canadian organizations benefiting from this support, from this work. It's important to say this because Canadian civil society organizations, including mine, have been working in the Democratic Republic of Congo for many years now.

There are perhaps several hundred local Congolese partners working on women's issues, who could implement projects. Finally, a project was undertaken that had been supported by another country, fortunately or unfortunately. It concerned the rights of women in Kinshasa and was an opportunity for us to provide information in all the national languages. Thanks to this project, we were able to turn the spotlight on this issue, but unfortunately, Canada has not undertaken the same kind of initiative. In my opinion, this is a significant loss.

That is essentially what I wanted to say.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you, Mr. Lambert.

Mr. Patry, you—

Monsieur Patry, you have five minutes.

[Bernard Patry, Liberal, Pierrefonds—Dollard, QC]

You can say it in French: you have five minutes.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

You have five minutes.

[Bernard Patry, Liberal, Pierrefonds—Dollard, QC]

Bravo!

Thank you very much, Mr. Blais, Mr. Lambert and Mr. Tougas.

The Congo is a huge country, geographically speaking, and the Kivu region is quite far from Kinshasa. I have never been there, but my colleague Mr. Dewar has just returned.

Mr. Tougas, you talked to us about the importance of Canadian mining companies in that region and the difficulties they have at present negotiating with the government, particularly since there are very few benefits for the population and for the government. That is what I understood.

In the DRC, is the fighting limited to the Kivu region or is there fighting elsewhere in the country?

You also said that, starting in 2008, there was no longer a Canadian special envoy in the DRC and that there was only a special advisor for Central Africa. Central Africa is an extremely vast region, so ultimately this means that there is no special envoy or advisor for the DRC as such. It's as simple as that.

Would the appointment of a special advisor ensure better understanding and, then, better ability to find solutions along with other European partners?

Do you think that the African Union is throwing spanners in the works, with regard to northern nations finding solutions for Africa? By the African Union, I mean in particular Libya, headed by Mr. Khadafi whom I mentioned earlier.