I think people supported the CPA for one very simple reason, which was that it would lead to self-determination. Southerners are very much attached to the idea of self-determination, and I think that's the only thing they saw in the CPA. After six years they would have their referendum and they would be free from the northern domination. That's what I think 99% of the southern Sudanese feel.
But you're absolutely right. There is a problem of distribution of income within south Sudan, and there's also a problem of perceived equality and fairness from the Juba government, and there's also an ethnic dimension to it, of course. The SPLM/SPLA is very much seen as Dinka-dominated, dominated by one of the major ethnic groups in south Sudan.
But there are a great many ethnic groups in south Sudan. The big ones and the small ones actually are very resentful of the Dinka rule, which is also another consideration for the election in fact, and this one is more pro-election than anything else. If the SPLM cancels the election or postpones the election or is seen as the party postponing the election, many of the communities in south Sudan will actually see it as a way of consolidating Dinka rule. So they have to, to a certain extent, be seen as going through the motions of an election to be seen as open to challenge, essentially.
The question you ask is very important for all of us. We've just had the same debate on the Congo very recently. How do you build a state in a place like south Sudan? This is perhaps something that should be discussed with the authorities of south Sudan.
We are all focused on 2011. What happens the day after? Even if they get their independence, what happens the morning after the referendum? So far, there's been extremely little debate about this. And perhaps this is something that we, even us as the Crisis Group, should think about.