The priority must be political investment, meaning that we must demand that the international response to the crisis in Sudan be strategic. As we said earlier, we must have a political strategy with clear objectives, which has absolutely not been the case up to now. Our response has been to the current situation, especially in Darfur. We have responded significantly to questions of human rights, but we have no political strategy for Sudan as a whole.
The first issue is to know what we want from this government. As we said earlier, the conflict between north and south needs more attention than Darfur. The north-south conflict is really the crux of the issue. Canada has to exert more pressure on the governments in Khartoum and Southern Sudan at the Security Council so that the process stays on track and so that the political work is done before 2010 or 2011.
The next issue is that, in terms of peacekeeping, the three missions presently in the area really have no political mandate, no operational mandate and no coordination mechanisms. For example, there is almost no coordination between the mission in Chad and the one in Darfur, and that is really quite curious.
One of the questions that could be raised might be for the Security Council to demand a joint report from the two missions on the situations in the east of Chad and in Darfur and a joint report on Sudan in general.
At the moment, the way in which problems are being handled is extremely fragmented.