Mr. Chairman and members of the standing committee, I'm honoured to have been asked to appear before you.
Your present focus is on relations between Canada and the United States. I contributed a paper to the recent Carleton University project on this subject. The project's papers are available to you, I believe; therefore, I will not repeat what I wrote there. Instead, since the subject is vast and complex, I shall concentrate in these introductory remarks on two aspects only, and I will speak about them today as an extension of what appears in my contributions to the Carleton project.
The first matter is Afghanistan, to which is linked terrorism. Thanks to the Manley report, Parliament reached a relatively high degree of agreement about the nature and limits of Canada's engagement in Afghanistan. Consensus may not have been total, but it was sufficiently broad to assure our soldiers and civilians in Afghanistan that the country is firmly behind them, whatever policy differences remain.
As a citizen, I thought this was an important accomplishment. Surely one of the most serious responsibilities a government or a parliament can undertake on behalf of the nation is to ask its soldiers and others to risk their lives in a war. Everyone senses that such a decision must be taken only after the most conscientious examination and with the broadest possible political support.
For the present, the debate about Canada's participation in Afghanistan is in abeyance. However, in light of the new approach of the administration in Washington, we, along with our allies, shall be obliged to resume the discussion reasonably soon. When we do, we should try to avoid some of the intellectual confusion that has marked past discussions.
Before we decide what we should be doing in Afghanistan, we need to recall why the alliance went there in the first place. This was to seek out al-Qaeda, the authors of the 9/11 atrocity, to capture and punish those responsible, if they could be found, and to prevent Afghanistan from being used as a base and sanctuary for further terrorist plotting.
In the process, NATO became involved with the Taliban, the local protector and ally of al-Qaeda. Extending the struggle to encompass the Taliban meant confronting a violent form of extremism that aimed at regaining power in Afghanistan and imposing its reactionary program of society. After years of fighting, original distinctions began to blur. The enemy became the Taliban as much as al-Qaeda, and the narrow aim of preventing Afghanistan from becoming a terrorist sanctuary merged into a broad program of political, social, economic, and cultural reform, involving not only Afghanistan but Pakistan.
It was interesting that when questioned about what can reasonably be accomplished in Afghanistan, President Obama said he believes the narrow aim can be realized, but by implication, the broad program cannot, at least not easily or soon. I understand this to mean that the new U.S. administration is coming to the conclusion that the concept of the war on terror espoused by its predecessor was a misconception. The United States now sees the possibility of a military victory in Afghanistan only in the sense that the sanctuary for terrorism can be contained and destroyed and that the task of political, social, and economic reform in one of the world's poorest countries is a task for the much longer term that cannot be pursued by committing the alliance to an unending war and that, in the last analysis, must be left to the Afghan people, however much other nations may be able to help.
Afghanistan then is one obvious field for further policy development, requiring close cooperation between Canada and the United States, and within NATO. Another is nuclear disarmament. This has received less attention. President Obama made only one brief reference to the subject in his inaugural address. He said: “With old friends and former foes, we will work tirelessly to lessen the nuclear threat.” This is not much to go on, but the statement by Vice-President Biden on improving relations with Russia, made at the Munich security conference, was an indication that nuclear disarmament is indeed on the agenda of the new administration.
There is growing support in the United State for progress on this issue. On January 4, 2007, an op-ed article appeared in the The Wall Street Journal entitled, “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons”. This article was signed by four eminent Cold War stalwarts: two former Republican secretaries of state, Henry Kissinger and George Shultz; and two eminent Democrats, William Perry, former secretary of defence, and Sam Nunn, former chairman to the Senate Armed Services Committee. They called for “U.S. leadership...to take the world to the next stage: to a solid consensus for reversing reliance on nuclear weapons globally as a vital contribution to preventing their proliferation into potentially dangerous hands.” They concluded that: “Reassertion of the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons and practical measures towards achieving that goal would be, and would be perceived as, a bold initiative consistent with America's moral heritage.”
Since 2007 the authors have continued to campaign for this vision and have now enlisted the support of some 70% of living U.S. secretaries of state, secretaries of defence, and national security advisers. You can see why this initiative might appeal to the new administration; it is bipartisan, and it comes not from the left of American politics, but from the heart of the security establishment.
The nuclear issue has acquired new resonance because of the increased risk of proliferation--for example, in North Korea and Iran--and because of the increased risk of weapons falling into terrorists hands in unstable areas. Anxiety is focused, for example, on Pakistan, where Dr. A.Q. Khan, the father of Pakistan's bomb and a notable patron of proliferation, was recently released after five years of house arrest. And there is widespread pressure to expand civil nuclear programs to meet energy needs, since the same technology required for civil programs can be abused to develop weapons. While the risks of proliferation grow, the Cold War rationale for nuclear weapons disappeared 20 years ago.
At the moment, there are supposed to be 25,000-odd nuclear weapons in existence. The largest stock is held by Russia, and the Russians and Americans between them are believed to hold at least 90% of the world's total. The five other avowed nuclear weapon states, Britain, France, China, India, and Pakistan, and the two unavowed states, North Korea and Israel, are believed to hold about 1,000 weapons altogether. In addition, there are about 3,000 tonnes of fissile material held in some 40 or 50 countries. Iran, according to the U.S. intelligence community, abandoned its nuclear weapons program in 2003.
What the authors of the U.S. initiative are calling for is the resumption of a process begun under Reagan and Gorbachev, which continued under George Bush Sr. but faltered under Clinton and George W. Bush, but which managed nonetheless to produce large reductions in U.S. and Russian stocks of nuclear weapons.
The difficulties of proceeding are considerable, to the point where some critics look on the whole project as utopian. The United States, by disarming itself to a much lower level, would have to persuade other weapon states to give up their weapons. This process would have to be managed in such a way that the non-weapon states relying on a U.S. security guarantee—Japan, for example—would have to consider themselves at least as secure as they were before, even as U.S. weapons disappear.
For this level of confidence to be reached, it would be necessary at the same time for the international community, building on what already exists under the IAEA, to create a much stronger, more intrusive, and more expensive system of international controls to ensure against cheating. And the world would have to decide what to do with a country if it ever were caught cheating. This is a formidable, but not impossible, undertaking; and if the United States were to go ahead with it, Canada should follow developments closely and be prepared, in my view, to give diplomatic and technical support.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, this concludes my initial presentation.