Foreign Affairs Committee on Oct. 19th, 2010

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

I call the meeting to order. Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), we'll commence our study on the implications and the ramifications of the referendum in Sudan.

I want to thank our guests for being here today. They are all from the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. We have Douglas Proudfoot, who is the director of the Sudan task force. We have Jillian Stirk, who is the assistant deputy minister of the Europe, Eurasia, and Africa bureau. We also have Donald Bobiash, who is the director general of the Africa bureau.

Once again, thank you very much for taking time as we embark on two or three or four meetings on the subject of Sudan and the referendum that's coming up in January.

I don't know who will make the remarks, but I will turn it over to you to get started. You've been here before. We'll have you make your opening remarks, and then we'll go around the room and follow up with some questions.

Ms. Stirk, thank you very much for being here. I'm going to turn the floor over to you.

[Jillian Stirk, Assistant Deputy Minister, Europe, Eurasia and Africa Bureau, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to the committee as well for inviting my colleagues and being here today to talk about Sudan.

Let me begin with a few introductory remarks.

Sudan has been plagued by conflict throughout its recent history. The largest country in Africa, bordering on nine other countries, Sudan is richly endowed with natural resources; however, despite its recent oil-driven economic boom, Sudan ranked among the bottom 30 nations in the 2009 United Nations Human Development Report. Sudan is also host to the world's largest humanitarian operation and two substantial United Nations peacekeeping missions, which together form the largest single UN peacekeeping presence in the world. There are an estimated 5.2 million internally displaced persons throughout Sudan, including 2.7 million in Darfur, and some 430,000 Sudanese refugees in neighbouring states, with more than half of them in Chad.

Despite its enormous potential, Sudan has been locked in a cycle of conflict and under-development since independence in 1956. Since 1956, two civil wars have devastated South Sudan, one has ended in the east, and the ongoing conflict in Darfur is now in its seventh year. Sudan's crises are a chronic source of instability, with regional implications, fueling the trade in light weapons, illicit smuggling, and cross-border conflict. Such instability perpetuates ongoing human rights abuses and human suffering in this region of the world.

Given the interconnected nature of the security, humanitarian and development challenges facing Sudan, Canada's response is a whole-of-government, whole-of-Sudan approach, aimed at promoting sustainable peace, development, and security throughout the country.

Both the humanitarian imperative and national security interests drive Canada's engagement in Sudan. Canada is pursuing a focused and principled engagement in Sudan based on fundamental values that underlie our foreign policy priorities--namely, democracy, freedom, human rights, and the rule of law.

But today we're here to talk about a critical turning point in the history of Sudan, the final phase of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and its consequences. On January 9, 2005, the CPA was signed by the largest rebel group in the south, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement, or SPLM, and the ruling political party in the north, the National Congress Party. The CPA sets out an extremely ambitious number of complex power-sharing, wealth-sharing, and security provisions that were designed to transform Sudan and to make unity attractive before its end date of July 9, 2011.

Although the stated goal of the CPA is to make unity attractive, the agreement contains provision for a January 9th referendum on self-determination for the people of south Sudan and a parallel one for the region of Abyei, which will determine if the state will remain with the north or join south Sudan. These referenda are key elements of the CPA.

We cannot underestimate the challenges facing the holding of these referenda in a transparent and credible manner. Deep political differences and suspicions appear to be hampering progress in referenda preparations. As a result, preparations for the south Sudan referendum are far behind schedule and those for Abyei have not yet begun. The south Sudan referendum commission was only formed last month, and voter registration, originally scheduled to begin in August, will now start in mid-November. However, given the anticipation building towards the January 9, 2011, date among southern Sudanese, many fear that any delay in the holding of the referendum may lead to the outbreak of widespread violence and the collapse of the CPA.

All preparations for the Abyei referendum are currently on hold because the two parties to the CPA cannot agree on the formation of the Abyei referendum commission. At the heart of this impasse is a disagreement over whether a large Arab nomadic group aligned to the north, the Misseriya, can be considered residents of Abyei and allowed to cast a ballot. Whether Abyei will remain in the north or join the south is a highly sensitive issue in Sudan, given that it is a key oil-producing state, is home to prominent founding members of the SPLM, and was denied a similar referendum promised to it in a previous peace agreement.

But the overarching goal of Canada's whole-of-government engagement in Sudan is the promotion of sustainable peace. The government believes that the implementation of the CPA is critical to ensuring that peace. We also consider it essential that the 2011 referenda be credible processes, producing results that cannot be contested and do not in themselves give rise to conflict.

As a result, Canada has been playing a leading role in helping the parties prepare for the referenda. I'd just like to outline for you here a few examples of this work. Canada founded and co-chairs the Khartoum-based donor working group on the referenda and has hired a full-time coordinator to facilitate its work. Canada is funding efforts to upgrade the capacity of the south Sudan police service to provide security during the referendum campaign. We've made a $7-million contribution to the UNDP referendum basket fund that will support activities necessary to hold the referenda, and Canada will be represented on the ground to observe the referenda. We are partnering with the Carter Center, through a $2-million contribution, to observe the referenda themselves, and we are planning to deploy monitors with the EU monitoring mission as well.

In August this year we hosted a very productive referendum study tour in Canada for a joint delegation from the north and the south. We trust that the lessons learned from this trip will be applied by Sudanese counterparts as they organize the referenda. Our team of foreign policy and aid personnel, both here at headquarters and in south and north Sudan, have long undertaken diplomatic démarches with both parties and with members of the international community with influence in Khartoum in order to promote the holding of credible referenda.

Now I will turn to longer-term peace and stability issues.

Regardless of whether the people of Sudan ultimately choose unity or secession, Canada's main desire is for the maintenance of peace and stability in Sudan and the region. The Canadian International Development Agency, the Department of National Defence, and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, with strong support from the RCMP and the Department of Public Safety, have jointly pursued that longer-term objective of peace and stability by investing over $800 million in Sudan since 2006, focusing essentially on three key priorities.

The first is working with the Sudanese and international partners to contain violence and enhance security. We continue to deploy highly capable and experienced Canadian Forces personnel and civilian police officers to key training and military observation positions in the United Nations Mission in the Sudan, or UNMIS. Nearly 430 Canadian military and civilian peacekeepers have served with UNMIS since its inception. Canadian funding has played a key role in the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of ex-combatants, as well as in the support for community safety and arms control initiatives.

A second priority is reducing vulnerability and saving lives. Since January 2006, the Canadian International Development Agency has provided over $448 million in assistance to the people of Sudan, including $233 million for humanitarian relief throughout the country and for Sudanese refugees in Chad and $146 million for early recovery. For example, Canada is making significant contributions to the World Food Programme, which is feeding nearly 11 million Sudanese. Also, over $20 million has been spent to relieve vulnerable populations in Sudan from land mine and explosive remnants-of-war threats.

Finally, as part of its overall goal of supporting sustainable peace in Sudan, Canada continues to build longer-term stability and resilience in the country. For example, CIDA supports increasing subsistence agriculture production and access to basic services such as education and health care for children and youth. Canada's stabilization and reconstruction task force has been building the capacity of rule of law, police, and criminal justice systems in south Sudan and supporting work on land and property management issues. Canada has also been providing technical assistance to Sudan to look past the January referenda and the July 2011 end of the CPA.

Southern Sudan is already highly autonomous, and if the people of southern Sudan choose independence, very few additional powers will flow to Juba, the south's regional capital. Despite this autonomy, the Government of South Sudan still lacks many of the basic capacities needed to effectively meet the needs of the people of southern Sudan. Therefore, whether unity or independence is chosen, it is important that we build up the capacity to meet the needs of the people.

Now I will turn to some of the issues in the post-referendum period.

Neither the CPA nor Sudan's Interim National Constitution provide clear guidance on what happens after the referenda. No matter the outcome of the votes on January 9, there is an urgent need for the parties to reach agreements on such issues as the management and sharing of oil and other natural wealth, the border, debt, and the status of southerners in the north and northerners in the south. These are all highly sensitive issues that could reignite violence if left unresolved.

For the international community, new challenges and issues will also arise post-2011, including revising the mandate for the UNMIS.

Canada is working to support peace and stability in the post-referenda period. For example, Canada has provided technical support to the government of South Sudan referendum and post-2011 task force, a body that is enhancing the capacity of the government of South Sudan to prepare for subsequent developments.

Canada contributed studies on border management and citizenship, at the request of the parties. Canada has also provided to both parties an extensive library providing examples of how others have addressed similar issues in a constructive manner.

Canada is providing staff to the CPA's assessment and evaluation commission, which serves as the secretariat for the post-2011 negotiations. Canada continues to engage in diplomatic efforts to maintain coordinated and concerted international support to achieve progress in the talks.

I'd like to turn briefly to the situation in Darfur, if I may.

While the implementation of the CPA is a central concern here today, we cannot neglect Darfur. Canada continues to actively support, both diplomatically and financially, the AU-UN Joint Chief Mediator for Darfur. Canada has also systematically called on the Government of Sudan and armed groups in Darfur to take part in the peace process; refrain from targeting civilians; ensure the safety and security of humanitarian workers; ensure that perpetrators of human rights violations are held accountable; and provide full, safe, and unhindered humanitarian access to populations in need.

Canadian Forces and civilian police peacekeepers continue to be active in Darfur. Canada has funded training of and provided state-of-the-art armoured personnel carriers for African police units serving in UNAMID, the African Union/UN hybrid mission.

To conclude, Canadians and the Government of Canada both have a fervent desire to see a sustainable peace established in all regions of Sudan, including Darfur. The integrity and timely implementation of the CPA is a crucial step in fostering long-term stability. As such, Canada is working in a number of important ways to ensure that the upcoming referenda defined in the CPA are held in a credible and peaceful manner, in addition to supporting both parties to define mutually beneficial long-term arrangements. For a country with so much potential that has experienced so much suffering, we must remain committed to helping them find the complex, long-term solutions that will provide a brighter future.

Thank you very much. My colleagues and I would be happy to answer any questions committee members may have for us at this time.

It will be a pleasure for us to take any questions the committee may have.

Thank you, Chairman.

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

Thank you, Ms. Stirk.

We're going to start our first round of seven minutes with Dr. Patry and Mr. Pearson.

[Bernard Patry, Liberal, Pierrefonds—Dollard, QC]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I'd like to thank our guests.

I just have one quick question, and then I'll turn it over to Mr. Pearson.

Sudan is one of the top three recipient countries of Canadian aid in the world. However, that aid, as you mentioned, doesn't really go to the south. It goes mainly to the vast Darfur region. For the January 9 referendum to be valid, the turnout will have to be 60%. Last week, there was a meeting in Libya, and Col. Gadhafi stated that Sudan's independence would spread like a sickness to other African countries, and that the continent needed foreign investment and stability. He added that with this precedent, investors will shy away from investing in Africa.

In Sudan, there are nine neighbouring countries. Will they accept a positive referendum result on the creation of a new country in southern Sudan? Will the other neighbouring countries accept the decision?

[Jillian Stirk]

Thank you for your question.

There are a number of important issues that the honourable member has raised. In the first instance, I just would like to say that Canada's assistance has been directed all across Sudan, in all parts of the country, so I don't think we've tried to favour one region over another. But I think the honourable member makes a very valid point that the results of the referendum will be critical. In a sense, it's what happens in the aftermath. That's why we've been working so hard with all of the parties to encourage them to work out arrangements in advance to negotiate all of these issues related to resources, citizenship, sharing of debt, and these kinds of questions so that whatever the outcome of the referendum, these things can be managed in an organized way.

It would be very difficult to speculate on what the reactions of some of the neighbouring countries might be post-referendum, but certainly our sense is that clearly the neighbours are also concerned about the outcome and that they too will want to see solutions that contribute to peace and security in the region, rather than the opposite.

I don't know if my colleagues have anything to add to that.

[Douglas Scott Proudfoot, Director, Sudan Task Force, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade]

I can add a couple of words.

The referendum is part of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The countries in the region support the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. It's only natural for neighbouring countries to hope it succeeds. The goal of the agreement is unity.

At the same time, they have undertaken to respect the results of the democratic decision of the people of southern Sudan. That is where the international community—including Canada—must support the process for it to be credible and workable.

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

Mr. Pearson.

[Glen Pearson, Liberal, London North Centre, ON]

I want to thank you for the briefing, especially looking at the long-term, post referendum. I think that's really helpful to us.

I do have two quick questions. I spent a fair bit of time on the phone this weekend with people from Washington, people who have just returned as part of a Congressional delegation from that region. They had some interesting views. They believe that the referendum will go ahead and that the north will not cause great obstacles to that. There will be other issues around Abyei and other things, but around that, that's what they believe.

They seemed to have great concern that so much emphasis has gone into Juba and not into the regional areas. They say themselves that they have failed on that and that they need to get going with that. The Obama administration is now seized with this issue, and is seeking to move out more to the border areas as well.

Their concern is migration: what happens when a referendum is signed and people come out of Darfur, as well as other areas--the people who are trapped in the north as well.

They were wondering...because CIDA had involved itself a little bit with the Darfur exit coming out into south Sudan a couple of years ago, does Canada have a strategy as to how it might help the IOM with all of the people who are coming back? They fear there might, in the end, be two million, and it will overrun the services.

I would like to link that to a number of months ago when the International Crisis Group was here. They said their major concern was not north-south, it was south-south. Their concern was also with all the exiles and others coming back, that it would overrun these services and therefore exacerbate an already difficult situation.

I wonder if you have any views on what you've discussed there and if you have any plans, as the Americans had hoped, maybe, around the exiles and those who are returning.

[Jillian Stirk]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I certainly share the view that we're very hopeful the referendum will proceed as planned. I think it's very important that all of us continue to deliver the message to the parties concerned that the referendum stay on track. I think that's very important in terms of contributing to stability.

In terms of the post-referendum issues, citizenship and provisions that are going to be put in place to hopefully prevent some of those movements of population are very important. This is one of the areas we've been trying to help the parties deal with in terms of preparation for that referendum, to try to address some of these issues before the referendum takes place and to minimize transfers of population.

I'm going to ask my colleagues whether they have any specific comments on what we might have been doing to help prepare for those eventualities.

[Douglas Scott Proudfoot]

Even assuming that the citizenship issue is resolved satisfactorily, there is a possibility there could be large movements of populations after the referendum, either from south to north or from north to south.

CIDA has had a number of programs dealing with the return of IDPs, and did particularly after 2005. I think they found that it was more effective to address the kinds of services needed for returning IDPs at the community level rather than targeting IDPs specifically. The IDPs coming back, even if there were resettlement or reintegration packages aimed at those IDPs, were very often not resettling and were turning back to Khartoum or wherever they'd been, because the community in which they were supposed to be integrating simply wasn't ready. There was no employment; there weren't services and so forth. CIDA therefore, as part of its activities, is broadening that to a wider pool of public services, through the Basic Services Fund and other things.

I believe the member also asked about south-south violence. This has been a real problem, and it has been a problem throughout the conflict--the civil war and after. The year 2009, which was a year of peace, saw 2,500 people killed in southern Sudan in inter-ethnic violence. This year it's been somewhat better, but it's still disturbing.

This is one of the reasons we feel it's so important to build up the capacity of the southern Sudan police force through training, and to build up and support UNMIS in its stabilization law.

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

Thank you.

We're out of time, but please go ahead and finish off.

[Donald Bobiash, Director General, Africa Bureau, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade]

I just wanted to add that within two weeks, my colleague Mr. Proudfoot and I will actually be travelling to Juba and the south, and we will be looking at these kinds of issues. We'll be discussing them with NGOs and we'll be visiting CIDA projects to bring us up to speed in regard to these sorts of questions on the ground.

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

Thank you very much.

We're now going to move over to Mr. Dorion from the Bloc.

[Jean Dorion, Bloc, Longueuil—Pierre-Boucher, QC]

I'm going to ask a quick question and then turn the floor over to my colleague Madam Deschamps.

I always have the same question about Sudan. We know there has been a civil war in the south between the central government and the local organizations and population. We also know there is a civil war in Darfur and that the ethnic composition of the north is essentially Arab or Arab-speaking, and relatively white. It is black in the south, where there are Christians and animists. In the north, they are Muslim.

How is it that, in the various settlements that have been reached, Darfur has not come under a settlement providing for a referendum or possible secession? Is it because of the ethnic composition of the population, or religious factors? What's the difference between Darfur and South Sudan?

[Jillian Stirk]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

As the member indicated, it's a very complex question, especially when it comes to ethnic composition and conflicts between various groups. If you don't mind, I'll switch to English to be more specific.

I think...not that there aren't serious tensions between Darfur and the central government as well, but rather that we have this Comprehensive Peace Agreement with the south. That has kind of allowed us to move on to this next step, which includes the referendum.

As it stands, the peace process under way with respect to Darfur has been aimed at resolving those tensions within the context of a united Sudan. But that's not to say that these tensions aren't serious, and of course we see a manifestation of that in the violence, the refugee movements, and so on that we have there.

Again, we're also following closely the peace process with respect to Darfur. We had a representative from the Department of Foreign Affairs participating in those talks just last week, so we follow those issues closely as well.

Merci.

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

Madame Deschamps.

[Johanne Deschamps, Bloc, Laurentides—Labelle, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I'd like to come back to something Mr. Bobiash said a bit earlier. You indicated that you would soon be travelling to South Sudan to meet with NGOs and members of civil society.

Last week, the committee heard from a woman named Zaynab Elsawi, who described the situation to us. She represents a group of women from all over Sudan, north and south. According to Ms. Elsawi, they participated in the peace process. She told us that civil society was virtually ignored in the process leading up to the referendum.

What you're proposing to do—to go there soon and meet with members of civil society and NGOs—isn't it a bit late on the eve of a January referendum?

[Donald Bobiash]

This isn't the first time we've contacted NGOs and representatives of civil society in Sudan. The process may not get much coverage, but we will be keeping in touch with these representatives in the weeks to come.

[Johanne Deschamps, Bloc, Laurentides—Labelle, QC]

On another occasion, Ms. Elsawi made a speech, and some participants let it be known that they were getting very little in the way of diplomatic services from the Canadian embassy, given the lack of staff there.

In your presentation, you say that Canada continues to engage in diplomatic efforts to maintain coordinated and concerted international support. Could you give us some examples of how that is being done on the ground?

[Douglas Scott Proudfoot]

Canada's diplomatic engagement is multi-faceted: in Sudan, obviously, through our embassy's interaction with Sudanese authorities in Khartoum, as well as with southern Sudanese authorities in Darfur. It is an ongoing effort. The political section in Khartoum and officials in Darfur are in constant contact with local authorities and NGOs, civil society and other political actors.

But our diplomatic efforts are not confined to Sudan itself. The situation in Sudan is a major international issue. So we are focusing our efforts on international forums, like the United Nations Human Rights Council, but also on our interaction with other countries that have some influence in Sudan or that are stakeholders, and on our contacts with rebel groups in Darfur, and there is our participation in the Doha peace process, the Darfur peace process.

I should also mention an outreach effort with the Sudanese community in Canada. A number of meetings in Toronto, Winnipeg, Calgary and elsewhere, where the Sudanese and Sudanese Canadian communities are concentrated, led to a conference in Winnipeg last month to create a dialogue with Canadians of Sudanese origin, who have very relevant opinions.

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

Thank you very much. That's all the time. We'll try to get back for another round.

Mr. Lunney, sir.

[James Lunney, Conservative, Nanaimo—Alberni, BC]

The first question I had was just a general one, about the populations there. What is the population of Juba, the capital, for example? Do you have any idea of how many people we are talking about in Juba?

[Douglas Scott Proudfoot]

There aren't very good figures, but the best guess we're hearing is about half a million. It doesn't look like a city of half a million; its infrastructure is very rudimentary.

[James Lunney, Conservative, Nanaimo—Alberni, BC]

So that's sort of a concern about the whole question. When there are so many things that are net yet agreed upon between north and south—about citizenship, about borders, about a whole range of issues there—should the referendum actually go ahead, when those questions are unsettled?

I hear the message that we're all staying positive and that it should go ahead. But how is it going to work out, if there's no agreement on these things? It will be a sort of free-for-all of negotiation afterwards, will it not?

[Jillian Stirk]

Thank you, Chairman.

Given the extraordinary efforts that were put into developing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, and the fact that the referendum was a central part of that peace agreement, to question whether or not it should proceed at this stage would have quite a destabilizing effect on the overall situation on the ground. South Sudan has gained a great deal of autonomy during this period while the peace agreement has been in effect, and they have begun to establish institutions. In fact many people believe that even if the referendum were to come out in favour of independence for south Sudan, the powers flowing to south Sudan post-referendum would not be significantly greater than they are today. So some of this work is already under way.

The honourable member is quite right that the capacity in both south Sudan and Sudan writ large is quite limited. As you may recall from the beginning of my statement, I emphasized how this is a country that has been rocked by violence and instability for a number of years. There is very basic infrastructure, and whatever the results of the referendum, the road ahead is not likely to be easy or straightforward and of course will require significant support from the international community. But I think to question the validity of the referendum at this stage would be not helpful in terms of the stability of the region.