Thank you, Mr. Chair. Good afternoon, honourable members of Parliament.
As the chair has indicated, I am a professor of law at Osgoode Hall Law School, but I'm also one of nine commissioners on a non-governmental comisión de la verdad, or truth commission, established by a civil society coalition of human rights organizations in Honduras. It was inaugurated eight months ago, on June 28, 2010, which was the first anniversary of the 2009 coup d'état in that country.
In the minutes I have, I have four main purposes. One is to explain briefly how the civil society Truth Commission came to be and what our mandate and working methods are. Second, I will say something very briefly about the human rights situation. Third, I will comment on what I consider to be a complementarity between the work of the commission I'm on--the civil society Truth Commission--and an official governmental commission, called the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, on which another Canadian sits, Mr. Michael Kergin. Fourth, to the extent I have time, I'll note some questions that both commissions need to analyze in the sphere of the rule of law.
My notes are written out, but they're in English, so only once they are translated into French will they be available for the entire committee. However, we've provided them to the committee. I won't be speaking to all aspects of my text.
The first point is on the civil society truth commission--let me start, actually, with the other commission. President Pepe Lobo, the holder of the presidency at the moment, established the Truth and Reconciliation Commission by executive decree. It began its work in May of last year. Now, this official commission's mandate is to clarify the facts “that occurred before and after June 28, 2009, in order to identify the acts that led to the crisis situation” and to make proposals to the Honduran people in order to avoid a repeat of such acts in the future.
They're due to report in mid-May, we were told two days ago. As I mentioned, a Canadian, a former Canadian ambassador to the U.S., Michael Kergin, is one of five commissioners, as is the former vice-president of Guatemala, Eduardo Stein, who is the chair.
Now it's fair to say that deep mutual distrust within a polarized society is a defining feature of Honduras at present, and it's perhaps not surprising that the coalition of human rights organizations called the Plataforma de Derechos Humanos, decided to constitute its own commission.
Generally put, our commission has the mandate to investigate, document, and analyze the nature and dimensions of the coup as well as the climate of human rights violations following the coup and up until the present, and indeed up until this coming June. In order to come to grips with the two fields of focus--the coup and human rights violations--it's necessary to understand the multiple dimensions of the fragile and compromised state of the rule of law in Honduras.
A crucial part of our report will be recommendations on the accountability of state and individual actors, on necessary structural and institutional reforms, and on desirable action from international institutions. We expect to report in October with a report that will be in both Spanish and English.
A team of staff members, who I'll note are not just dedicated but courageous, has experienced a multitude of threats in the months of November and December, which thankfully have quieted down in the last couple of months. I offer my thanks to the embassy of Canada, and to the ambassador, for the concern expressed by Canada and the willingness to consider further actions on the part of Canada if the situation worsens for our staff members.
The team is looking into four prongs of investigation. One is a contextualized understanding of the entire situation in Honduras, historical and sociological. The second is a study of the nature of the coup, both from a factual perspective and in terms of the legal justifications that have been offered by some actors. Third is a study of the human rights situation in Honduras in terms of the facts and the application of relevant law to those facts. Fourth is an analysis of options for recommendations in light of accumulated, comparative, and international experience.
On the human rights situation, I'll briefly say that a wide range of credible and authoritative institutions have issued reports on what is viewed as a serious deterioration of the human rights situation in Honduras since the coup. They include the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the UN High Commissioner, and the International Commission of Jurists.
It's very important to know, in line with what you've already heard, that such reports have by no means focused only on the six months between the coup and the holding of elections in November 2009. For example, an interim report from the International Commission of Jurists just this past December focuses on the serious problems of the rule of law and the organization of impunity in Honduras.
Perhaps surprisingly for external observers, since the immediate post-coup regime headed up by Roberto Micheletti ceded power to the government of Porfirio Lobo after the November 2009 elections, the situation is not getting better, and indeed in certain respects, is getting worse. I can give examples during the talk.
Briefly, on complementarity, there is great value if Hondurans, the OAS, Canada, and Canadians have the benefit of the report of both the commissions to allow broader, more informed, and more inclusive national and international deliberation on ways forward for Honduras.
I am inclined to think about the relationship between the two commissions in terms of a fuller truth, including--as may be produced by discussion and debate--any differences in findings, interpretations, and recommendations in the two reports. In the most simplified sense, as I have said more than once to journalists in Canada and Honduras, more truth is better than less. In a more complex sense, it's not just a quantitative matter; it's also a qualitative thing. I think we're more likely to arrive at a deeper truth.
It's important to take into account two facts. Within this way of thinking, note the very different mandates and different emphases of the two commissions. The official commission is focusing on what their mandate calls “a crisis”, without using the word “coup”, and their investigations are to stop with the start of the current presidency of Pepe Lobo.
The human rights situation in Honduras is not specified in the President's mandate for the official commission, and I believe the term “human rights” appears once. It receives only an indirect mention in the mandate, so we don't know what we can expect from the other commission in terms of how far they think they can go in that area.
I'll end here, but there's also the important reality of the two commissions having access to different actors and different forms of evidence. For example, the official commission--at least by its mandate--has full access to executive branch documentation. On the other hand, our commission has much more extensive and higher-quality access to information on the human rights situation in the country, both because of the documentation that human rights organizations are assisting us with and because we have adopted an approach to comprehensively documenting the situation through individual witness testimony.
My final point on complementarity is that it's not just about a fuller and a better truth: it's a prudential and strategic recommendation. Honduras is a highly polarized society with immense distrust, including distrust on the part of many Hondurans of the official commission and obvious distrust of our commission on the part of other sectors. There are thus political legitimacy consequences if the Honduran government moves ahead based solely on the official commission's report. To move ahead of having both reports is not just to lose the benefit of more knowledge and a healthier basis for debate and deliberation; it's also to risk, and indeed practically invite, exacerbation versus amelioration of the fractures in Honduras.
Such prudential considerations also apply to external actors. The OAS, for example, is viewed by many in Honduras as having sided with justice and the rule of law even if pressure was ineffective in carrying out the OAS's own call for the coup regime to stand down and allow Zelaya to return to the presidency. If the OAS were now to act in a way that is perceived as an abandonment of its support for democracy and human rights--for example, a premature lifting of the suspension of Honduras from the OAS--it will take a huge hit in terms of its respect levels in the country.
Finally, Canada also has to consider the context in which it takes initiatives, including the planned free trade agreement between Canada and Honduras.
As predicted, I didn't get to the fourth point--the rule of law--but I'm happy to answer questions.
Thank you.