Just to echo that, it's not just NGOs that need that certainty and stability. If you are recruiting teachers, you need to be able to pay them in three, four, five years' time. That's why you keep a very close eye on what's happening on the commitment side of the ledger.
Also, this issue about remittances is a really important one, because it draws attention to potential other sources of financing. We know it's not going to be possible to close a $16-billion financing gap at the next G8 summit. We know at the same time the G20 is already looking at a whole range of innovative financing options to mobilize additional resources.
Again, I think this is an area where there ought to be a far more active and robust G8/G20 dialogue looking at potential avenues, at whether these ideas are being explored around financial transactions, levies, and this sort of thing, but making sure that education figures are a potential beneficiary from those sorts of approaches.
The reason I mention the Afghan example is that what you often hear when you speak to donors about providing aid to conflict-affected countries is essentially that the risks are too high to get involved; the reporting structures are too weak so they don't know what's going to happen to the money; they're not going to have to report properly to legislative assemblies and so on; and we can't afford to get it wrong.
Afghanistan has demonstrated that when donors pool their resources, they reduce their shared risk to some degree. They are pooling risk. That is essentially what they are doing, and they are pooling risk in an environment where they are looking both at the security side of the agenda and how to create a secure environment for development to happen, and how to pool risk, and how to recognize that these governments aren't going to be able to report in the same way as a far more developed, secure, stable country.
If you look at a context like the DRC, you have this combination of insecurity on the ground, very large IDP camps with appalling levels of provision for education and highly variable levels of provision for education, and the collective donor response tends to be that they can't do business with the government because of all the weaknesses I have described. This is a classic example where donors could be pooling their resources far more actively. They could be looking to the type of arrangement they put in place in Sierra Leone or Liberia, a multi-donor pooled fund type of arrangement, and I think they'd be willing to take a little more risk. These are high-risk environments. You're recognizing it may not deliver the same results in the short term, but as a long-term investment in peace and security it could do a very great deal.