Thank you very much, and thank you for the invitation.
My comments will focus on the relationships between mining and development, and they draw on a decade of research exploring relationships among extractive industries, social conflict, governance, livelihoods, and development in Latin America. I, along with postgraduate students and a range of research partners, have been involved in that work. The comments also draw on relatively close collaborations with civil society and governmental organizations in the region.
I want to begin by suggesting that rather than talking about development and development projects, it's perhaps more appropriate to talk about the relationship between mining and transformation. The appearance and the expansion of large-scale mining changes so much, so profoundly, that achieving development in such a context becomes particularly complicated and difficult. While these transformations do not make development impossible, they are of such a magnitude that any effort to foster development cannot simply focus on projects. Instead, it must focus on institution-building and regulation. It must also get sequences right. Very often mining expansion happens first and then efforts are made to build capacities later, usually after conflicts begin to emerge. By then it's too late, and the train has already left the station.
With that opening gambit in mind about transformation and the difference between projects and institution-building, I want to organize my remaining comments around three themes: mining and social conflict, mining and possible pathways to development, and the whole issue of legitimacy and legality.
On mining and social conflict, which has been a topic of our work, not all mining leads to social conflict; however, much does. The Peruvian human rights ombudsman consistently reports that over half of social conflicts in Peru are socio-environmental and related, in particular, to mining and, secondarily, to hydrocarbons. Similar patterns, though not so extreme, are visible in Bolivia and Ecuador, and mining-related conflicts are a particularly serious governance challenge for the government of El Salvador at present.
There's a narrative that says that these conflicts are manipulated. But who is deemed to be the manipulator depends very much on who's making the allegations, and that can range from the communist party to international NGOs to USAID. Those are all from allegations in the last few months.
This very diversity, and who's being accused of agitating, already weaken this interpretation of conflicts. More seriously, it's impossible to explain why so many people take to the streets, risk their physical safety, and invest so much time in protesting, if they're simply being manipulated. It seems more reasonable to conclude that their own motivations and frustrations lead them to put themselves in harm's way and to run such risks. I think it's also worth noting that in many cases people who are protesting and questioning are often themselves capitalists, agricultural producers, dairy farmers, fruit exporters, and the like.
So how do we understand this conflict?
I think one way into it is to look at maps of mining concessions, which are at the end of my paper. Those maps reveal that very significant areas are already affected by mining concessions. They reveal concessions overlapping with water resources. Fifteen of Peru's largest rivers have 25% or more of their drainage basin under concession. They reveal concessions overlapping with other forms of governing territory. Some experts calculate that about 55%—at least over half—of Peru's registered peasant communities are affected by concessions, and concessions overlap with landscapes that mean something to many people.
Of course, concessions are not mining projects. Projects cover far smaller areas.
So what do these concession maps tell us?
I think, from our research, that they can be best understood as maps of uncertainty. When people know that their land has been concessioned, their understanding of the future changes profoundly. They perceive new risks, new threats, and new opportunities. How much threat they perceive depends very much on the context in which they are living. In cases like Peru and El Salvador, where a whole range of people worry so very much about water, it's not surprising that people mobilize, worried about the effects of concessions on water sources.
Now while some people see threats, others see opportunities. Indeed, a recurrent feature in our research has been that the areas that are caught in the expansion of mining are characterized by severe internal divisions. Just as an illustration, in 2008, I was present as an invited speaker at the public consultation of Ecuador's Constituent Assembly on mining. We went to Loja and Zamora Chinchipe, a region where Canadian mining actually happens to be active. At two meetings, each with around a thousand people, the room was divided down the middle by police. It's the only time I've ever spoken to a room divided by police, and hopefully it will be the last time.
Much more detailed work at a local level by one of my graduate students shows how that polarization reaches into everyday life. School kids shoot notes or fight in playgrounds depending on whether their families are pro- or anti-mining. People's decisions on where to buy food, where to have their hair done, or even what taxi to take depend on the whether the provider is pro- or anti-mining. Shopping, she notes, has never been so complicated.
Under conditions where everyday social relations have become so polarized, achieving development is that much harder.
I also want to say one more thing about social conflict before moving to my next point—very quickly—and it has to do with the effects of fiscal transfers on conflicts. One of the primary contributions, of course, to the extractive industries is through the taxes and the royalties that they pay.
A colleague of mine, Dr. Javier Arellano-Yanguas, has shown through very careful econometric work and field study that, in the last few years, the primary source of conflicts in Peru has been related to struggles over, and conflicts over, what to do with these tax transfers. Groups struggle to get access to local government to control those resources. Groups inside communities struggle to control those resources. Neighbouring administrative unions struggle to get increased access to those resources. The submission has an example, which I won't speak to now, that shows one case of how that works out in practice.
I have just a few words about conflicts. I want to say something about mining and pathways to development, related to this observation on conflict, because such conflict is undesirable in itself. It's a negative development outcome, but it also affects other possible links between mining and development.
Discussions on mining and development generally identify three pathways through which mining can contribute to development: through multiplier effects, such as employment service purchasing and so forth; through CSR and community development programs; and through these tax transfers to local authorities. These pathways, however, don't occur automatically. They require institutional, organizational, and social conditions to be in place if they are to operate. The first pathway needs organizations that will train skilled labour that can respond to the demands of companies. The second pathway requires that CSR and community development initiatives of companies have a degree of autonomy from the other operations of companies, so they can respond to development dynamics rather than mine dynamics. The third pathway, above all, requires relationships of trust and collaboration in society so that people can agree on what to do with these fiscal transfers, which are so significant.
There are critical questions there. Do those institutions that need to be there actually exist? Can they be built, and how easily? Does the presence of mining facilitate or undermine that process of building these institutions?
I think the answer to the first questions is very often, no, they don't exist. To the second, generally, yes. They can be built, but this takes time and should precede the expansion of mining. The troubling question is really the third one, because I think there's reasonable evidence to suggest that in many cases—and the comments on conflict beforehand suggest this—the presence of mining can undermine the very social institutional arrangements that need to exist for mining to be translated into development.
I won't speak anymore on that because my time's running out.
I want to say something now about legitimacy.
I shared a panel with a twice-former minister of energy and mines in Peru. The minister, by then, ex-minister, once said that what matters most is not legalities around mining, but questions of legitimacy. If distrust and uncertainty are so dominant in areas affected by mining, and if trust is so central to economic development and to the fostering of partnerships, and if actors and processes must have some legitimacy before others will begin to trust them, then it is absolutely vital to seek that legitimacy.
Of course, not all companies are of the same feather, but the point I think is an important one. If a Canadian company in northern Ecuador even appears to be associated with the use of force as it pursues its legal rights, what does that do for the possibilities of partnership and trust in the future? Or if a different Canadian company in Central America professes its commitment to development, but then pursues a legal case against the government of El Salvador for various tens of millions of dollars, how legitimate is its claim to being committed to development going to appear to the Government of El Salvador and the population of El Salvador? How will that contradictory combination of orientations affect the claims of other Canadian companies that they are committed to development?
Questions of legitimacy apply to the sector more generally, as well. As long as governments have minimal professional and technical capacity to exercise binding environmental oversight over companies, many people will simply not believe in the environmental claims of mining companies through no fault of the companies themselves. El Salvador's office to regulate mining, for instance, only has three professionals to regulate the whole sector, and none are trained in environmental or mining sciences.
Until the approval of environmental impact assessments and the monitoring of the environmental and social performance of mining companies are placed in autonomous environmental authorities that are independent of the executive office, the approval of environmental and social impact assessments will always have legitimacy problems with the population.
We conclude from our work so far that these are the sorts of long-term institution and capacity building that need to precede the expansion of mining, if that mining is going to have the legitimacy it needs to contribute to development. Once again, the link between mining and development is not a question of development projects. It's a question of institutional development and addressing institutional constraints.
Also related to these thoughts on legitimacy, I have one final observation. My comments have really not been Canada-specific, but the case of Canada does come up in our research and our interviews. I want to share three quotations—two are literal and one is paraphrased.
The first two are from a pretty middle-of-the road minister of environment in Latin America who is concerned with mining. He said to me, in the context of a discussion about mining and Canadian policy, “I don't know if Canada has been quite so discredited in its history.” Then he went on to say, “I don't think they really care.”
My paraphrasing of a quotation from a then sub-secretary in a ministry of energy and mines is, “As far as I can tell, the Canadian ambassador here is a representative for Canadian mining companies.”
It seems to me that these sorts of comments matter. They're not from raving, left-of-centre activists. They're not from MiningWatch. They're from politically appointed technocrats trying to build public policy, and address questions of poverty and vulnerability in very practical ways.
If someone were to say similar things about my faculty members in my department then I would conclude that something was seriously wrong.
Thank you very much.