Foreign Affairs Committee on March 7th, 2012

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), a briefing on the situation in Ukraine, we'll get started momentarily.

I want to let everyone know that probably in about 10 minutes we're going to have bells, which means we should all leave right away.

I want to seek unanimous consent to make sure we can at least hear the testimony before we come back, which would mean that we go to at least four o'clock. We'll still be back in the House with a lot of time because of where we are.

Do I have unanimous consent?

[Some hon. members]

Agreed.

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

Thank you very much. I also want to seek consent. We have a few extra members from the parties at the table again. I believe it's all right if they're all sitting here.

[Some hon. members]

Agreed.

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

Thank you very much.

Witnesses, we have a number of votes this afternoon and we apologize for that. We have five witnesses, and you can take about five minutes for testimony so that we can get it all. We will go to the House and we'll do our vote and come back here. I will apologize again. We may have to come back once or twice.

We have until 5:30, but I'm not sure exactly how long the votes will go. I'm just warning you that we'll probably have bells in about ten minutes.

It would be nice if we can get all the testimony. Gentlemen, I'm going to ask you to introduce yourselves very quickly when you speak and tell us what you're currently doing. Mr. Tarasyuk, we're going to get you to start first, sir, and then we're going to move across.

You have five minutes. Before you get started, Borys, I would like to welcome 25 guests from the BCU Foundation's youth leadership program—25 young Ukrainian Canadians from across Canada. To all the young Ukrainian Canadians, thank you very much for being here and welcome to our committee.

[Some hon. members]

Hear, hear!

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

We'll work to make sure we can get all the testimony in. Mr. Tarasyuk, you're going to start first.

Thank you.

[Borys Tarasyuk, As an Individual]

Good afternoon to everybody. I'm Borys Tarasyuk. I'm a member of the Ukraine Parliament; chairman of the committee on European integration; leader of the Rukh party, which led Ukraine to independence; and co-president of the Euronest Parliamentary Assembly.

Dear fellow parliamentarians, first of all, allow me to express my gratitude to you for paying attention to our country, to Ukraine. This is proof that you Canadian parliamentarians are keeping a close eye on what is going on in Europe and in my country, in particular. I have a special feeling for talking to Canadians, because back in 1991, the then Consul General of Canada to Ukraine, Nestor Gayowsky—who is sitting here—presented a verbal note to the Ukrainian government recognizing the independence of Ukraine. Canada was the first western country to recognize the independence of Ukraine, together with our neighbour, Poland.

Since that time on, Canada, and in particular, the Canadian Parliament, has kept a very good relationship with the Ukraine. I'm happy to say that there are a lot of ties connecting Ukrainians and Canadians because of the huge Ukrainian diaspora—the huge Ukrainian community here in Canada—which contributed a lot to the consolidation of the relationship between Ukraine and Canada after Ukraine resumed its independence back in 1991.

I'm happy to say that Canadian Ukrainians were the first to contribute to the development of the Ukrainian foreign policy infrastructure. This community was the first to present a gift to the Ukrainian government in the form of premises, which to this day are serving as the building of the Ukrainian embassy in Canada, and the building of the consular section of the Ukrainian embassy. I am trying to recognize the great contribution of all Canadians, and of Ukrainian Canadians, to the development of our relationship.

You are now having hearings on the course of democracy in Ukraine. I was told that you are trying to review democracy in Ukraine over the last 10 years. For me, this is very difficult to compare. I will try to help you by saying that the years before 2005 were the years when political forces—which are currently in power and have been since 2010—caused the retreat of democracy in Ukraine.

After the Orange Revolution victory, we had Ukrainian authorities who changed the country and the attitude towards democracy and freedom. As a result, according to the Freedom House index, Ukraine was transferred from a partly free country to a free country. Unfortunately, in just less than one year, the current authorities managed to return the Ukraine from free to partly free country, according to the Freedom House index. So this is the result of their two-year rule.

Unfortunately, the time limit doesn't allow me to explain the backsliding of democracy in Ukraine in a systemic way, but I would like to use this opportunity to ask you, members of the Canadian Parliament, to do whatever you decide necessary, but also to do what we, in Ukraine, expect of you.

We expect that Canada will continue to be an active country, being a member of the most prestigious unions, such as the G-8, the G-20, NATO, and the International Monetary Fund. Also, we expect—and here I am speaking as a member of the Ukrainian Parliament and a member of the opposition—that the results of these hearings in your committee will probably be a resolution by the Canadian Parliament on the situation in Ukraine.

We are moving towards a very important political event in Ukraine, that is the parliamentary elections coming this October 28. We expect that we will change the country. We, as the opposition, are representing the alternative to the current authorities in Ukraine.

We expect that the Canadian Parliament, Canadian NGOs, and first of all, the Ukrainian community will be as active as they used to be in the 2004 presidential elections in international observance missions.

Thank you very much.

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

Thank you, Mr. Tarasyuk. I apologize for the limited time we have.

I'm going to move over to Valentyn Nalyvaichenko.

[Valentyn Nalyvaichenko, As an Individual]

My name is Valentyn Nalyvaichenko, and I am the chairman of the political council of the Our Ukraine political party, and also here representing the NGO renewal of the country.

It's my pleasure today to address you, distinguished members of the Canadian Parliament. Let me start with the agenda of the opposition in Ukraine. We understand now that we have to be united. We really have to propose the agenda for Ukraine for the 21st century.

Let me start with expressing appreciation to your government, to you, for the Canadian physicians who have visited Yulia Tymoshenko in prison to examine her medically. They did a great job. We appreciate that and we'd like to encourage you to continue such missions. They are very important, especially for political prisoners currently in jail and imprisoned by the current authorities, by the regime of Mr. Yanukovych.

Let me also present my strong belief that the only effective means to oppose the existing authoritarian regime in my country are united opposition, a strong civil society, and fair elections.

As Mr. Tarasyuk mentioned, the upcoming elections are crucial and are of great importance for my country. We, as a united opposition, think the only force that can defend and free political prisoners—let me again mention Tymoshenko, Lutsenko, and other members of the opposition—must be united and studying from the same line in order to oppose the current events and the course of the current government.

The course it has chosen is clearly pro-Russian, Soviet-style, with no clear understanding of what Ukrainian independence means for all Ukrainians, what our history is, what our culture is, and what our Euro-integration and Euro-Atlantic aspirations are on the whole.

Again, let me bring your attention to the main point where we'd like to ask you, as distinguished members of Parliament, to support our democracy as much as you can by sending a broad-scale observation mission to Ukraine for the upcoming election, as you did during the Orange Revolution.

We thank our Ukrainian communities in Canada and the United States for conducting such very important missions. Let me again ask you to support, by all means—by governmental means, by parliamentary means—such an observation mission to Ukraine.

Let me conclude with the following. Geopolitically we understand what happened to Ukraine and what we expect from the so-called band of swindlers and thieves, currently back in power in Moscow, in Russia. We are talking about Mr. Putin's aspirations and plans to bring us back to the CIS, a USSR-style union, where we don't see any place for us as a democratic country as Ukrainians do not want to live again under the curtain of a Soviet-style regime.

Let me ask you to understand that the first target for the new, third term of Mr. Putin's presidency, of course, will be the independent Ukraine. It will be, by any means, trying to bring us back, to limit our liberties, and to limit Ukraine's independence. It will, by any means, provide pressure on foreign policy and domestic policy, and as much as it can, separate Ukraine from the western world—the democratic world—to show that the only alternative for such countries, for my country, is being back united again with Russia.

Thank you for your attention. Thank you very much.

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

Thank you very much.

We're going to move over to Marcin, if you could introduce yourself.

[Marcin Swiecicki, As an Individual]

My name is Marcin Swiecicki. I am a member of the Polish Parliament. I used to work in the Ukraine—for the last four years.

Mr. Chairperson and distinguished members of Parliament, it is my great pleasure to testify here in this meeting. Let me first start by reporting on the Polish and the European Union position on human rights and on the future of Ukraine.

The Polish position on Ukraine is determined by the thinking of the famous Polish émigré writer and editor, Jerzy Giedroyc, who in the 1970s had already formulated the so-called doctrine that independent and strong Ukraine, Belarus, and Baltic states are crucial for Polish independence and sovereignty.

That is why Poland was one of two first countries to recognize Ukrainian independence. At the beginning of this century, Poland was disappointed with the developments in Ukraine with regard to human rights, especially after Gongadze's murder. It was distasteful, even, to looking at our president at that time meeting with President Kuchma. However, it proved to be somehow useful later during the Orange Revolution, when President Kwasniewski took the role of mediator and facilitator of the agreements in Ukraine during the Orange Revolution.

The Orange Revolution was welcomed with great enthusiasm in Poland on the basis of solidarity—the same suffering under Communism. The young generation had their chance to participate in a great event, because they were too young at the time to participate in the Solidarity movement. The older generation—all politicians from all sides of the political spectrum—were coming to Maidan Nezalezhnosti to express their support for the fight for democracy and independence.

The developments after the Orange Revolution, from the point of view of human rights, the freedom of the press, freedom of association, and freedom of expression, were quite satisfactory for quite a long time. Although, less satisfactory in terms of the economic reforms, which were moving forward more slowly. What was disappointing for Poland at the time was that the European Union did not offer Ukraine the prospect of membership.

This requires a unanimous vote of the European Council. Only a majority vote in the European Parliament to adopt resolutions can offer such a prospect. Some countries in the European Union, unfortunately, were not offering their vote. We know from our experience that the prospect of membership is the most important factor—mobilizing, disciplining, showing direction for the modernization of the country. It played an enormous role in the accession process for the modernization of Poland and other central European countries. I think the same would be very beneficial also for Ukraine.

The second-best solution is what is on the table right now—the association agreement, which is a special association agreement that also provides for harmonization of legislation. According to the words of Philippe Cuisson, the chief negotiator on the European side, it can offer Ukraine the same legal status vis-à-vis the European Union as Norway and Switzerland have. After implementation, it wouldn't be a problem to join the European Union.

But there are obstacles in this, in particular regarding the human rights situation and the rule of law in Ukraine. Right now, there is a deterioration—the problem of imprisonment of Yulia Tymoshenko and other opposition leaders. There are unfair processes. There is also the deterioration of freedom in the media. All these are problems of great concern for the Polish authorities and Polish society, as well as for the European Union.

Therefore what I consider as crucial is to have fair elections, because this is also one of the conditions of ratifying the association agreement. For ratification, you need to have a vote of approval from 27 parliaments. It will be impossible under the present conditions to get such an approval.

So the assistance for the civil society that is very active in monitoring elections.... They are monitoring elections from the very beginning, registering the candidates, because some of them are intimidated. Access to the media is also very important. So it's not just the election but also the pre-election process and the campaigning that has to be monitored. That's very important.

In the long run, what is also important is the support for an independent society, independent think tanks and universities, etc. I think that part of the development egg should be transferred for the support of an independent society rather than to support some specific economic show of projects.

Regarding the geopolitical future, Ukraine right now is under enormous pressure from Russia. Russia wants to prevent this association agreement, but if Ukraine succeeds in modernization, if Ukraine succeeds in implementing its European aspiration, I think it will also be a very good example for Russia, for all these forces in Russia who are in the minority, but who are fighting for democracy and modernization and a rule-by-law Russia. If Ukraine fails, of course, it will be a disaster because it will nourish all this nostalgia for imperium, for an extension of their influence.

Thank you very much.

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

Thank you very much.

Mr. James Sherr, the floor is yours.

[James Sherr, As an Individual]

My name is James Sherr. I am the senior fellow of the Russia and Eurasia Programme of Chatham House, the Royal Institute of International Affairs, in London.

Chairman, distinguished members of this committee, I have been asked to speak about Russia's response to Ukraine's European policy. That response is proactive, multidimensional, and hostile.

Integration with the European Union represents a civilizational choice, and successful integration would have civilizational consequences not only for Ukraine but for Russia itself. For Russia's governing elite and much of Russia's society, Ukraine is a part of Russia's own identity. This is also true for many of the most liberal opponents of the Putin system who subscribe faithfully to Vernadsky's axiom that Russian democracy ends where the question of Ukraine begins.

For the illiberal Russian state that exists today, identity politics play a central role in foreign policy and they exacerbate every other serious issue—geopolitical, geo-economic, commercial, and security—in the relationship between Ukraine and Russia.

The second reality I wish to discuss is the EU itself. Within the past 10 years, Moscow's views about the European Union have changed decidedly for the worse. In the 1990s, there was a positive attitude about the strengthening of the EU because the EU was seen as a geopolitical counterweight to NATO and the United States. Today, Russians now correctly understand that the EU is first and foremost a project and mechanism of integration on the basis of a sociopolitical and business model different from and antithetical to those that prevail in the post-Soviet states. That model in the post-Soviet states is driven by networks rather than markets. It is producer- rather than consumer-oriented. It is monopolistic rather than competitive in ethos. It is not built on property rights and judicial integrity, but on patron-client relationships, negotiable legal order, and privileged relations at all levels between business and structures of power.

It is also a model based on co-optation and money—lots of money—which is not only being used to reward the networks that sustain it, but to expand those networks and undermine the rules-based ethos and regulatory structures of the EU member states.

My penultimate point is that despite all I have said, the greatest obstacle to Ukraine's EU integration is not Russia but Ukraine itself, specifically the Yanukovych regime and the interests that sustain it. President Yanukovych is an individual who is impervious to his own inability to understand the premises upon which EU integration is based. For him, the EU is about markets, not about making the changes that would enable Ukraine to exploit these markets to its own benefit.

It is doubtless true that Yanukovych would prefer an association agreement with the EU to integration into the Russia-sponsored CIS customs union. But the bigger truth is that Yanukovych would rather be president of a Ukraine reintegrating with Russia, than not be president of a Ukraine integrating with the European Union.

In view of the time constraints, I will leave my final point—the issue of what Canada can do—for our Q and A.

Thank you very much.

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

Thank you, Mr. Sherr.

We'll now finish off with Mr. Piontkovsky.

You have five minutes, sir.

[Andrei Piontkovsky, As an Individual]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

My name is Andrei Piontkovsky. I am a senior fellow of the Russian Academy of Sciences, and a member of the ruling body of anti-Putin opposition, Movement Solidarnost.

I came from Russia just after the so-called election organized by the Putin regime. It was not an election, but a special operation of the Putin kleptocracy on legitimizing its lifetime rule. This so-called election was falsified long before the day of voting, first of all, by barring any opposition candidates from participating in it. Putin himself selected four clowns to orchestrate this special operation.

The subject of Ukraine was very strongly present during this operation. The main slogan of the Putin propaganda was “Stop the orange plague”. They tried to portray the Orange Revolution in Ukraine as a conspiracy of the west, and especially the United States, to dismantle Ukraine, Russia, and other states of the former Soviet space.

I have been frequently asked by U.S. and western audiences about how they can help the cause of democracy in Russia. I always answer that it's rather difficult to help Russia. Russia is a huge country. The most efficient way to help Russia is to help Ukraine. Help Ukraine, and help Ukraine deliver a success story of developing an Euro-Atlantic option. This success story will become the crucial argument in the battle inside Russia between the proponents and enemies of democracy. But the west, especially European Union giants France and Germany, did everything to discourage the European aspirations of the Ukrainian people during the Yushchenko presidency.

My recommendation to the distinguished members of the foreign affairs committee is the same as my Polish colleague: help today. Help the Ukrainian democracy, morally and politically, win in this year's parliamentary election. In today's Russia, the Putin regime has lost all political discourse and narrative. His kleptocracy alienated all creative elements of society, but still kept power. In this unstable balance, the success of our sister country on the road to democracy and European development will be decisive, not only for Ukraine itself, but for Russia and for all the post-Soviet space.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

Thank you.

To our witnesses, thank you very much. I have to suspend the meeting. We have votes in about 12 minutes. Hopefully we'll be back around 4:30.

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

Thank you very much. I apologize again. This will be the last time I apologize for the bells, but we are going to have additional bells, probably in about three or four minutes. What we're going to try to do is get in as many rounds as we can. There are going to be 30-minute bells again, which is going to confuse the rest of the afternoon.

We'll get started right away. We're going to go for five minutes, back and forth, as quickly as possible. The bells will go again. I'll just let the witnesses know that we'll continue for about 15 minutes or so. We'll get in as many questions as we can. Then we're probably going to have to conclude the meeting, because we're going to be back into that again.

I'm going to move over to Ms. Latendresse, who is going to have the first round. You have five minutes.

[Alexandrine Latendresse, NDP, Louis-Saint-Laurent, QC]

I would like to start by saying diakuyou douje, thank you very much.

Thank you very much for your presentation.

And thank you for being here to explain this to us.

Anyone who would like to answer can.

Do you think that the west should focus its efforts on one country in the region, lend its support, and hope that the transition toward democracy ends up bringing democracy to the other four countries around it—Moldava, Ukraine, Belarus and Russia?

Do you think it would be better to focus on one country in particular, rather than spread the effort around? We can see that this is what happened in Caucasus, because Georgia, which is increasingly democratic, is helping the two other countries this way and moving them toward democracy.

I'd like to hear your comments on this, if possible.

Thank you.

[Valentyn Nalyvaichenko]

Let me start with the following.

Of course, Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, and the Baltic States, all should be protected against the new plans of Mr. Putin for a so-called expansion of the former USSR—the so-called CIS, Customs Union, or another Eurasian union.

Even more, in Ukraine we are now thinking that, with our friends from Georgia, Lithuania, and Moldova, we could establish some kind of NGO or something—friends of democracy—that would include all of these countries. I mean, Moldova and Ukraine are in opposition now, but nevertheless, the civil society from Ukraine, the NGOs, and Georgia—that's the best way we could respond to any new expansion plans from Mr. Putin's administration.

[Borys Tarasyuk]

Thank you for your question.

Of course, being a Ukrainian and being in the Ukraine, sure, I would prefer that the efforts of our friends are concentrated in Ukraine. But to be serious, I would like to say that when democracy gained victory in Ukraine, it was Ukraine that initiated the coordination and the union of like-minded democratic countries in the area, from the Baltic states to the Black Sea through to the Caspian Sea. We created, together with Georgia, the community known as the Community of Democratic Choice.

What I am trying to say is that the more effort you allow to help democracy in Ukraine, which is the biggest country in the region and in Europe, the better.

Thank you.

[Marcin Swiecicki]

No democratic forces in any country should be abandoned when they are fighting for democracy and freedom. But at this moment, I think, and in general, if you look at the map, Ukraine is the most important country, and really, foreign assistance can tip the balance. So I would dare to say that Ukraine is crucial in this part of the world for democratic transformation.

[Alexandrine Latendresse, NDP, Louis-Saint-Laurent, QC]

We are often told that, to improve democracy in Ukraine in particular, the ideal would be to give direct support to the civil society. This would allow us to establish democracy afterwards, through a pyramid effect.

Where could we focus our efforts, within the civil groups, to improve democracy in Ukraine?

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

It's in order to foster democracy.

[Borys Tarasyuk]

Thank you for this question. Indeed, civil society in Ukraine is a very important factor in bringing Ukraine to democracy. It was the maturity of the civil society that brought the victory of democracy in Ukraine during the Orange Revolution. A lot of analysts had doubts about the maturity of civil society in Ukraine before 2004, but 2004 proved that the civil society in Ukraine is very strong and is a very influential force for bringing democracy into Ukraine.

What I would like to say is that we are expecting that the Canadian government and the Canadian Parliament will pay enough attention to support civil society in Ukraine, which requires its support, especially taking into account the undemocratic trends of the current authorities.

Thank you.