First is to emphasize the language that we're not interested in reforming the Arctic Council; that we don't want to make it into a treaty-based organization. In fact, it works fine the way it is. Instead, it's a case of strengthening what's already there.
China and the European Union are already sitting as ad hoc observers, so their being granted permanent observer status doesn't necessarily change the practical look of the room itself. They're still sitting in the back rows watching what's going on during the main meetings.
But at the end of the day, those criteria setting up the possibility to put conditions on permanent observer status—“If you're going to be here, you must be contributing money”—which helps keep the Arctic Council functioning at the practical working group level, but also on the part of the permanent participants being able to represent the north at these meetings.... That's very key.
There's also a very tricky line, in terms of those criteria, saying that any permanent observer must recognize the legal rights of the coastal states. That's challenging, when we come back to the questions about the Northwest Passage. Which legal interpretation do you side with? If there literally is a difference in legal position, how do you navigate that and still meet the criteria?
Again, as I was suggesting, when Canada is chair...just because we have the Nuuk declaration, where these criteria are set out, I don't think the permanent observer issue has been settled, and as much as those criteria are taking us a couple of steps towards clarity, it's still as fuzzy as heck for me at this point.