Yes, sir. I think generally speaking we can say that the French offensive operations were mounted extremely quickly, very professionally, and indeed have been very effective to this point in time.
Over a very short period they have served to do two things: primarily to stop the southern advance of the rebels, as Ms. Buck has indicated; and actually to reverse that such that they are now being pushed above the Gao-Timbuktu line, in fact all the way up to Kidal, a city where the MNLA are prominent.
To be sure, there has been some attrition of hardened terrorist elements, AQIM and others, and some attrition of Islamist extremist rebel groups. But largely speaking, from the very beginning of the operation, the rebels started to melt back and were pushed out of the towns. There's been some attrition, but lots remain, particularly in the mountainous region bordering Algeria.
The French would intend to take advantage of any political rapprochement that would occur and use this period to then support the arrival of AFISMA forces that would then start to conduct operations in Mali, both to secure Mali and to set conditions for a training mission, and while the EU training mission mounts, such that they can be effectively rebuilding the Malian forces.
The one thing I would leave you with is that the description of the intertribal, inter-group relationship is one thing that's extremely complex, as we know. I think we've done a very good job of understanding to this point in time, but it would be impossible for us to say at this point in time what the regional Islamist radical threat will do as a result of what's happened in Mali.
I think there's a very sound plan and approach. We have yet to see what the response is. If you think of all-up numbers, generally speaking the trend is a growth of Islamist extremism in the area. If that trend continues, this will help Mali, but of course there remains the regional concern.